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Abstract 
Visible Deliverances:  
The Fact and Figure of Miracle in Eighteenth-Century America 
by 
Nicholas Mason Junkerman 
Doctor of Philosophy in English 
University of California, Berkeley 
Professor Mitchell Breitwieser, Chair 
 
In my dissertation, “Visible Deliverances: The Fact and Figure of Miracle in Eighteenth- 
Century America,” I argue that the idea of the miraculous was a vital resource for the 
representation of physical and spiritual experience in eighteenth century America.  If the 
peculiar power of a miracle is that it can disrupt apparently fundamental systems like time 
and causation, that same unique power constituted its great virtue for the Protestant 
thinkers in my study.  The idea of the miraculous suspension of natural law dramatized 
the subordination of all perceived order to the will of God.  Consequently this shock of 
divine power was a useful construct for the purposes of pious exhortation.  In a deeper 
sense, however, it allowed the clerical writers I focus on to imagine the link between 
divine power and the contingent structures of human understanding. In “Visible 
Deliverances” I argue that this work of writing the human relation to the divine through 
miracle took place in the imaginative space of literary representation.  Faced with the 
incommensurability of human perception and divine force, these writers turned to 
allusive figural strategies.  It was only figural comparison – a practice of spiritualizing 
analogy – that could place human experience in a defensible relation to the immensity of 
God’s greatest works of power.  In an initial chapter on miracles stories in Cotton 
Mather’s medical writing, I argue that he advocated for these stories as necessary 
evidence for understanding the full scope of physical experience.  In my second chapter I 
read George Whitefield’s sermons on Christ’s miracles in the context of early-eighteenth-
century English religious controversies. In a final chapter, I describe the complexity of 
Jonathan Edwards’ approach to the persistence of miraculous power in the world, an idea 
that he disavowed but could not fully relinquish.  Ultimately I argue that the principle of 
contemporary miracle is what allows these writers to describe the full power of the 
essential evangelical experience of spiritual rebirth. 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. The Meanings of Miracle 
In the tenth section of his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, David Hume 
grounds a skeptical account of miracles in the unreliability of human testimony.  
Interestingly, that unreliability, and the threat that it poses to a correct estimation of the 
truth of miracle, is for Hume partly a question of pleasure: 
The passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable 
emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief in those events from which it 
is derived.  And this goes so far, that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure 
immediately, nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are informed, 
yet love to partake of the satisfaction at second-hand, or by rebound, and place a 
pride and delight in exciting the admiration of others.1 
Here the delights and the dangers of miracle have a strikingly literary character.  To the 
extent that those who credit such testimony give themselves over to the pleasure of 
miraculous narrative, they wrongly subdue their rational impulses.  As a consequence, the 
pleasure of surprising narratives is destructive to the soundness of religion:  “[I]f the spirit 
of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense; and human 
testimony, in these circumstances, loses all pretensions to authority.”2  Hume’s point is 
intentionally limited.  He does not attack the possibility of miracles themselves, but rather 
suggests that no story about a miracle could be sufficient proof of the reality of the 
phenomenon.  Whether he meant thereby to discredit the concept of miracle entirely has 
been a matter of considerable debate.3 
Yet Hume’s emphasis on the dubious pleasures of testimony, and his need to 
segregate the authority of religion from the “love of wonder” is an important point in its 
own right.  It directs his readers toward a crucial observation on the nature of miracles–
that they tend to be transmitted, understood, and debated through the material of 
narrative.  Even when evaluating the general status of the miraculous, its claim to truth 
we inevitably recur to testimony, as Hume realized.  Those testimonies describe an event 
located in a context, and embedded in a temporal sequence.  They tell a story, and in so 
doing they capitalize on our love of stories.  In Hume’s account this fact is asserted in 
order to diminish the miraculous, and beyond that to place the supposed evidentiary 
foundations of the Christian religion in the disreputable company of tale-telling, and our 
fallible desires.  Yet even less corrosive accounts of Christian miracle must reckon with 
the consequences of Hume’s assertion.  For the vast majority of people in all times and 
places, miracles appear at second-hand, and their supposedly ultimate significance must 
                                                
1 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Lorne Falkenstein (Peterborough, 
ON: Broadview Press, 2011), 152–3. 
2 Ibid., 153. 
3 A careful and interesting discussion of this question can be found in: R. M Burns, The Great 
Debate on Miracles: From Joseph Glanvill to David Hume (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 
1981), 142–175;  for another examination of the question in the context of more recent 
scholarship see: Robert J. Fogelin, A Defense of Hume on Miracles (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2003). 
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be framed in narrative.  This is a study of the way that those stories were told, the ways in 
which miracles were described and deployed in the English-speaking Protestant discourse 
of the eighteenth-century America.  My particular focus is on the use of miracle 
narratives, both contemporary and historical, by ministers writing and preaching in the 
American colonies from the 1720s through the 1750s.  In that period, in spite of (and 
sometimes in response to) a vibrant but fairly isolated skeptical tradition, miracle 
continued to function as a valued evidentiary resource, a crucial tool for exhortation and 
a means of investigating the relation between the divine and the natural.  In criticizing the 
“pride and delight” of those who testified to miracles, and the “satisfaction” of those who 
listened to them or read their accounts, Hume was not poking at a dying tradition.  He 
was chipping away at one of the major intellectual and spiritual resources of eighteenth-
century Protestantism.   
Before delving into the intellectual and spiritual significance of miracle in the 
eighteenth century, it’s helpful to consider the parameters of the idea.  What exactly did 
the word “miracle” signify in the Anglo-American Protestant tradition of the eighteenth 
century?  For Hume, the violation of natural law was the determining factor, as he makes 
clear in a footnote to the tenth section of the Enquiry:  “A miracle may be accurately 
defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the 
interposal of some invisible agent.  A miracle may either be discoverable by men or not.  
This alters not its nature and essence.”4  It is significant that Hume could confidently 
advance the “miracle” as a concrete category.  As Peter Harrison has pointed out, this is 
not a reflection of any terminological consistency in scripture, where “those events 
typically identified as miracles are variously described as ‘signs’ (semeia), ‘wonders’ 
(terata), ‘mighty works’ (dunameis), and on occasion, simply ‘works’ (erga).”  For 
Harrison, this variety suggests “that the authors of the Gospels were not working with a 
formal conception of ‘miracle’–at least not in that Humean sense of a ‘contravention of 
the laws of nature’ familiar to modern readers.”5  What would become the accepted 
association between miracle and natural law was a product of centuries of reflection on 
the topic.  Yet the apparent simplicity and convenience of the definition obscures 
considerable complexities.  Many of these definitional problems emerged from the 
practical questions that naturally proceed from the theoretical principle.  How, exactly, 
was a miracle to be identified?  Who could define the limits of the natural?  How might 
one distinguish between a merely unusual natural event and a truly miraculous one?  
These were questions that engaged the great early virtuosi of the Royal Society, including 
Boyle, Newton and Clarke, who sought to reconcile the evolution of mechanical 
philosophy with the apologetic needs of Christianity.6   
Some skeptical thinkers were much less concerned with saving appearances.  
Indeed, almost a century before Hume wrote the Enquiry, the notion of separate natural 
and supernatural orders of God’s action in the world had provided Spinoza with the 
grounds for his audacious critique of the miraculous, one that goes much farther than 
Hume’s.  According to Spinoza, the idea that natural law could be violated reduces the 
                                                
4 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 165. 
5 Peter Harrison, “Miracles, Early Modern Science, and Rational Religion,” Church History 75, no. 
3 (2006): 493. 
6 Peter Harrison, “Newtonian Science, Miracles, and the Laws of Nature,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 56, no. 4 (October 1995), 531–53. 
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concept of law to meaninglessness.  That conclusion is the foundation of the central 
dictum in his rejection of miracles: “whatever is contrary to Nature is contrary to reason, 
and whatever is contrary to reason is absurd, and therefore should be rejected.”7  
Spinoza’s critique has the effect of yoking miracles to a strong and particular concept of 
natural law, even if only as a means of denying their existence.  Much like Hume, he 
found one of the roots of this troublingly credulous faith in miracles in the pleasures of 
their reception.  This is linked to Spinoza’s sense of the textual objectives of the Bible, and 
their formal consequences.  Scripture, for Spinoza, is not natural philosophy.  It aims at 
“narrating what appeals to the popular imagination.”8  Since the text is designed to 
increase devotion, it uses the metaphorical and poetic language of wonder to describe 
natural events.  This approach is reminiscent of that of Thomas Hobbes, another 
important skeptical voice on miracles in the mid-seventeenth century.  For Hobbes, the 
commonly accepted definition of a miracle begins with reception, with the admiration 
produced by the miraculous event.  “By miracles are signified the admirable works of 
God; and therefore they are also called wonders.”  To understand the idea of miracle is to 
understand what it is that produces wonder: “[T]here be but two things that make a man 
wonder at any event: the one is, if it be strange, that is to say such as the like of it hath 
never, or very rarely, been produced; the other is if, when it is produced, we cannot 
imagine it to have been done by natural means, but only by the immediate hand of 
God.”9  For Hobbes, it is the subjective nature of this admiration, and the hunger for it, 
that makes men vulnerable to the considerable threat of imposture, to those false miracles 
that are to be distinguished from the true miracles of scripture.  The accounts of both 
Hobbes and Spinoza suggest how efforts to arrive at a precise definition of the miraculous 
were twined together with the pleasures of reception.  A theoretically pure expression of 
miraculous power was difficult to disentangle from the intellectual and affective response 
of the one who experienced it or especially, as Hume emphasized, from the reader or 
hearer who receives it at second hand.   
This dual understanding of miracle, as both a thing that might or might not exist 
in the world and also as an experience to be marveled at, is characteristic of seventeenth-
century American thought as well: In his seminal book on popular faith in seventeenth 
century New England, Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment, David Hall describes an 
incredible variety of unusual events that went under the name of “wonders.” This 
category encompassed not merely those things that clearly violated all precedent set by 
the experience of nature (like ghost ships and armies in the sky), but also “any event 
people perceived as disrupting the normal order of things-a deformity of nature such as a 
‘monster’ birth, a storm or devastating fire.”10  According to Hall, the wonder lore of the 
seventeenth century was grounded in meteorology, prophecy, apocalyptic prophecy and 
natural philosophy.  As a consequence, a compilation of wonder stories entitled Miracle of 
Miracles could concern itself with earthquakes and comets, as well as the immediate 
execution of sinners by fire sent from the sky.  The variety and notoriety of the events 
outweighed the desire for precise categorization. As Hall puts it, “Strictly speaking, a 
                                                
7 Baruch Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 80. 
8 Ibid., 90. 
9 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994), 293. 
10 David D Hall, Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment:  Popular Religious Belief in Early New England 
(New York: Knopf, 1989), 71–72. 
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‘wonder’ was distinct from a ‘miracle,’ though in everyday discourse, and even among the 
ministry, the two words became interchangeable.”11  This was not, in other words, an 
instance of rampant folk superstition contrasting with elite discernment, but a more 
general indication of an early colonial culture that did not fix on “miracles” as a primary 
and particular mode of categorizing divine action in the world.  
By the third decade of the eighteenth century, the picture is considerably changed.  
For the writers in my dissertation, the miraculous is a much more tightly controlled 
category.  Rather than being synonymous with providential intervention of all kinds, it 
tends to denote only the most persuasively and disruptively supernatural events, with a 
special focus on the miraculous actions of Christ.  Those events are further limited in the 
Protestant context by an increasing interest in temporal restrictions, in identifying the 
point in human history after which miracles had ceased.  The outlines of this shift toward 
a more limited idea of the miraculous are consistent with now familiar models of cultural 
change in Western culture from the late seventeenth to the early eighteenth century.  For 
example, the world of wonders described by Hall bears a striking resemblance to the 
epistemological regime that Foucault identifies with the Renaissance.  In one instance 
Hall describes a single English ballad that “spoke of blazing stars, monstrous births, a 
rainstorm of blood, lightning, rainbows, and the sound of great guns.”12  The striking 
variety of these catalogues makes them appear like aleatory assemblages of remarkables.  
Yet for Foucault this is typical of the Renaissance episteme, the world of “legenda,” in 
which “nature, in itself, is an unbroken tissue of words and signs, of accounts and 
characters, of discourse and forms.”13  Thus, the organization of the collections of wonder 
stories is based not on their nature, but on their significance.  In the Renaissance 
episteme, “[t]he function proper to knowledge is not seeing or demonstrating; it is 
interpreting.”14  In light of Foucault’s analysis, the lack of attention to the distinction 
between “wonder” and “miracle” looks less like a pre-modern failure of rationality.  
Instead it reflects an interest in how events are to be interpreted, rather than how they 
should be categorized.  If a Renaissance chronicler understands a rainbow and a rain of 
blood as speaking indications of the will of God, the fact that the second looks much more 
like a violation of the ordinary course of nature might well seem less salient.  For 
Foucault, it is only in the succeeding “Classical” episteme, the dominant regime of 
knowledge in the eighteenth century, that order, tabulation and taxonomy became 
primary characteristics of the epistemological field.  Foucault is careful to distinguish his 
larger argument from a narrative of the emergence of rationalism.  Indeed, the very 
concept of a shift from the Renaissance to the Classical episteme implies the disruption of 
the smooth progression from superstition to reason.  What really matters is the not the 
“surface appearance” of the “uninterrupted development of the European ratio” 15 but the 
underlying and fundamental changes in the structure of knowledge. 
Foucault’s analysis, especially when examined in conjunction with the body of 
wonder literature chronicled by Hall, raises questions about whether there is such a thing 
                                                
11 Ibid., 72n2. 
12 Ibid., 73. 
13 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things; an Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1994), 40. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., xxii. 
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as a continuous concept of “miracle” between the writers I study and their predecessors in 
the English and American Protestant traditions.  To be sure, there are elements of 
continuity.  Increase Mather was one of the major American accumulators of wonder 
lore, and the form (and some of the content) of those tales is echoed in his son Cotton’s 
extraordinary medical cases, as well as in the healing narratives that crop up throughout 
the American eighteenth century. 16  Nonetheless, as I suggest above, there is a 
difference–a general confinement of miracle to a narrower band of theological usages.  
Ultimately, this idea of a shifting sense of miracle matters to my dissertation because it 
helps to identify the parameters of the subject in the cultural moment I describe.  
Although the evidence I examine relates to issues like the reach of Enlightenment and 
possible itineraries of secularization in America, this study is not primarily focused on 
explaining the origins or the degree of a possible epistemic shift in American ideas about 
the supernatural, or on tracing a general history of colonial miracles.  What fascinates me 
is the durability and the consistent appeal of this particular category of supernatural 
activity in the second quarter of the eighteenth century.  The animating question here is 
how and why, in the face of the generally declining prestige of wonder lore (and its 
subcategories like tales of witchcraft, anecdotes of remarkable providences and so forth) 
did the idea of miracles continue to matter?17  In other words, why miracle?  Why in this 
moment, would these writers return to the idea of disruptive divine action in the world?  
How do they understand the importance of the idea of the event of immediate divine 
action?  This is an account of the particular requirements that eighteenth century 
American culture brought to the spiritual and intellectual concept of miracle, and the 
writings that they produced as a result.  I’ll summarize those particulars below, and detail 
them across the chapters that follow in an effort partly to describe a particular problem in 
the history of American Protestantism, but also to reveal the imaginative power of this 
discourse, and the literary effects it produced. 
 
2. Miracle and Ministerial Speech 
 Most simply, Cotton Mather, George Whitefield and Jonathan Edwards turned to 
miracles as a resource because they were all ministers.  The importance of this common 
professional and spiritual commitment would be hard to overstate.  For each man miracle 
mattered most as a means of doing saving work in the world.  Thus, although they all 
show an interest in the history and the limits of the miraculous, this remains a question of 
the spirit, of the ways in which the fact and figure of miracle could be used to facilitate the 
understanding, the strengthening and the expansion of the Christian religion.  In other 
words, the nature of the miraculous thing mattered, but its greatest importance lay in its 
purpose.  Miracles were necessarily worked for a reason equal to the excellency of the 
divine cause, as Edwards argues in his Freedom of the Will: 
For the moral world is the end of the natural world; and the course of things in the 
latter, is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with respect to the former.  
Therefore he has seen cause, from regard to the state of things in the moral world, 
extraordinarily to interpose, to interrupt and lay an arrest on the course of things 
                                                
16 Hall, Worlds of Wonder, 104–110. 
17 A classic account of this shift can be found in Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic 
(New York: Scribner, 1971), 570-83, 641-68.  
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in the natural world; and even in the greater wheels of its motion; even so as to 
stop the sun in its course.18 
Edwards’ emphasis on the supremacy of the moral world is indicative of both the formal 
and the functional status of the works under consideration in the following chapters.  In 
this study I limit my focus almost exclusively to ministerial writing.  More particularly, I 
trace the use and investigation of miracle among several major figures of an emergent 
American evangelical Calvinism.  As a result, this dissertation does not seek to account for 
the totality of American miracle writing in the eighteenth century, but rather to describe a 
particular and important strain of thinking on the subject.  In limiting the scope of my 
study, however, I do not mean to imply that the interests of these writers were exclusively 
parochial.  Indeed, one of my contentions throughout this dissertation is that this 
particular eighteenth century American understanding of the meaning of miracle was 
profoundly shaped by its participation in a larger transatlantic Protestant imaginary.  Nor 
do the writers in question, especially Mather and Edwards, seem especially limited by 
developing professional limits on intellectual exploration.  They consider miracle in 
philosophical, medical and natural historical frames, as well as from a more explicitly 
theological and exegetical perspective.  But their interest in the subject is always, at its 
root, centered in explaining and promoting the significance of Christ. 
 Recognizing the intensity and the consuming seriousness of that task is essential to 
understanding the writings that I analyze here.  For each of these authors, all the possible 
natural and supernatural operations of the universe cohere around and subserve to the 
fact of Christ’s existence.  It is precisely this commitment that Alain Badiou emphasizes in 
his consideration of Pascal’s writings on miracle.  What fascinates Badiou about Pascal is 
the apparent perversity of his attachment to miracles:  “[W]hy does this open-minded 
scientist, this entirely modern mind, absolutely insist upon justifying Christianity by what 
would appear to be its weakest point for post-Galilean rationality, that is, the doctrine of 
miracles?”19  This question might also be directed toward the apparent incongruity of the 
continuing prestige of miracles in the eighteenth century, and for that reason Badiou’s 
response is illuminating.  The answer at which he arrives has everything to do with the 
special status of miracle, which he sees as “the emblem of the pure event as resource of 
truth.”20  The link between the miracle and the “event” is grounded, most generally, in 
his sense that both are entirely divorced from their situations.  They appear within a 
context, but are not in any way produced by it.  Indeed, the event, like the miracle, is 
defined by the way in which it ruptures expected order:  “A truth is solely constituted by 
rupturing with the order which supports it, never as an effect of that order.  I have named 
this type of rupture which opens up truths ‘the event.’”21  It is the work of Christians, 
then, to maintain and promulgate a faith in the miracle of the incarnation of God.  Pascal 
is, for Badiou, an exemplary case of a necessarily militant fidelity to that event.  This work 
is carried out in a more general sense, however, by the institutional body of the Church:  
“Amongst the Christians, the Church, the first institution in human history to pretend to 
universality–organizes fidelity to the Christ-event, and explicitly designates those who 
                                                
18 Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 1 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957), 251. 
19 Alain Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2005), 215. 
20 Ibid., 216. 
21 Ibid., xii. 
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support it in this task as ‘the faithful.’”22  The role of miracles then is not to enforce belief, 
to crush any possibility of doubt, but to provide the grounds for fidelity, and the role of 
the cleric is to maintain focus on (and faith in) the immutable, non-contingent, and 
specific fact that is Christ. 
 This, at its heart, is the task that preoccupies Mather, Whitefield and Edwards, 
who are ministerial speakers above all else.  This commitment, this unvarying 
requirement to “organize fidelity to the Christ-event” begins to suggest how and why 
miracles continued to function for the eighteenth century American faithful as a 
contemplative and spiritual resource.  Yet if the status of the miracle-as-event is similar in 
these two instances, the strategies for representing that event are dependent on the 
cultural contexts.  Where the Catholic Pascal understands Christ’s sacrifice as the 
essential feature of the miracle of his incarnation, and venerates the Cross accordingly, 
the Protestants in this study turn invariably toward the resurrection, almost to the 
exclusion of Christ’s death. That second birth is for them the defining miracle of the 
gospels, the type both of the resurrections that precede it in the Gospels and of the New 
Birth that will succeed it in the spiritual lives of the faithful. 
 This focus on the New Birth marks the emergence of a major trend in American 
religious life.  As Richard Lovelace puts it in The American Pietism of Cotton Mather:  “One of 
the identifying marks of the evangelical tradition descending from the eighteenth-century 
awakenings had been the insistence on spiritual rebirth as the indispensable first 
experience of all genuine believers.”23  In placing Cotton Mather toward the head of this 
long line, Lovelace allows that Mather does not always prioritize the distinction between 
the specific idea of rebirth and other categories of faithful experience like conversion.  
Nonetheless, he argues persuasively for Mather’s belief in a firmly Calvinist notion of 
spiritual transformation originating outside of the believer, a wonderful regeneration 
beyond all human power.  This rigorous faith points toward an important set of 
commonalities between the authors I discuss, shared interests that bear directly on their 
writings about miracle.  Each of my three central figures remained staunch Calvinists, 
even as some of their contemporaries strayed from the path.  All were nostalgic admirers 
of seventeenth century American Puritanism, although even in Mather, a direct heir to its 
theological and cultural institutions, there is a sense that the movement’s moment has 
passed.24  All three were also caught up in the broader transnational ferments of pietism 
and revivalism that occupied the Protestant world in the first half of the eighteenth 
century.  In other words, I am partly concerned here with the emergence of what would 
come to be called evangelicalism in America.  I approach that development by examining 
one particularly important representational strategy, one way that a strain of American 
religious thought understood itself and attempted to communicate its truths to the 
faithful.  Protestants writing and preaching in American were able to make both rational 
and spiritual work of the idea of a miracle because it powerfully represented the 
                                                
22 Ibid., 214. 
23 Richard F. Lovelace, The American Pietism of Cotton Mather:  Origins of American Evangelicalism 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Christian University Press, 1979), 73. 
24 Whether that “movement” had ever existed in a stable historiographical sense is another 
question: see Michael P. Winship, “Were There Any Puritans in New England?,” The New England 
Quarterly 74, no. 1 (March 2001): 118–38.   
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disruptive force of the central evangelical conviction–that the believer must be born 
again.   
References to New Birth and regeneration make use of an analogical form, but 
they are not metaphors.  To the Calvinist evangelical of the eighteenth century, the 
rebirth of Christ and the resurrection of the faithful have the same motive force–both 
depend upon the atemporal, non-conditional and entirely arbitrary will and power of 
Christ.  In other words, the New Birth continually recreates the disruptive event of 
Christ’s resurrection.  Here is how Jonathan Edwards frames that essential idea, in a 
commentary on the second chapter of Ephesians:  
Therefore the apostle compares the work of God, in forming Christians to true 
virtue and holiness, not only to a new creation, but a resurrection, or raising from 
the dead (v. 1), ‘You hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins’.… 
In speaking of Christians being quickened in Christ, the apostle hath reference to 
what he had said before…of God’s manifesting the exceeding greatness of his 
power toward Christian converts, in their conversion, agreeable to the operation 
of his mighty power, when he raised Christ from the dead.25 
He begins with the idea of similitude, as the apostle “compares” these two mighty works, 
but progresses to the notion that these two operations are “agreeable.”  The resurrection 
of the soul and that of Christ’s body share an intellectual resemblance, but they are more 
powerfully united in their source and purpose.  This is the representational dance of 
resemblance and cooperation–the elaboration and expansion of miracle in the space of 
language.  
 
3. Miracle as Resource and Threat 
The possible benefit of a reliance on miraculous evidence was compelling for the 
writers in my dissertation.  The idea of God’s immediate intervention in the world offered 
a means of strengthening the commitment of the faithful by indicating, even at second 
hand, a proof beyond doubt of the existence, power and sovereignty of God.  This is very 
much how Edwards understands resurrection:  “I can think of no other miracle whatever 
that would be so full an evidence and manifestation of the finger of God; it must therefore 
be a certain evidence of the truth of that that it is done in confirmation of.”26  Yet even in 
this brief and confident assertion, there is an indication of the double-edged nature of 
miracle.  If resurrection is the most persuasive form of miraculous evidence imaginable, 
then it follows that there are other miracles that provide less persuasive proof.  What 
about the limit cases, the more minor orders of healing?  What about the possibility of 
imposture?  Rather than being just a local issue in Edwards, I would argue that this is an 
example of miracle’s inherent resistance to rhetorical and doctrinal control.  If disruptive 
miraculous power presented itself as a spiritual resource in this moment, it also 
constituted a continual threat.  As a rhetorical object, it has something of a sorcerer’s 
apprentice quality–tempting to use, but difficult to wield.  In the chapters that follow, I 
describe a range of pressures that came to bear on eighteenth-century deployments of 
                                                
25 Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin, ed. Clyde A. Holbrook, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 3 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1970), 302. 
26 Jonathan Edwards, The “Miscellanies,” a-Z, Aa-Zz, 1-500, ed. Thomas A. Schafer, The Works of 
Jonathan Edwards, vol. 13 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 394. 
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miracle, and how the representational efforts of my authors grappled with (and 
capitalized on) those pressures. 
Despite the range of opinions expressed by eighteenth-century Protestants on the 
subject, one consistent, broadly agreed upon point was a rejection of all Catholic beliefs, 
rituals, anecdotes and evidence pertaining to the subject.  Alexandra Walsham finds 
evidence of such anti-Catholic statements on miracle among early seventeenth century 
English polemicists “like Samuel Harsnet, John Gee, and Richard Sheldon” all of whom 
“devoted much space to describing the ‘lying wonders’, ‘mendacious prodigies’, and 
‘egregious impostures’ by which the Jesuits and their secular brethren sought to seduce 
the credulous laity and prop up the reputation of the Antichristian papacy.”27  The 
durability and the consistency of this Protestant preoccupation with priestly trickery and 
Catholic credulity is apparent in Edwards’ Religious Affections, which appeared more than a 
century later:  “when the images of Christ, in popish churches, are on some extraordinary 
occasions, made by priestcraft to appear to the people as if they wept, and shed fresh 
blood, and moved and uttered such and such words, the people may be verily persuaded 
that it is a miracle wrought by Christ himself.”28  While a full examination of the 
confrontation on miracles between eighteenth century Protestants and Catholics is 
outside the scope of this study, it’s essential to remember how deeply alien, repellent and 
strangely fascinating Catholicism could seem to these men.29 
Even if the Catholic faith in contemporary miracles seemed foolish and distasteful 
to the Protestant orthodoxy, they also recognized both its appeal and the ways in which it 
responded to urgent concerns among the faithful.  Partly in response to this perceived 
threat, they established the principle of the cessation of miracles as a polemical 
commitment of orthodox Protestant faith.  As I explain in my third chapter, the 
overarching idea of cessationism was that miracles, which by common agreement had 
occurred throughout the canon of Scripture, had ceased at some point in the post-
Apostolic era.  Recently Jane Shaw has suggested that assent to this doctrine was perhaps 
not as monolithic as has been supposed.30  My own observations on the American context 
tend to align with Shaw’s.  Cotton Mather seems not to have been attached to the 
doctrine, and openly preached about a return of miracles to the earth.  Whitefield was 
more willing to follow the orthodox line, even as his friend John Wesley rejected it out of 
hand.  In chapter three, in a detailed discussion of the question of cessation, I argue that 
even for an explicit cessationist like Edwards, the doctrine was difficult to define and hard 
to reconcile with the unlimited power of the Calvinist deity.  Again, I understand this as a 
testament to the unique status of miracle, and its tendency to disrupt fixed orders.  If 
rupture is the essence of miracle, efforts at bureaucratic limitation (such as the precise 
correlation of unlimited divine power and calendar time) tend to produce more or less 
                                                
27 Alexandra Walsham, “Miracles and the Counter-Reformation Mission to England,” The 
Historical Journal 46, no. 4 (December 2003), 782. 
28 Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, ed. John E. Smith, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, vol. 2 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959), 309–310. 
29George Whitefield’s letters describing a 1754 visit to Lisbon offer an especially interesting look at 
an eighteenth-century evangelical Protestant’s impressions of Catholic ritual.   George Whitefield, 
The Works of the Reverend George Whitefield (London, 1771), 3:72–89. 
30 Jane Shaw, Miracles in Enlightenment England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 21–
50. 
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absurd results.  Nonetheless, the broad strokes of the idea are a fundamental aspect of the 
Protestant approach to miracles in England and America in the early eighteenth century. 
Another way that the disruptive power of miracle made itself felt in intra-
Protestant debates was in the conflict over the nature and the threat of “enthusiasm.”  
The individual and independent spiritual bent of the rising evangelical movement in 
America constituted a persistent challenge to orthodox constraint.  Claims to 
extraordinary spiritual experience drew the passionate interest of elements of the 
evangelical faithful, along with accusations of enthusiasm from the orthodox clergy.  One 
useful way of thinking about this important tension is to ask how miracle served both to 
support and threaten the aims of established, hierarchical and bureaucratic Protestant 
religion.  Sermons on Christ’s miracles, for example, were regularly used by preachers in 
England and America to encourage a piety that was warm and steadfast, but also stable 
and lawful.  In this mode, the disruptive power of miracle is relegated to the realm of the 
exemplary.  It is in this sense that Cotton Mather urged his hearers to emulate the man in 
Matthew 12:13, who responded to Christ’s command, and obtained a cure: “What will 
you now do?  What? Ly and dy in the ditch? GOD forbid! No, Up, and be Doing; and 
Stir up your selves to take hold on GOD.  Set apart a Time Immediately; and spend this 
Time in making a TRIAL, whether your SAVIOUR do not Enable you to Stretch out a 
withered Hand.”31  This is a mode of exhortation that relies on a safely distant instance of 
disruptive power, and that makes that example into a motive for quiet, diligent and 
progressive internal spiritual labor.  It is, usefully, a figural approach that is acceptable to 
Mather’s Calvinism without seeming to encourage spiritual passivity in the face of divine 
will.32 
The accusation of enthusiasm in questions of miracle begins to arise when the 
immediate power of God moves closer to contemporary experience.  The opportunity (a 
critic would say the fatal trap) of contemporary miraculous action is that it places the 
believer at the active center of God’s action in the world.  No longer a closed book of 
pious examples, Christian miracle becomes, once again, a raw, disruptive and observable 
event.  Even Mather, an eminently stable representative of the New England orthodoxy, 
felt the thrill of miraculous novelty.  In 1696, he triumphantly presented new evidence of 
miraculous events in England:  
For there seems as if there were an Age of Miracles now Dawning upon us.  
Proper Miracles were continued in the Church of God, for Two or Three 
Hundred years together, even until the Antichristian Apostasy was come to some 
Extremity.  And when that Apostasy is over, tis possible, there may be a return of 
proper Miracles; those, Powers of the World to come.  Such Miracles have been 
lately wrought, more than two or three of them, in the City of London.33   
Mather’s prophetic assertion significantly restructures the relation of the faithful to God’s 
power.  In modifying the doctrine of the cessation of miracles to allow for a new spike in 
divine power, he brings Christ’s power into the contemporary Protestant world.  At the 
same time, he plainly capitalizes on his congregation’s (and his own) desire to be in the 
most significant temporal and spiritual location in history, to be witnesses to the dawning 
                                                
31 Cotton Mather, The Quickened Soul. A Short and Plain Essay On, the Withered Hand Revived & Restored. 
(Boston, 1720), 21. 
32 Lovelace, The American Pietism of Cotton Mather, 83–4. 
33 Cotton Mather, Things for a Distress’d People to Think Upon (Boston, 1696), 36. 
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of the world to come.  In so doing, he opens himself up to Hume’s critique, that he 
derives pleasure from the wonder of the miracle story, that he places “a pride and delight 
in exciting the admiration of others.”  If in Mather the impulse is safely contained within 
the structures of the New England church, many other Protestants in the ensuing decades 
would pursue this pleasure more freely, and rejoice in being immediate (or closely 
proximate) witnesses to the visible power of God.   
 For George Whitefield and Jonathan Edwards, the pressing work of encouraging 
and managing religious revival led to famous conflicts with the defenders of orthodoxy.  
Their approaches were by no means identical, and neither one could be classed among 
the most radical of revivalists.  To say that they championed the evangelical revival is not 
to say that they were contemptuous of order in general.  Nonetheless, both men clearly 
understood themselves as witnesses to the vital, immediate work of God.  The origin and 
the progress of that work, the mighty spiritual rebirth of Christianity, was necessarily 
resistant to external, bureaucratic control.  It was, in other words, a fundamentally 
disruptive spiritual event.  For both men, the character of this rebirth could best be 
expressed in the language of miracle.  It was not, however, a language of simple 
comparison.  The powerful resurrection of the human soul in the New Birth was a 
supreme divine action.  In the sermons of Whitefield and perhaps most movingly and 
completely in the thought of Edwards, the miracle of the reborn soul is no mere 
metaphor. 
It is, however, an act of representation.  The link between miracle and the 
resurrection of the soul brings me to a final note on the method of this dissertation.  As I 
have suggested above, I understand the representations of miracle in these eighteenth 
century American Protestant writings as having a fundamentally literary character.  This 
assertion is grounded in two particular aspects of miracle discussed above:  1) That the 
event of a miracle, when it is represented in text, appears almost exclusively in narrative 
terms, its claim to notoriety being founded on its location in a particular context and in a 
particular series of events.  2) That these same narratives are attractive to those who 
encounter them.  The idea of miracle survives and thrives because it produces something 
like the “passion of surprise and wonder,” that “agreeable emotion” described by Hume.  
In other words, miracles are predominantly encountered in the form of exceptional 
stories, and exceptional stories tend to produce pleasure, and so tend to be reproduced, 
circulated and celebrated.  Yet this would seem to be true of essentially any miracle at any 
time.  In linking eighteenth-century American miracles to the literary, and thereby 
making the argument that the miracles writings I discuss can (and should) be analyzed as 
literature, I want to make a more particular point.  In this dissertation, I detail a wide 
range of theological, spiritual and cultural pressures that were brought to bear on the 
concept of miracle.  Ultimately, I argue that the only way in which the tremendous 
exhortatory and evidentiary value of the miraculous could be sustained in this challenging 
context was by placing it in the imaginative space of literary representation.  This is not, 
as I understand it, the same as arguing that miracle was vitiated, reduced to the status of a 
simple trope or cliché.  Rather I suggest that the urgent spiritual applications of miracle in 
this moment were intimately tied to the imagistic, allusive, and narrative effects of a 
literary mode. The work of fostering early American evangelical piety was substantially 
about representing divine power to the faithful, and the intellectual and spiritual figure of 
miracle was at the center of that effort.  Reading these miracle writings in this framework 
has the potential not only to enrich our understanding of early American Protestant piety, 
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but to expand our sense of how literary representation has helped to structure American 
religion. 
 
4. Summary of Chapters 
My first chapter is concerned with the presence and the importance of miraculous 
material in Cotton Mather’s medical writing.  I begin by describing a letter sent by 
Mather to the Royal Society, of which he was a proud and active member.  The letter 
details a series of cures suggested to sick people in their dreams.  The Society, while it 
welcomed other communications from Mather, dismissed these relations as irrelevant to 
the aims of natural philosophy.  I argue that this judgment, and the accompanying desire 
to sort Mather’s interests into the scientific and the superstitious, is largely replicated in 
more recent scholarship.  As an alternative to this critical trend, I argue that miracle in 
Mather is a much more flexible and complex category than has been supposed.  Building 
on Steven Justice’s analysis of medieval writing on miracles, I suggest that rather than 
being direct evidence of credulity and superstition, miracle in Mather’s writing is 
inherently linked to issues of empirical investigation, verification and the accuracy of 
testimony.  To this end, I argue that Mather engages in a steady and self-conscious 
project of mixture, amounting to a refusal of a rigid distinction between the study of 
miracles and other epistemological projects.  This effort is related to his lifelong interest in 
the evidence produced by the human body.  I survey a range of important precursors to 
Mather’s late-career writings on medical miracles, including his examinations of possessed 
children, his interest in angelic apparitions and his advice to young men on sexual purity.  
The final section of the chapter deals explicitly with medicine, and analyzes the form of 
Mather’s miracle stories as well as his insistence in arguing for their significance.  
Ultimately I argue that this interest is not a simple question of atavistic attachment, but 
an internally consistent effort to merge the empirical and spiritual material of Protestant 
piety with the scientific material of medicine. 
 In the second chapter of the dissertation, I extend my examination of the uses and 
challenges of miracle for eighteenth century Protestants by examining the sermons of the 
celebrated evangelist George Whitefield.  I approach his work by detailing the major 
conflicts over the miraculous that troubled the English church in the second quarter of 
the eighteenth century.  I begin by describing the critical examination of the miraculous 
conducted by skeptical English writers of the period, reviewing the arguments of 
important voices like Matthew Tindal, John Toland and David Hume.  My chief focus 
here, in establishing a context for my discussion of Whitefield, is on one of the most 
radical and controversial “deist” writers, Thomas Woolston, who wrote a series of 
inflammatory and deeply heterodox tracts about miracle in the 1720s.  In opposition to 
an orthodox reliance on Christ’s miracles as direct evidence of the truth of his doctrine, 
Woolston proposed a purely figural interpretive scheme.  For Woolston, the significance 
of miracle lies in its visionary, mystical possibilities, the meaning that transcends the literal 
context.  I argue that Woolston’s writing, for all the caustic excess of its style, establishes 
two important baselines for my consideration of Whitefield.  First, his provocation reveals 
the delicacy of the Church of England’s orthodox position on miracles, wherein too active 
a literal faith in miracles indicated enthusiasm, but an entirely visionary and figural faith 
was also a sign of dangerous heterodoxy.  It also suggests the importance of published 
controversy in setting the parameters for the Protestant understanding of miracles in 
eighteenth-century England and America.  Whitefield was no stranger to this kind of 
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controversy.  In the second portion of the chapter I detail the rhetorical combat that he 
and his friend John Wesley carried out with the orthodox leadership of the Church of 
England about the acceptable limits of the miraculous.  Ultimately I argue that the 
pressures of deist skepticism and church controversy provide the context in which 
Whitefield elaborates his homiletic approach to miracles.  I close the chapter by 
examining a series of his sermons on Christ’s miracles, with a particular emphasis on his 
figural understanding of the implications of the resurrection of Lazarus. 
 The third and final chapter of my dissertation focuses on Jonathan Edwards’ 
engagement with miracles, and particularly the complexities and the contradictions of his 
thinking about the doctrine of cessation.  I begin with a general overview of the 
emergence of the English Protestant idea of the cessation of miracles.  I survey an 
increasing body of scholarship that suggests that the principle of cessation was persistently 
challenged in England and America, not only by Catholics (against whom it had initially 
been directed) but also by the Protestant faithful.  I argue that this sense of cessation as an 
unstable principle is essential to understanding the imaginative power of Edwards’ writing 
on miracles.  To establish the more immediate context for Edwards’ thought, I review 
two major influences on the idea of miracle in America in the second quarter of the 
eighteenth century.  The first is the anti-revivalist writings of Charles Chauncy, and his 
criticisms of enthusiastic belief in what he called “extraordinaries.” Chauncy’s writings 
relied on an earlier generation of anti-enthusiastic writing, particularly Bishop George 
Hickes’ response to a Huguenot group known as the French Prophets.  The second is 
English deist skepticism, to which Edwards responded with an argument based in the 
coercive rational power of miraculous evidence.  I argue that this defense, rooted as it was 
in the contemporary effectiveness of historical miracle, puts some strain on Edwards’ 
commitment to the idea of cessation.  This commitment (as Edwards argues at length in a 
series of sermons on 1 Corinthians 13) was based on a fundamentally ethical principle.  
God performed his extraordinary works in the world as preparation for an infinitely 
superior reign of divine love.  His withdrawal of the miraculous gifts was, in Edwards’ 
analysis, a sign of the coming maturity of his divine plan.  At the same time, to assign such 
a motive to God’s action in the world risked violating the core Calvinist commitment to 
God’s complete sovereignty.  To explain this conflict in full, I turn to an examination of 
the principle of arbitrary and unconditional divine power as it is expressed in Edwards’ 
Freedom of the Will.  In that text and a series of other statements on the subject, Edwards 
returns to the fundamentally disruptive and uncontainable power of miracle, a power that 
can interrupt the accepted operation of causation at any point.  It is a power that, in spite 
of his ethical commitment to cessation, Edwards cannot restrict to the past, as indicated 
by his interest in apparent causal ruptures in the case of snakes charming their prey.  
Ultimately, I argue that Edwards approaches this conflict between an essential doctrine of 
his faith and the unlimited power of his God by way of a literary elaboration of the 
miraculous.  This finds its most profound expression in his discussions of the operation of 
grace as an event comparable to god’s mightiest miracles.  By forging an allusive, but 
entirely non-trivial link between these two central Christian concepts of the divine, 
Edwards is able to construct an imaginative spiritual and intellectual realm that respects 
doctrine but also stands outside it.  In that sense his vision is a product of the pressures of 
eighteenth century controversy, but also an expression of a linguistic and literary 
imaginary that can realize a world that transcends those conflicts. 
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Chapter One 
 
 “An Insensible Manuduction”: 
The Uses of Miraculous Narrative in Cotton Mather’s Medical Writing 
 
 
1. Mather and Miracle:  Readers Old and New  
On December 1, 1712, Cotton Mather sent a batch of 13 letters to the Royal 
Society in London.  In his cover letter he referred to them as “a small collection of Curiosa 
Americana,” intended to communicate unusual and edifying American phenomena to his 
metropolitan correspondents.1  Under that general heading, the letters form a 
heterogeneous group, variously offering accounts of rattlesnakes, giant bones, celestial 
events, and supernatural phenomena.  He opens the sixth letter in the series with a 
confident declaration of common understanding:  “It has doubtless been somewhat of a 
surprise unto you to find what operations of the invisible world there have been in 
communicating the knowledge of medicine unto us.”2  In support of this assertion, he 
offers a variety of historical examples of miraculous healing, as well as three local 
anecdotes describing effective remedies communicated in dreams.  He opens this trio of 
stories with a brief account of a man cured of stomach pain by an “odd cataplasm” of 
boiled perch and parsnip, the preparation of which had been suggested to him in a 
dream. Mather then proceeds to relate the story of his own late wife Abigail [here an 
unnamed “gentlewoman”] whose suffering in her terrible final illness was relieved by a 
remedy described to her in her sleep.3 
The third and final local example merits fuller summary, since it offers an 
overview of the key rhetorical and methodological features of Mather’s medical miracle 
stories.  This tale concerns “a young woman of Boston, called Lydia Ingram” who, “after 
other languishing illness, fell ill of a fever.”4  Eventually the fever leads to swelling and “a 
total suppression of urine for ten days together.”  Mather goes on to relate that after her 
physicians had given up hope, she “dreamt that there came into the room a gentleman 
with the circumstances of a venerable old age upon his head and face, but of a very 
comely countenance.”  This mysterious dream visitor proposes a remedy of white wine 
mixed with alum and “the powder of a burnt beef marrow bone.”  The presumably angelic 
nature of this dream visitation lends the story its narrative notoriety, but the description is 
also carefully medicalized.  Ingram’s visitor repeatedly emphasizes the makeup of the 
remedy and the importance of its proper administration.  The first time the remedy is 
prepared, Ingram’s forgetfulness leads to the omission of the powdered bone, and the 
medicine has no effect.  After being corrected by the visitor in a subsequent dream, she 
finds relief in the properly prepared remedy.  As the miracle story blends with the medical 
                                                
1 Raymond Phineas Stearns, Science in the British Colonies of America (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1970), 405.  
2 Cotton Mather, Selected Letters of Cotton Mather, ed. Kenneth Silverman (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1971), 115. 
3 The identification of this woman as Mather’s late wife appears in his diary: Cotton Mather, 
Diary of Cotton Mather, 1681-1724, ed. Worthington C. Ford (New York: Fredrick Ungar 
Publishing Co.: 1957), 1:444–5. 
4 Cotton Mather, Selected Letters of Cotton Mather, 116. 
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case study, bodily evidence becomes part of the prodigious spectacle.  When the angelic 
visitor’s remedy begins to take effect, Ingram’s suppression is relieved in spectacular 
fashion:  “she had the relief that was promised her, and voided five pints of urine at one 
time; and from Wednesday at one o’clock to Friday at one o’clock, there came from her 
by measure six gallons.”5  However, she fails to repeat the treatment, and the suppression 
returns.  When the angel returns in a third and final dream, Ingram protests that she 
could not find white wine.6  This prompts a scolding from the angel: “No white wine! There’s 
enough in the town; but people that want a will seldom want an excuse!”  This exasperated outburst 
is followed by a gentler reassurance:  “However, take it again; all things are possible with God!”7  
Ingram dutifully complies, and her final, fully obedient preparation of the remedy 
produces a perfect and lasting recovery.  
Mather emphasizes the participatory nature of this wonderful healing through his 
concern for procedure, measurement, and diligent self-care.  Although Lydia Ingram is 
painfully incapacitated and constantly attended by physicians, the responsibility for the 
cure falls directly on her.  She is the conduit for the expression of the private divine will in 
the public medical realm.  Consequently, her helpless physicians are figured as extensions 
of either her recalcitrance or her obedience, able to do no more than what she tells them 
to.  Ingram is responsible for directing the preparation of the remedy, which will then 
allow her to produce both the prodigious evidence of her urinary output and the ultimate 
proof of the cure.  She is called not just to cure herself but also faithfully to bring forth the 
physical evidence of divine intervention.  This makes her the crucial participant in the 
providential and medical drama being played out in her mind and through her body.  
More significantly, it merges the horizontal network of medical action and experiment 
with the vertical axis of private faith.  For Mather, Ingram’s story makes an explicit case 
for the consonance of divine cures with the aims and methods of contemporary medicine 
and natural philosophy.  These are modified miracles–prompted by divine agency, but 
ultimately effected through the proper use of means. 
The Royal Society was less sanguine about this possibility.  In response to 
Mather’s Curiosa Americana, the Society’s Secretary Richard Waller published a summary 
of the letters in the Transactions.8  Faced with the extravagant variety of the letters, 
Waller’s summary resorts to an evaluative sorting process.  Those letters deemed more 
                                                
5 Ibid., 117. 
6 The three-part structure of the Ingram tale is hard to ignore.  It is the third and final story in the 
series, the angel visits three times, and the remedy contains three ingredients. This classic folkloric 
rhythm prompts useful consideration about the narrative construction of the story and Mather’s 
letter.  Mather himself recognized that such symmetrical structures could tempt and threaten both 
reader and writer. To impose a rule of three is to attempt to compel divine power, and, like 
miracle stories themselves, such narrative practice risks slipping into impious superstition. He 
warned of this danger in an earlier narrative:  “[A]ltho I have thought of beseeching of the lord 
Thrice, when buffeted by Satan, yet I must earnestly Intreat all my Readers to beware of any 
superstitious conceits upon the Number Three.” Cotton Mather, “Another Brand Pluckt out of 
the Burning,” in Narratives of the Witchcraft Cases, 1648-1706, ed. George Lincoln Burr (New York: 
Barnes & Noble, 1975), 317.  
7 Cotton Mather, Selected Letters of Cotton Mather, 117. 
8 Cotton Mather, “An Extract of Several Letters from Cotton Mather, D. D. to John Woodward, 
M. D. and Richard Waller, Esq; S. R. Secr.,” Philosophical Transactions (1683-1775) 29 (1714): 62-
71. 
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relevant receive careful treatment, and relatively complete summaries, while others are 
set aside as being outside the Society’s purview.  Mather’s letter on miraculous cures falls 
in the later group.  Of this account, Waller says simply: “The sixth Letter relates the 
Stories of some Persons that had Informations of Medicines for the Distempers they lay 
under, in their Dreams; these Accounts relate little to Natural Philosophy.”9  The 
Society’s refusal to take seriously the relation between phenomena like miraculous cures 
and natural philosophy has been noted by scholars like Raymond Stearns and Susan 
Scott Parrish.10  In general, the disjunction between Mather’s enthusiastic contributions 
and the Society’s response (which remained cordial, if discriminating) has been laid to the 
excesses of Mather’s language and to his immutable intellectual habits.  As Parrish puts it, 
“Mather, though he understood the empiricist imperative of the New Science, could not 
erase his ministerial and local trust in the spiritual immanence of the Word, nor could he 
abjure his greater talent for scholasticism than empiricism.”11 The terms of Parrish’s 
analysis are well chosen.  Mather’s miracle writing does unite local, ministerial, scholastic 
and empiricist concerns.  However, the texture and the significance of that union have 
not been adequately explained.  Although appreciation for Mather’s scientific curiosity is 
generally on the rise, contemporary scholarship has tended to share the Royal Society’s 
desire to sort Mather’s writing into meaningful and irrelevant contributions.  This has 
deflected our focus away from apparently inauspicious discursive mixtures like those we 
find in miraculous medical narratives.  A dominant critical interest in tracking the 
evolution of Mather’s enlightenment has prevented a full examination of the evidentiary 
and rhetorical possibilities of his miracle stories.  
Winton Solberg, in his comments on Cotton Mather’s Curiosa Americana, suggests 
that the content of the letters reflects “the transitional character of [Mather’s] mind.”12  
In an echo of Secretary Waller’s judgment centuries earlier, he notes that some of these 
letters “contain superstition, and some have little relation to ‘natural philosophy’ or 
science.”13  Nonetheless, Solberg also sees evidence of evolution, and argues that by 
comparing the letters with their seventeenth-century sources, we can see “that Mather 
was moving from a supernatural explanation of various phenomena toward greater 
objectivity.  Yet he had travelled but partway.”14  In essence, Solberg sees the 
supernatural elements in Mather’s scientific writing as evidence of an incomplete effort at 
transformation.15  He suggests, however, that the problem was not unique to Mather.  
                                                
9 Ibid., 65. 
10 Stearns, Science in the British Colonies of America, 414; Parrish, American Curiosity, 122. 
11 Parrish, American Curiosity, 122. 
12 Winton U. Solberg, introduction to The Christian Philosopher, by Cotton Mather, ed. Winton U. 
Solberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), xli. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., xlii 
15 See also: Otho Beall, “Cotton Mather’s Early ‘Curiosa Americana’ and the Boston 
Philosophical Society of 1683,” The William and Mary Quarterly 18, no. 3, (1961): 371–2. In this 
much earlier analysis, Beall makes a similar point: “By this time, the supernatural explanation of 
various phenomena was not always satisfactory to him, and he was moving toward a greater 
objectivity. At the same time, however, he traveled only part way:  in other areas he was content 
to remain the uncritical gatherer and disseminator.”  I hope to show here that Mather’s gathering 
and dissemination were always tied to the critical faculty, especially when dealing with the 
supernatural. 
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According to Solberg, “[s]cience had not yet completely emancipated itself from magic, 
the occult and folklore in this seminal period of Western intellectual history, and Mather’s 
views are in accord with the best scientific knowledge of his time.”16  There is truth to this 
developmental narrative.  As we will see, Mather himself was enchanted with the 
possibility of progress and frustrated by its delay. Yet measuring the completeness of 
epistemic change is, after all, only one way of approaching the presence of the 
supernatural in these letters.  As a dominant means of considering (or ignoring) Mather’s 
engagements with miraculous stories, this framework can distort the complexity of his 
moment and his work.  This has particular consequences for our analyses of his much-
discussed “credulity,” his willingness to accept apparently fantastical or supernatural 
anecdotes as legitimate evidence.17  A tendency to ignore the evidentiary and explanatory 
force of Mather’s miracles had also obscured their particular uses and their continuing 
relevance to other discourses.    
Medical miracles are of interest for Mather precisely because they are extreme 
examples of divine intervention into the physical realm.  As such, they make a useful site 
for examining the flattening, normalizing effects of critical readings of the interaction 
between Mather’s faith and his natural philosophy.  Solberg sees the heterogeneous 
textual assemblage of the Curiosa letters as the product of the period as much as Mather’s 
critical faculties:  “The early eighteenth century was still a world of wonders; most found 
it hard to distinguish between the natural and the supernatural.  Mather, like many 
learned contemporaries, continued to mix the factual with the fanciful.”18  It is precisely 
that unseemly mixing that will concern me here.  I will consider how Mather himself uses 
the miracle story to construe and delimit categories like fact and fancy.  The problem, 
after all, is not just that Mather believed in multiple causal systems, but that he insisted on 
comingling them.  He repeatedly chooses to include miracle stories within or alongside 
other texts–in a series of letters, in the entries of a diary, in a medical manuscript.  In 
order to grasp the full meaning of these stories, I will consider this apparently discordant 
assembly as a potentially meaningful act, rather than simply a product of Mather’s 
epistemic limitations.  A close analysis of the structure and the context of these miracle 
stories will allow us to see them as carefully considered and internally coherent textual 
interventions.  This will require, however, that we permit Mather’s understanding of 
miracle a certain dynamic critical value that it is usually not afforded. 
My thinking on the meaning and uses of miracle has been influenced by a recent 
article that considers their status in quite a different context.  Steven Justice, writing about 
medieval miracle stories, argues that miracle has always been a contested category, and 
that the idea of an undifferentiated “age of faith” is a critical fiction.  Far from being a 
product of a failure to distinguish between the natural and the divine, the deployment of 
the term “miracle” is, he argues, an effort at just such a distinction: “[…] as Hume 
recognized, ‘There must . . . be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, 
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otherwise the event would not merit that appellation’; calling something a miracle implies 
its singularity.  If all of creation really was one great miracle, miracles would by definition 
have been inconceivable.”19  This observation invites us to consider miracle as a product 
of critical examination.  As both an object and an instance of faith it is extreme, unusual 
and always subject to internal and external challenge.  As Justice goes on to argue, the 
experience of believing in miracles is, at least for his medieval subjects, never a settled and 
comfortable one.  He frames his discussion of this restless faith by considering a quotation 
from Aquinas:  “cogitare est simul coagitare: roughly, ‘to think is to bang things together.’”  As 
Justice reads it,  “The violent agitation imagined in that verb, and the cognitive 
restlessness it signals, are not the condition from which belief rescues the mind but a 
condition it inflicts.”20  In this account of belief, critical thought and assent are twinned–
faithful assertion and doubt meet in a potentially endless dialogue.  My intent here is not 
to map the Middle Ages onto the early eighteenth century, nor to draw a line between 
Aquinas’ faith and Mather’s.  I do, however, want to proceed with this sense of co-
agitation in mind.  Mather’s accounts of medical miracle tend to bang and jar against 
their discursive containers.  They often fit awkwardly both with their textual neighbors 
and the expectations of their readers, as evidenced by the dismissive responses both of 
Secretary Waller and of Mather’s more recent readers.  Yet Mather’s texts do not need 
rescuing or excusing from his miraculous attachments.  Rather, his insistence on the 
relevance of miracles can usefully be read within the matrix of both his scientific work 
and his evolving but historically grounded faith.  Our unwillingness to credit miraculous 
evidence would have been part of Mather’s own experience of miracle, and his narratives 
are always responding to the possibility of doubt. 
Indeed, as Reiner Smolinski has shown, the nature and extent of Biblical miracles 
was a subject of considerable debate in Mather’s lifetime.  In his introduction to the Biblia 
Americana, he examines Mather’s response to a number of debates concerning Old 
Testament miracles.  Here again, miracle is called into service more as a critical heuristic, 
a kind of touchstone, than as an internally dynamic discourse.  Smolinski understands 
these theological and philosophical debates as test cases by which “we can gauge the 
extent to which Mather has crossed the threshold into the Enlightenment.”21  In general, 
while he acknowledges that “Mather is supremely unwilling to sever the ties between 
natural philosophy and theology” he also notes that “his commentary in ‘Biblia 
Americana’ not infrequently moves in that direction.”22  In these high-level international 
exegetical debates, the Mather of the Biblia appears flexible, curious, and open to the 
possibility of tempering conservative piety with innovative reasoning, a stance which 
Smolinski calls Mather’s “ambidextrous approach.”23  This restless play back and forth 
over the threshold of Enlightenment recapitulates the age-old process of engagement with 
miraculous phenomena, that insistent interchange between skeptical inquiry and faithful 
assent.  If the miracle is that which we cannot explain without God, its narrative power 
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develops through comparison with what we do understand, what we can verify 
empirically. 
This is borne out by Mather’s review in the Biblia of the hypothesized causes of 
the flood in Genesis.  He allows that “Some hold, That the Flood was altogether 
Miraculous; and that the Almighty created Waters on Purpose for this tremendous 
Occasion; which being dispatch’d, He again destroyed them.”24  Yet he goes on to 
suggest that this kind of pure miracle may be too simple a solution:  “This is to cutt the 
Knott.”25  Instead, he offers a variety of possible explanations for the cause of the flood, 
heavily supported by contemporary natural philosophy.  This refusal of an incurious 
absolutist belief, and the subsequent effort both to accommodate and distinguish between 
divine power and natural means, is one of the charms of Mather’s thought.  Smolinski’s 
edition of the Biblia helps to show Mather’s engagement with the early Enlightenment in 
new light.  In so doing, it contributes to the effort of distinguishing his life and thought 
from what Smolinski calls “the popular caricature of Mather as an old witch doctor and 
diehard bigot.”26  Yet this important sense of Mather’s flexibility and sophistication 
should not oblige us to set aside those aspects of his thought which might at first seem to 
be associated with that old, flat caricature.   
Mather’s interest in miraculous cures can help us to see how he developed and 
promoted a distinctly flexible and multivalent role for direct divine action.  This 
intervention occurred in quite a different generic context from that of the scholarly, 
historical miracle debates of the Biblia Americana. In these medical cases, miracle is 
construed as an ongoing, emphatically local phenomenon.  The great historical 
cataclysms of the biblical miracles have been muted into intimate, almost lonely 
phenomena.  These miracles begin as explicitly private experiences that are available only 
to the supplicant.  They hover always on the edge of perceptibility, and in their 
unverifiable privacy, they call up the possibilities of deception, misperception and 
hallucination.   In this context, the stories find their public importance, and their verified 
divine reality, first through the bodily evidence of suffering individuals, and then through 
pious recording and repetition.  Mather’s stories serve to amplify and celebrate not just 
the consonance of divine providence and natural medical means, but also the individual 
experience of piety.     
As indicated by the case of Lydia Ingram, this is a rhetorical project that takes 
advantage of the empirical evidence provided by the human body.  Mather carries out his 
work, to a surprising extent, through the careful textual examination and display of the 
bodies of young people, especially young women.  In these cases the invisible, liminal, 
dream-shrouded experience of miracle becomes legible through stories of prodigious 
physical recovery and the alleviation of symptoms.  Mather’s construction of these 
miracle stories is certainly informed by his medical and theological reading, and by his 
broad, scholarly sense of the history and evolution of miraculous Christian experience.  
Yet the crucial context of these local stories is Mather’s meticulous lifelong study of the 
legibility and communicative possibility of the suffering human body.  The sufferers testify 
to their faith and their private experience, but it is their symptomatic bodies, their 
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measurable physical responses, which can offer proof of the operations of the invisible 
world.  Over a span of decades, and in a wide variety of texts and genres, Mather 
contemplated direct experiences and reports of the effects of the invisible world on 
individual bodies.  These investigations required the simultaneous deployment of both 
natural and supernatural interpretive strategies.   
 Other scholars have noted Mather’s lingering attachments to the supernatural, and 
their fraught relationship with science and medicine.  Linda Breen, in an analysis of 
Mather’s advocacy of smallpox inoculation, shares my sense that “we must resist the 
temptation to divorce his medical thought from other pursuits now deemed unproductive 
or backward-looking.”27  Yet ultimately she decides that Mather “was a revivalist, not a 
transitional clergyman-scientist” and that his primary concern with conversion was the 
determining force in shaping his response to medical issues.28  Jeffrey Jeske, in his useful 
reading of Mather as a “physico-theologian,” does not require Mather to choose between 
the roles of clergyman and scientist.  Instead, Jeske suggests he engages in a form of sly 
code-switching:  “the protean Mather, attempting both to preserve the Calvinist core of 
Puritan belief and to accommodate the new science, adopts different personae with 
contradictory philosophical assumptions, depending on situation and audience.”29  In 
contrast to both of these readings, I would suggest that Mather’s narration of the suffering 
human body is always insistently blending these two discourses, even in situations where 
such mixing could be avoided.  It is my sense that this blending is a product as much of 
Mather’s narrative commitments as his philosophical investments.  Consequently I will 
focus here on details Mather provides about suffering bodies, but also on the form of the 
stories he tells about them.  This approach offers a means of thinking not only about the 
strands of Mather’s thought, but about how such a famously multiple perspective could 
be effectively integrated through the rhetoric of the miracle story. 
In his early encounters with demonic possession, in his pastoral writings on 
sickness, in his private writing on personal miracles and especially in his late medical 
writing, Mather created a complex hermeneutics of the divinely influenced body.  A 
selective review of these texts will help to trace Mather’s construction of the miracle story.  
What all this experience and articulation produced was a discourse of miracle that 
adapted treasured narrative modes to new ways of seeing and knowing, and finally gave 
birth to truly multi-vocal texts.  I will close with a careful examination of Mather’s last 
significant writing on medical miracles, which can be found in his unpublished 
manuscript The Angel of Bethesda.  In the eighth chapter of that volume, Mather reworks 
and expands his Royal Society letter on dream cures into a heterogeneous and fascinating 
statement on the meanings of personal miracle.  Without assigning miracle stories a 
central position in Mather’s later work, I argue that instances of their survival are 
indicative of miracle’s enduring and important relation to Mather’s more respectable 
eighteenth-century epistemological projects.  Particularly in The Angel of Bethesda, the 
possible unity of miracle and modernity opens imaginative vistas for Mather that have not 
been sufficiently examined.   
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2. Reading Symptoms:  The Body as Public Example 
  One factor in the shaping of Mather’s medical miracle stories was his desire for a 
multivalent social and professional role.  Much has been made of his interest in medicine, 
and the divine consonance he perceived between the work of soul-saving and the labor of 
caring for the sick.30  Despite this abiding interest, he showed himself willing to accept the 
authority of physicians on material questions.31  By 1710, when he published Bonifacius, he 
clearly understood that his beloved old New England model of the minister-cum-physician 
was no longer tenable.  Still, his reaction to a more rigid division of labor offers an 
illuminating view of his eighteenth-century medical and spiritual hermeneutics.  
Addressing fellow ministers, with his own Boston experience plainly in mind, he suggests: 
In a more populous place you will perhaps choose rather, Sir, to get some religious 
and accomplished physician into your neighborhood; and make medical studies your 
own diversion as much as may be; but with some eye to this, that you will 
communicate unto your Luke, what notable things you do in reading meet withal; 
and sometimes unite counsels with him, for the good of his patients.  You may this 
way save the lives of many, who may themselves know nothing of it.32   
Faced with the pressures of social development and professional specialization, Mather 
recuperates his desired medical role in scholarly terms.  Reading and counseling can be 
the means of saving both bodies and souls, and the minister is instructed to employ these 
tools to become a sort of shadow eminence in the new medical system.  Fantasy or no, 
Mather’s proposed solution illuminates his sense of the harmony between his medical 
interests and his spiritual vocation, as well as his faith in the efficacy of texts, reading and 
writing in both spheres.  This theoretical approach was conditioned by a series of urgent 
and frightening experiences in which the human body appeared to produce evidence 
from the spiritual world. 
The late seventeenth-century struggles over witchcraft and demonic possession are 
the most dramatic and well-known examples of Mather’s physical investigations into the 
invisible world.  While we will be primarily concerned with less familiar narratives of 
miraculous cures, these “case-studies” of possession hold important clues to his 
understanding of the significance of the suffering body.  From the beginning of Mather’s 
witchcraft experiences, the empirical, experimental evidence of having seen and touched 
the possessed is of primary importance.  Yet he is aware, at the same time, of the ethical 
complexities of his dual role as minister and investigator.  In referring to his earliest 
witchcraft experience, his 1688 examination of the apparently possessed Goodwin 
children, Mather frames the problem like this:  “I was not unsensible, that it might be an 
easie thing to be too bold, and go too far, in making of Experiments: Nor was I so 
unphilosophical as not to discern many opportunityes of Giving and Solving many 
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Problemes which the pneumatic Discipline is concerned in.”33  Mather is aware that he 
can do real and important investigative work with these afflicted bodies, yet he is also 
wary of unseemly excess. 
The value of this experience, and the temptation of experiment, comes from the 
immediate power of the evidence produced.  These visible proofs become not only 
reinforcements for the personal commitments of faith, but also cudgels with which to beat 
doubters.  As David Levin characterizes Mather’s association with one of the Goodwin 
children: “[W]hen he took Martha, the thirteen-year-old, into his own household, his 
explicit purpose was not only to cure her but also, without the slightest skepticism about 
the nature of her affliction, to observe her symptoms and the devils’ powers at length, and 
to accumulate ‘evidence and argument as a critical eye-witness to confute the Sadducism of 
this debauched age.’”34  The importance of the final quote rests largely on Mather’s sense 
of being a “critical eye-witness.”  The phrase places a meaningful dual emphasis on 
observation and judgment.  While he may betray little skepticism about first causes, he 
does insist upon discernment as well as accurate and careful observation.35  Mather is, in 
essence, developing an experimental hermeneutics of the invisible world.  He filters his 
experience through his understanding of his duty, which is not only to comfort and heal, 
but also to watch carefully and to report his findings. In keeping with this systematic 
reporting drive, he goes on to de-emphasize any hermeneutical authority outside the 
experimental mode:  “yet I will give a Touch upon one Problem commonly Discoursed 
of; that is, Whether the Devils know our Thoughts, or no?  I will not give the Reader my 
Opinion of it, but only my Experiment.”36  This ostentatiously cautious experimentalist 
stance is a response to the complexity of the task at hand.  The empirical projects of 
medicine and supernatural investigation share the basic challenge of divining obscure 
causes from potentially deceptive effects.  In both disciplines, the body acts as medium, 
displaying a sort of magic mirror correspondence between the visible symptom and the 
invisible cause.  In reading the bodily signs of the possessed, Mather feels compelled to 
distinguish satanic possession from natural illness.  In addition, he must sort feigned 
symptoms from the legitimate effects of witchcraft.  The watchful, critical eye and the 
reporting voice are both marshaled in the examination and interpretation of the afflicted, 
deceptive body.  He is a witness to newly revealed secrets, but he is also a filter.   
This “critical eye-witness” role is rhetorically advantageous in that it insulates the 
speaker against criticism.  Beyond these strategic considerations, however, the emphasis 
on experiment has another practical use.  The strictures and forms of evidence and 
experiment help Mather to harmonize his various perceived responsibilities in the 
moment of crisis.  As Levin points out, this task could be challenging: “He found himself 
in the awkward position of trying to do three incompatible things at once.  He had to 
fight the devils who possessed Martha, he wanted to study their behavior and of course he 
wanted to cure the afflicted child.”37  In a literal sense, these purposes are indeed 
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incompatible, since accomplishing one either delays or prevents the others.  Nonetheless, 
Mather is at pains to articulate a system in which these desires are compatible.  The 
human body provides a potential ground for that compatibility.  Part of the intellectual 
work of these possession episodes (and part of the reason they relates to his later accounts 
of miraculous healing) is the careful unification of Levin’s three strands into a single braid.    
This process of textual solidification of the invisible world via the techniques of 
careful reporting was not Mather’s invention.  The responsibility of the clerical and 
intellectual elite of New England to report providential occurrences was heavily 
emphasized in Mather’s youth.  Indeed, it was explicitly codified in a number of 
documents from that era.38  These included a Harvard College document (signed by both 
Increase and Cotton Mather) that enjoined ministers to “obtain and preserve the 
knowledge of such notable occurrences as are sought out by all that have pleasure in the 
great Works of the Lord.”39  Such providences, successfully recorded, attain their proper 
use-value, since they can then be banked and deployed as a kind of spiritual currency “the 
Accounts thus taken of these Remarkables, may be sent in unto the President, or the 
Fellows of the Colledge, by whome they shall be carefully reserved for such a use to be 
made of them, as may by some fit Assembly of Ministers be Judged most conducing to the 
Glory of God.”40  These providential anecdotes are related to emerging systems of 
scientific exchange, but their instrumental function has less to do with elucidating natural 
principles than with continually reaffirming the existence of the invisible world.  This is 
perhaps an unsurprising ministerial endeavor, but what should seize our attention here is 
consonance of natural curiosity and providential history. 
It was this imperative to investigate and report unusual events that helped 
determine the form and method of such volumes as Cotton Mather’s Memorable Providences 
and his Wonders of the Invisible World.  Michael Winship, in his Seers of God, offers a sensitive 
reading of providentialism in colonial New England and particularly in the work of 
Cotton Mather.  Specifically, he examines “the progression of Mather’s providentialism 
in the eighteenth century” as an index of “the cultural negotiations involved in the 
diffusion of the early Enlightenment.”41  Winship emphasizes that the volume of Mather’s 
writing on providential events declined considerably over the course of his life, in large 
part because of the reduced prestige of that discourse in intellectual circles.42  More 
particularly, he argues that Mather begins to understand phenomena like witchcraft, 
divination and astrology not just as theological problems, but as “signs of a social location 
a ‘gentleman’ would avoid.”43  Bearing that change in emphasis in mind, it’s nonetheless 
possible to see how the techniques of encyclopedic collection and assembly characteristic 
of the providential catalogues carry over into Mather’s medical writing.  Changes in 
explicit content need not always result in methodological transformation.  Furthermore, 
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as our focus on the endurance of miracle implies, even as the prevalence of supernatural 
discourse diminished in Mather’s writing, its claim on his imagination persisted.  The 
point here is not to deny Mather’s eighteenth-century urbanity, but to suggest that he 
continued to make strategic use of certain explicitly supernatural data in his later work.  
As Louise Breen has suggested, Mather’s sense of the importance of medical examples 
was deeply rooted in the embodied empirical methods of his earlier supernatural 
investigations. 44  Providential and medical expertise were both, we should recall, an 
important part of Mather’s portfolio, intellectually and socially.  These disciplines were 
repeatedly intertwined in Mather’s seventeenth century education and in his experiences 
with possession.  This consonance finds a significant and developed expression in his 
eighteenth century accounts of medical miracles.  However, Mather’s sense of the 
malevolent effect of the invisible world on the human body had always been leavened by 
his interest in cases of angelic intervention. 
Assistance from a presumably divine source is very much in evidence in Mather’s 
famous accounts of two possessed young women, Mercy Short and Margaret Rule.  
Short, in Mather’s account, suffered a multitude of torments at the hands of her demonic 
persecutors.  Her body produces visible evidence of these tortures, as when demons stick 
her flesh full of pins: “some of the Pins They left in her, and those we took out, with 
Wonderment.”45  Toward the end of her suffering, however, Mather recounts quite a 
different kind of intervention.  He tells us that Short “was attended with another Spirit, 
besides those which were her continual Tormentors; a Spirit which indeed was neither 
Visible, nor, I think, properly Audible, any further than a whisper unto her; but which 
managed his communion with her chiefly by an Impulse, most powerfully and sensibly 
making Impressions upon her Mind.”46  Short’s vulnerability to demonic intervention 
also opens her mind to a benevolent intrusion from the invisible world.  The spirit offers 
comfort, and correctly predicts the day of her deliverance from the demons.  The shift 
from the demonic torture is noticeable.  In place of the visible horror of pins and blisters 
and burns, the angel provides only the gentle evidence of Short’s own timely recovery.   
Importantly, the telepathic internality of divine communication is described as a process 
of “a Spirit…sensibly making impressions” on Short’s mind.  Of course, in marked 
contrast to the pins extracted from her flesh, this “communion” is insensible to outside 
observers.  By offering us access to Short’s internal experience, the narrative transforms 
this insensible influence into sensible evidence of the divine.  When Margaret Rule is 
subsequently visited by a similar spirit, Short’s private angel experience is treated as an 
available public example:  “what lately befel Mercy Short from the Communications of 
such a Spirit, hath been the just Wonder of us all, but by such a Spirit was Margaret Rule 
now also visited.”47  Mather clearly perceives a duty not just to record the dramatic public 
disruptions of demonic possession, but also to make public the private, countervailing 
force of divine aid.  
Recent scholarship has paid increasing attention to these early modern beliefs 
about angels and their activities.  This work has been cast, in part, as a corrective to a 
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perceived imbalance in our readings of the post-medieval experience of the supernatural.  
Peter Marshall and Alexandra Walsham, examining the English context, suggest that 
“while the demons (or evil angels) who haunted the imaginations of both elites and people 
between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries have become familiar, their more benign 
counterparts remain hidden in the shadows.”48  Very much in keeping with this trend, 
scholarship in the American context has tended to focus more on the public crises 
occasioned by demonic agency than on the private comforts offered by angelic aid.  One 
notable exception is Cotton Mather’s own private experience with an angelic apparition, 
which has occasioned consistent critical interest.49  This awareness of the omnipresence of 
literal and metaphorical angels in Mather’s life, has not, however, produced a careful 
analysis of his treatment of medical miracle. His scattered descriptions of these angelic 
interventions in moments of crisis form a literature of privacy and uncertainty which has 
its roots in Mather’s demonology but takes on its full character as a persistent thread in 
his less explicitly providentialist medical writing. 
 Examples of miraculous intrusion into the ordinary suffering of illness were 
sometimes painfully close at hand.  If terrible sickness proved a powerful rhetorical 
resource for Mather, this was as much a function of its omnipresence as its extremity.  
The final illness of Mather’s first wife provides just such an instance.  Mather records the 
wrenching details of Abigail Mather’s suffering in his diary for October, 1702.  Abigail’s 
torment, like that of Short and Rule, is mentioned in part because it gives rise to an 
unusual and potentially useful manifestation of the invisible world:   
Behold a strange Thing!  On the Night after the Fast, my Consort had appearing 
to her, (she supposes, in her sleep) a grave Person, who brought with him, a 
Woman in the most meager and wretched Circumstances imaginable.  My 
Consort fell into the Praises of God, in that her Condition was not yett so 
miserably Circumstanced as that woman’s now before her.50   
This strange and heartbreaking pantomime, taking place on the indefinable border of 
sleep and dream, capitalizes on exactly the kind of cascading display that is central to 
Mather’s possession stories. The angel presents the wretched body to Abigail’s sight.  She 
watches, and gives thanks, as Mather watches through her relation, and the reader 
watches through his.  The display of the sick body radiates outward from the private core 
of the miraculous experience.  In addition to this silent and ambiguous display, Abigail’s 
angelic visitor offers practical remedies for her symptoms.  He proposes freshly cut wool 
for the pain in her breast and gum dissolved in water for her excessive salivation.51   The 
remedies are singularly effective: “unto our Astonishment, my Consort revived at a most 
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unexpected Rate.”52  This observational corollary to the miraculous tale of the angel 
provides essential evidence of the consonance of divine suggestion and empirical 
verification.  The success of the remedy was unfortunately not permanent–Abigail’s 
condition eventually worsened, and she died in early December.53  Nonetheless, this 
temporary recovery would go on to have its own life as a public example of medical 
miracle. 
Mather expresses no doubt in his diary about the authenticity of this angelic 
vision.  In fact, as we saw in our initial examination of the Curiosa letter, he felt confident 
enough to report the story to the Royal Society, although he omitted his wife’s name and 
the wrenching particulars about the angel’s wretched companion.54  Such acceptance of 
spiritual evidence was not assured.  Elizabeth Reis, in a discussion of Mather’s views on 
angels, suggests that while Mather believed in his own angelic visions, “[h]e had less 
confidence in the visions of his parishioners, especially if they were women.”55  This sense 
that women were less reliable receivers of true angelic influence is rooted in the persistent 
fear that any seeming angel could be a demonic deception.  As Reis reminds us, Increase 
Mather was quite explicit about the links between gender and Satanic delusions: “‘if those 
White Angels appear to females only, who are the weaker sex, and more likely to be 
imposed on, that renders the case yet the more suspicious.’”56  The specific charge laid 
against the female observer is that she is susceptible to being imposed upon.  This 
openness to demonic imposition is the dark mirror image of the angelic impressions that 
sustained, comforted and healed.  As we saw in the case of Mercy Short, such invisible 
influences on the female mind could be synchronized, warring elements in one complex 
experience.  More importantly, as the recorded experiences of Mercy Short, Margaret 
Rule and Abigail Mather suggest, Cotton Mather could make a virtue as well as curse out 
of female susceptibility.  In the weakened states of possession and profound illness, Satan 
could threaten these women, but they were also given access to a direct and authorized 
form of pious interaction with the invisible world.  
To fully understand the context of these individual medical miracles, a brief look 
at Mather’s pastoral medical writing is in order.  I have suggested above that Mather’s 
interest in the combination of medical and spiritual investigation was a steady theme 
throughout his ministerial career.  Important critical work has been done on the texture 
of that combination, on the way in which Mather “assigned a new significance to the 
spiritual aspects of disease, thereby exalting the specialist in affairs of the spirit, the 
minister, to a new importance.”57  I am primarily interested here, however, in one aspect 
of this rhetoric–the way in which Mather turns the spiritual and symptomatic case of an 
exemplary individual to public account.  This effort required him to establish a 
vocabulary and a method for reading between body and soul.  In a major 1698 sermon 
on the subject of illness, Mens Sana in Corpore Sano, (reprised in the opening chapter of The 
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Angel of Bethesda), Mather frames sickness-induced suffering as a multiply directed act of 
divine providence.  It is a scourge that punishes the world for its sinfulness (“flagellum dei 
pro pecatis mundi”).58  Simultaneously, the curse of illness can serve as strengthening test for 
God’s chosen:  “Diseases” as Mather says, “may be Love Tokens!”59  When read thusly, as 
part of God’s saving work, the disease is not exactly to be loved, but it is certainly meant 
to be recognized as a meaningful sign of God’s interest in the sinner.  At times, this 
reading takes the form of a kind of dogged analogical correspondence, as in this pious 
anecdote offered by Mather: “Our excellent Mitchel, being but Incommoded with an 
Hoarse Cold, wrote thus upon it, in his Diary.  ‘My Sin is Legible in the Chastisement.  
Cold Duties, Cold Prayers… my Coldness in my whole conversation, Chastized with a 
Cold.’”60  Even a cold, then, is a message from God.  A sinner in this case could read in a 
straight line, by direct causation, from his sickness to his sin, through the visible evidence 
of his symptomatic body. 
A more fully drawn case study in the physical legibility of sin can be found in 
Mather’s The Pure Nazarite.  In this 1723 pamphlet, framed as a kind of open pastoral 
letter to a young man, Mather develops an anti-masturbation argument.  Notably, he 
links physical and spiritual investigation through the imagery of demonic possession 
“Every time a Young Man commits this Impiety, he makes a new Resignation of himself 
unto the Unclean Spirit, and gives the Unclean Spirit a new Invitation to take Possession of 
him.  The Glorious Lord now permits a Devil, not unlike those who entred into the 
Gadaren Swine, to enter into him.”61  Here the gospel account of the possession of the swine 
by the legion of devils, a key text for Protestant demonologists, is repurposed in service of 
a medical and moral argument. Physical sin translates into spiritual exposure; it 
constitutes an opening, an “invitation” for the disruptive influence of the invisible world.  
The secret act becomes a kind of self-possession, a recurrent compact with devils.   
This is where the act of publication takes on medical and spiritual significance.  As 
a publicly available work, The Pure Nazarite fights the secret scourge with display.  It takes 
hidden, private shame and publicizes it, holding up the masturbator to scrutiny and so 
breaking the internalized cycle of self-possession.  The work is painful, but necessary.  
Taking his cue from the fifth chapter of Ephesians, he pronounces:  “It is a shame even to 
speak of those things, which are done of them in Secret.  But I am to write of those things, which it 
is a shame to speak of; and I shall hope to do it so, that you will be Ashamed, and also Afraid of 
doing them.”62  In keeping with this practice of display, Mather offers an anecdote about 
an Italian doctor who sought to prevent new cases of venereal disease by showing pictures 
of sufferers with advanced symptoms to healthy young men.63  Mather then emulates this 
medical and visual strategy by painting his own portrait of the impenitent masturbator: 
“If you should but see the Picture of a young man by this Impiety, reduced into a woful 
Consumption; his Visage Pale and Leane, and Stomach Depraved, and his depauperated Blood 
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fill’d with acid, and acrid Particles…[o]ne would think, it would be an Infallible 
Preservative.”64  Mather’s story, like the Italian doctor’s picture, uses the means of 
publication and representation to do real work in preventing future sickness and sin. 
What he shows the reader is how invisible physical and spiritual causes work in 
tandem, bad blood and bad actions both possess and waste the frame.   This is another 
kind of display, the publication of the medical details to match the young man’s demonic 
possession.  The literal visibility of his lean visage is subtly blended with an imagined 
vision of his blood and stomach.  The rhetorically exposed young man, the subject of 
Mather’s ekphrasis, is both a medical subject and a moral example.  He is an agent, a 
willing participant in the destruction of his health.  At the same time, his agency has been 
evacuated.  He is displayed, exemplified, and also possessed–a more or less literal 
demoniac.  As before, in the case of the young energumens, Mather’s account itself 
undeniably possesses and instrumentalizes the sufferer.  Yet, as in the cases of Lydia 
Ingram, he also invites a kind of self-possession.  In these suffering young bodies, Mather 
juxtaposes two classic requirements of his faith:  the command to patiently acknowledge 
providential intervention and the obligation to intervene, to provide, whenever possible, 
for the well-being of your body and soul.  This dual approach to the suffering body is 
symptomatic of the discursive blending that characterizes Mather’s thought about 
sickness and sin.  It’s worth keeping the young Nazarite’s simultaneously active and 
passive role in mind, as we turn to stories of miraculous healing in The Angel of Bethesda.  
There also, providential and medical discourses interact through the medium of afflicted 
young bodies.  It is the definitive rhetorical strategy in Mather’s treatment of miraculous 
medical experience.  The physical emanations of the invisible world are blended with the 
practical (and increasingly non-spiritual) vocabulary and methodology of medicine, 
through the useful stories of individuals.  As befits a volume that takes its name from an 
ancient instance of divine healing, The Angel of Bethesda makes important use of exceptional 
physical narrative in articulating its understanding of the medical and spiritual world. 
 
3. The Angel of Bethesda: Miraculous Innovation and Encapsulation 
 Modern analyses of Mather’s medical writing have tended to cluster around the 
particular issue of smallpox inoculation.  The tone was set early by Beall and Shyrock, 
who admired his advocacy of the “animacular” theory of disease and his associated work 
in promoting inoculation.  They saw in this aspect of Mather’s thought an “indication of 
open-mindedness on his part–an attitude associated, also, with an ability to select out of 
contemporary science certain ideas which were to prove of lasting value.”65  As I have 
already suggested, this characterization of Mather as a prescient selector inevitably 
involves some selection on the part of historians and critics as well.  Nonetheless, Beall 
and Shyrock’s advocacy of Mather’s significance in medical history offered an important 
early look at Mather as a scientific thinker.66  This sense of Mather as an able and 
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forward-thinking empiricist is central to my own reading of his work.  Yet in focusing so 
steadily on one retrospectively appealing aspect of Mather’s work, we risk losing sight of 
the central rhetorical objective expressed in of the Angel of Bethesda: “The Design of all this 
Essay is to Lead the Reader unto HIM” (AB, 10).  On this point, Mather could not be 
clearer.  The method of his writing is the persistent unification of the medicalized body 
and the sin-sick soul, and the ultimate purpose is salvation.   
This is the dense and rather delightful puzzle of Mather’s medical writing.  What 
are we to make of texts that put so little space between soteriology and the innovative 
treatment of disease?  The point is directly addressed in Linda Breen’s sensitive reading of 
the supernatural underpinnings of Mather’s smallpox advocacy, in which she places an 
entirely appropriate emphasis on his paramount commitment to issues of faith.  She 
clarifies the ways in which Mather’s efforts to observe and define the invisible world 
shaped his empiricism, rather than undermining it: “The struggle to separate vital 
religious supernaturalism from damnable superstition made Mather even more receptive 
to scientifically-based theories of disease than he would have been by virtue of his early 
training in medicine.”67  Breen’s reading of Mather’s career leads her to consider both 
demonic depossession and dream cures as means of thematizing conversion.  She sees 
Mather working to convince his audience that divine healing could be “carried over into 
the Lord's dealing with the ‘sin-sick’ soul, inspiring them ultimately to make an attempt at 
salvation.”68  Yet she determines that “the analogies with depossession and dream cures 
were eventually deemed imperfect because it became increasingly difficult to show how 
dream cures comported with the ‘rational’ or scientific soul.”69  With that, she turns away 
from Mather’s supernaturalism and toward his faithful engagement with smallpox 
inoculation.  I find Breen’s larger argument about the spiritual uses of bodily evidence 
quite persuasive.  Yet I think that the turn away from the dream cures has more to do 
with our own discomforts than Mather’s.  These stories have long appeared as a critical 
problem in the analysis of Mather’s development.70  Thus, Breen echoes a long line of 
readers when she describes the Mather of the dream cures as “[f]ully credulous.”71 
Even as the extent and power of Mather’s effort at combining medical and 
religious discourse becomes ever clearer, we continue to set some forms of evidence aside.  
Cristobal Silva, in the final chapter of his recent book Miraculous Plagues, reassesses the 
smallpox controversy by taking up aspects of Mather’s synthesizing drive that are central 
to Breen’s argument, and my own.  Importantly, he sets the terms of the debate on 
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linguistic and stylistic grounds:  “The representation of style as secondary to scientific and 
theological matters is part of a vision that accepts the conventions of specialized 
discourses as foregone conclusions rather than the product of contested epistemologies.”72  
He proposes to remedy this shortcoming by “reading Cotton Mather’s knotted rhetorical 
posturing as an attempt to reintegrate the growing schism between science and 
theology.”73  The introduction of rhetoric as a central concern is heartening.  It suggests 
that we can begin to see Mather’s work not just as the product of a moment of discursive 
multiplicity, but also as a sensitive critical contribution to those discourses.  Perhaps even 
more importantly, Silva shows concern for the physical bodies that constitute the real 
tragic material of the smallpox debate.  He suggests that we “pause…for a moment to ask 
what is at stake when we abstract from patients’ bodies to theories of illness and 
treatment, and how print is complicit in making those transactions.”74  This pause is a 
deeply important moment of critical self-examination, and Silva’s reading of the 
racialized bodies of the smallpox controversy has implications for the ways in which 
bodies become a kind of evidentiary currency throughout Mather’s work.   
Nonetheless, the centrality of the smallpox controversy as a site of inquiry 
continues to allow us to defer the examination of other bodies in Mather’s medical 
writing.  In this framework, the healed bodies of the miracle cures can still be associated 
with Mather’s old epistemic attachments, with what Carla Mulford calls the “cultural lag” 
between England and New England in the eighteenth century.75  This colonial 
backwardness is typified, for Mulford, by a lingering attachment to providentialism, and 
was “exacerbated when church leaders such as Mather, well read in the new science, 
turned to occult interpretation rather than rational explanation.”76  Despite continued 
interest in the cultural negotiations of the smallpox controversy, the bodily evidence of the 
miraculous cures remains a part of Mather’s “older system, which created affiliation 
between the phenomena of the natural world and what he perceived to be the divine 
providence of his God.”77  Yet if we are to take faith seriously as an intellectual and 
cultural force, how could such an affiliation constitute a lack?  Certainly that link was 
being reframed, in Mather’s time, to account for cultural changes.  In that respect, 
Mulford’s analysis of the smallpox debate as a “crossroads of early modern liberalism” 
seems apt.78  Nonetheless, some faith in the connection between God’s power and the 
phenomena of the natural world would seem to be a constitutive factor of any Christian 
belief system, no matter how modern.  If we allow faith some continuing critical force, 
Mather’s miracle stories can be read as more than an epistemic dead end.  Miraculous 
cures offer Mather a chance to talk about abstract theological and medical questions in 
emphatically physical and specific terms.  In fact, they are, by virtue of their content and 
method, very much in line with Silva’s concerns about attending to the importance of 
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specific bodies.  They centralize private and particular miraculous experience as a site 
where faith can engage with a changing world.  None of these concerns diminish as the 
eighteenth century progresses.  These medical stories may allow us, ultimately, to see the 
forward-looking possibility in Mather’s vision of miracle. 
We can best start to understand that possibility by looking at exactly how Mather 
narrates his own experience of the important advances concerning smallpox:  “It begins 
now to be Vehemently Suspected That the Small-Pox may be more of an Animaculated 
Business, than we have been generally aware of.…  And so, we are insensibly drawn into 
New Sentiments, about the Way of its [i.e. smallpox] Conveyance, and the Cause why tis 
convey’d but once” (AB, 94).  Mather is a sensitive analyst of the implications of this 
change, but also of the texture of that change, of what it feels like to be “insensibly 
drawn” into a new set of understandings.  There is a lyrical quality to Mather’s 
representation of the progress of medical knowledge.  It’s hard not to sense that he is 
aware of the importance of this shift, and the potential that it has fundamentally to 
improve scientific understanding of the causes of disease.  He is pulled toward “New 
Sentiments” in part because they have real explanatory power.  Yet there is also 
something ineffable for Mather about the way in which this change takes place.  His 
feeling of being “insensibly drawn” into the new not only captures the numinous mystery 
of intellectual change; it also insinuates the gentle necessity of the providential guide, of 
the force that draws.  
Understanding the animaculated nature of smallpox allows for the solution of the 
scientific puzzle of post-infectious immunity, and it also provides Mather with a wealth of 
theological metaphors.79  Yet the animacular vocabulary does not explain the mystery of 
its own origins.  For Mather, divine providence alone can provide the motive force for 
such a surprising and valuable intellectual shift.  The insensible pull toward the rightness 
of the animacular theory points us toward the imaginative intertwining of Mather’s 
empirical and pious discourses. The experience of discovery is miraculous, and remedy is, 
at its core, a species of miracle.  This is a thread that runs through The Angel of Bethesda, 
and we find it again in Mather’s chapter on miraculous cures:  “The Good Angels may by 
Impressions on the Mind of [shall I say, His Brother?] the Physician, or, by an Insensible 
Manuduction to the Friend or Book [suppose an hint in our, Angel of Bethesda!] that may 
inform us, How to be cured” (AB, 53).  The insensible orchestrating force that urged the 
smallpox investigations forward returns as the “insensible manuduction” that connects 
miraculous actors to earthly means.  In Mather’s writing on the dream cures, the gentle 
insinuation of the providential guide becomes a powerful and direct force.  Yet they are 
all of one piece, and the extremity of miracle, rather than being a retrograde attachment, 
offers Mather the chance to articulate the textual and physical place of the divine in a 
changing world.  
One of the principle stylistic vehicles of this articulation in The Angel of Bethesda is 
Mather’s use of the chapter. He refers to each of the chapters in the Angel as a “Capsula.”  
His medical pun subtly emphasizes his attention to the formal division of these texts, and 
their importance as unifying, enveloping containers of useful information.  What is placed 
within the capsula must not only relate thematically to the other materials, it must 
strengthen them, and participate in the beneficial effect of the whole.  The division of the 
manuscript’s sixty-one surviving capsulae allows Mather to multiply his modes of inquiry 
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under the heading of medicine, and consequently to include, but also to segregate, 
potentially objectionable material like miracle.80  The ordering of these sections can 
produce surprising juxtapositions, as at the close of the seventh capsula, on animacular 
theory.  True to the developmental theme he has been pursuing, Mather ends with a call 
for an increased use of mathematical methods in medicine:  “How much would the Art of 
Medicine be improved, if our Physicians more generally had the Mathematical Skill of a Dr. 
Mead or a Dr. Morgan” (AB, 47).  He follows this with an approving citation of an 
unnamed proponent of iatromechanical medicine: “Since the Animal Body is a 
Machine…a Blind Man might as well pretend to Regulate a Piece of Clockwork, or a Deaf 
man to tune an Organ, as a Person ignorant of Mathematicks and Mechanism, to cure 
Diseases, without understanding the Natural Organization, Structure and Operations of 
the Machine, which he undertakes to regulate” (AB, 48).  This bold claim concludes the 
seventh capsula of the Angel of Bethesda. 
 The eighth opens with the following sentence:  “It is not more Notorious, than it is 
Astonishing, that many Methods and Medicines for the Cure of Diseases, have been the 
Communications of Daemons to our World” (AB, 48).  This inauspicious swerve back to 
pneumatology appears to be the antithesis of the mechanistic line of argument he has 
only just now so capably reproduced.  Maxine Van de Wetering, in her analysis of 
Mather’s engagement with new medical ideas, reacts to this conflict in a useful way.  In 
arguing that Mather’s thinking progressed gradually toward more “enlightened 
positions,” she notes that linear progress can nonetheless be difficult to track in his major 
works:  “A chronological view… does not give sufficient guidance to Mather's maturing 
position in medicine, for he never seemed to discard any early notion in favor of later 
ones.  What he said in the early Magnalia, he repeated in Bonifacius, and much of his most 
reflective work in the Angel was a recapitulation of various earlier thoughts.”81  This frank 
analysis points directly to one of the central frustrations of reading Mather’s late work.  
How do we integrate our understanding of the curious theorist of smallpox with a mind 
that seems to recur endlessly to old fights, old beliefs and old texts?   
It is partly in hopes of addressing this question that we turn directly to the 
presumably anti-scientific category of miracle.  Recursion to old themes, the wholesale 
repetition of stories, the reassembly of previously available texts, all of these are 
constitutive stylistic features of the miraculous stories contained in The Angel of Bethesda.  
The problem, then, is not just the content, but the style, which led one critic to praise the 
book’s display of erudition, but to call the work itself “ill-digested, poorly assimilated, and 
uncritically presented.”82 The Angel is certainly not the only one of Mather’s works at 
which such charges could be leveled.  It may in fact be that his practices of assemblage 
were partly the result of haste, or were a necessary coping mechanism for a prolific and 
tireless public speaker and writer.  The purpose of this final section is not conclusively to 
explain the origins of Mather’s style, nor particularly to defend it.  However, I will argue 
that the style of The Angel of Bethesda, if sometimes a source of frustration, must be 
understood as more than a mere impediment.  Mather’s accretive style, defined by his 
                                                
80On the condition of the manuscript and its missing chapters, see:  Gordon W. Jones, 
introduction to The Angel of Bethesda, by Cotton Mather, ed. Gordon W. Jones (Barre, MA: 
American Antiquarian Society and Barre Publishers, 1972), xxxvii. 
81 Wetering, “A Reconsideration of the Inoculation Controversy,” 59, n. 42. 
82 Warner, “Vindicating the Minister’s Medical Role,” 293. 
 33 
habitual recycling of material and his achronological assemblies, is a powerful expression 
of his intellectual and methodological investments.  It has tended, however to obstruct our 
understanding of the importance of the miraculous aspects of the Angel.  We have, 
perhaps, been searching for definitive patterns of development in Mather that do not 
match either his spiritual or his scientific goals.  It may be that the apparent defects in the 
style of the Angel–its looseness, its refusal to make critical distinctions between apparently 
incompatible themes, its collocation of old and new data–are markers of a conscious, 
consistent objection to emerging restrictions on the interpretation of bodily evidence. 
Mather assembles his reflections on miraculous healing in the eighth capsula of 
the Angel, under the heading “Raphael.  Or, Notable Cures, from the INVISIBLE 
WORLD” (AB, 48).  The details of Mather’s assembly of the Raphael capsula are clearest 
when we compare it to its predecessor, the unpublished letter to John Woodward on 
dream cures, which I discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  In the Raphael capsula, 
Mather repeats the story of Lydia Ingram’s dream cure, continuing to use it as an anchor 
in his account of medical miracles.  At the same time, the surrounding materials are 
adjusted, reinforced and updated in ways that may subtly alter the reader’s view of the 
implications and the uses of miracle.  The stories vary considerably in their length, detail 
and (perhaps most significantly) in their depiction of angelic agency.  They all, however, 
depict the body as a medium for reading the action of the invisible world, and emphasize 
the care required to observe, understand and respond to that agency.  The presentation 
and the framing of these stories, as well as Mather’s subtle adjustments in their emphasis, 
help us to see his faith in the consonance of natural philosophy and miracle.  They also 
permit us to examine the rhetorical work that Mather does to solidify and defend this 
necessary connection. 
The first story Mather offers is the only one in which an angel appears in waking 
life to a sick person.  In this case a man named Samuel Wallas, terribly ill with 
consumption, is visited by “a person of an aged, but comely and lively Aspect” (AB, 49).  
The visitor gives him a recipe for a medicine designed to cure his consumption, and 
Wallas prepares it and uses it to good effect.  This tale was briefly mentioned in the letter 
Mather sent to the Royal Society as something of a commonplace, a tale that could “not 
escape” his learned reader.  Now, more than a decade on, Mather expands his treatment 
of the tale, with this introduction:  “Of the Angelical Ministry conspicuous, or at least 
probable, in Showing the Sick what to do for a Cure, I will not recite any Outlandish 
Instances:  Except One, which my Father has transferred out of Clark’s Collections into his 
Remarkable Providences.  And this I will mention, for a Reason anon to be intimated” (AB, 
49).  Here we see a simultaneous movement backwards and forwards, in keeping with the 
larger strategy of Mather’s capsula.  He makes the story’s provenance a central point.83  
Rather than hiding the link back to the genre and the spirit of his father’s providential 
catalogue, he celebrates that association.  Yet he also labels this tale of naked miracle as 
“Outlandish,” drawing a sharp distinction from the critical categories of Increase, who 
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called Wallas’ story “a strange providence.”84  This constitutes an admission on Mather’s 
part that his new catalogue cannot simply reproduce, but must also rejustify inherited 
miraculous material.  The providential content is still useful, but the evidentiary 
framework must be reformulated.   
Mather concludes his story, as his father did, with a mention of a council of 
ministers that met after the event, and determined that the visitor was indeed “One of the 
Good Angels.”  Unlike his father, however, he elides the significance of that ministerial 
approval.  Increase Mather closes his version of the Wallas story by admitting that angels 
may appear.  However he warns “for any to desire such as this is unwarrantable, and 
exceeding dangerous.  For thereby some have been imposed upon by wicked Daemons, 
who know how to transform themselves into Angels of Light.”85  In the discursive frame 
of the late seventeenth century, the ministerial stamp of approval would have been a 
valuable confirmation of the theological soundness of this widely distributed story.  Cotton 
Mather, in his eighteenth-century medical book, is much more concerned with the 
efficacy of treatments, and, by extension, with the anecdotal evidence of the suffering 
body itself.  Therefore, he allows the pleasing ministerial consensus to stand, but removes 
the context that gave rise to it.  The more important justifying anecdote for his Wallas 
story comes from the brief addendum that follows it in The Angel:  “I knew a person who 
at Fourteen Years of Age had great Symptoms of a Hectic upon him….In this Distress, he 
betook himself to this Wallasian Remedy; And now, At more that Threescore Years of Age he writes 
the Story of it!” (AB, 50).  The “Outlandish” story of Wallas is included because Mather 
himself verified the remedy by using it.  In the first detailed anecdote of the chapter, then, 
we find Mather reworking the time-honored raw materials of the providential accounts.  
His own investigation effectively balances the concerns of pneumatology and medicine by 
returning us to local, verifiable physical experience.  The exemplary figure is Samuel 
Wallas, with the weight of Mather’s forefathers behind him.  But the local experimenter 
who defuses the outlandishness of the story is Cotton Mather himself.  The young Mather 
is both a respectful and judicious inheritor of the miracle tradition and an active 
practitioner of an empiricism that can bolster and update that tradition.  Like Wallas, he 
synthesizes providential acceptance and active, precise, health-promoting activity. 
 In keeping with this effort to add contemporary and local support, the chapter 
then shifts from this providential classic to a series of “domestic examples,” three stories of 
Massachusetts women who were miraculously cured of their illnesses.  This is a 
recapitulation, but also an expansion, of the strategy Mather used in his earlier letter to 
the Royal Society.  The first example is a short account of woman’s dream, in which she 
foresees the arrival of a remedy that will cure her gout.  For his second example, Mather 
reproduces, almost verbatim, the story of Lydia Ingram from his Curiosa Americana letter.  
In spite of his well-attested reverence for the Royal Society, their disapproval does not 
seem to have carried much weight in this case.  He is unapologetic about re-presenting 
Ingram’s story as crucial medical and spiritual evidence.  Indeed, he updates the 
biographical details that close her story, adding that “She is now above Twenty years 
after alive” (AB, 52).  (The previous version had given the time elapsed time as “fourteen 
years.”)  In the face of skeptical dismissal, Mather reiterates his data, implicitly insisting 
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on its relevance and its currency.  He then extends and deepens this re-commitment with 
a new and carefully rendered story of miraculous healing. 
To complete his trio of “Domestic Examples,” Mather describes the case of a 
young woman from Falmouth named Thankful Fish.  His account of Fish’s miraculous 
healing opens in the mostly undated historical time that characterizes the preceding 
stories. Toward the end of the tale, however, he gives the first specific date of the capsula:  
“[O]n the Day following, [which was Nov. 14. 1724] she found herself yett more Able to 
Stand and Step” (AB, 52).  The date is significant in part because it comes very late in the 
accepted timeframe for the composition of the Angel.86  This historical immediacy of the 
anecdote indicates to a potential reader that the process of miraculous healing continues 
even to the very moment of the manuscript’s composition, and that the networks for 
transmitting edifying stories of miracle are intact.  The context provided by the capsula is 
also essential.  Mather has just sketched out a synoptic history of miraculous healing. He 
begins the capsula with classical precedents, progresses through the “outlandish” 
seventeenth century account of Wallas and the previously-anthologized story of Lydia 
Ingram, and then lands on the very current story of Thankful Fish.  Mather was faced 
with frank discouragement from the Royal Society and his own anxieties about the 
possibility of “Encouraging Unwarrantable Superstitions, or Affectations; or Countenancing 
any Dispositions to go out of the Ordinary Road for Cures” (AB, 53).  Nonetheless, his 
investigations of medical miracle continue.  The internal and external doubt about 
miracle is met with faithful reassertion.  He might have suppressed the material entirely, 
or let the authorized stories of past miracles stand in the middle distance of history.  The 
safe course of pious moderation, after all, was to allow that miracles had happened 
before, but did not continue at the present moment.  Instead, Mather gives us an example 
of miraculous intervention that is as current as any he could summon.  His inclusion of 
the Fish story, in view of the discouragements he faced, must be read as an argument for 
the continuing medical, spiritual and narrative relevance of miracle. 
  Despite this emphasis on the continuity of miracle, its phenomenal nature is not 
constant across the arc of Mather’s capsula.  As the stories progress, the divine presence is 
progressively dephysicalized.  Fish’s story begins much like that of Walls and Ingram, with 
debilitating chronic illness:  “In her Thirteenth Year, she was visited with Sickness and 
Weakness, for Three Months together, and followed with Fitts that had on them an 
Hysterical Aspect, which so Enfeebled her that she could neither Step nor Stand, for Ten 
Years together” (AB, 52).  For Thankful Fish, however, there is no angelic visitor.  
Instead, she has “a Strong Impression on her Mind, that if she were carried unto Rhode-
Island, she should there find a cure” (AB, 52).  Here again, the capsula divisions help to link 
and unify disparate data under a single theme.  The inclusion of the Fish story in the 
Raphael capsula, under the heading of “Notable Cures, from the INVISIBLE WORLD” 
and alongside dramatic angelic interventions, offers a means of placing her impression 
and her eventual cure under the sign of miracle.  By raising the possibility of an end to 
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Fish’s disability, the appearance of the impression advances the story’s medical narrative.  
Yet it also initiates a parallel tale of exemplary Christian behavior that reframes the 
meaning of her suffering and her cure.  When Mather talks about Fish’s “Impression,” he 
is describing a direct providential intervention.  This is the force of heaven, pressing its 
truth on her mind.  The weakness of Fish’s illness turns out to be a kind of virtuous 
vulnerability.  In an echo of Mercy Short and Margaret Rule’s openness to angelic 
influence, Fish’s body and mind are ideally prepared for the reception and transmission of 
divine suggestion.    
 The “Hysterical aspect” of Fish’s “Fitts” is crucially related to this sense of useful 
impressionability.  Mather believed women to be more vulnerable to disease in general, 
and denominated chronic, apparently neurotic female illness as “hysteria” (AB, 36).  The 
natural infirmity of the female body made the mind susceptible to hysteria, and this in 
turn opened that mind to a range of influences.  The role of hysteria was significant in his 
diagnostic work with possessed young women.87  In The Devil in the Shape of a Woman, Carol 
Karlsen alludes to these earlier encounters with young female bodies in distress.  She 
notes that Mather considered hysteria as a cause of Margaret Rule’s fits in 1693, as in this 
quote from “Another Brand Pluckt out of the Burning”:  “I do believe that the Evil 
Angels do often take Advantage from Natural Distempers in the Children of Men to 
annoy them with such further mischief as we call preternatural…and perhaps for this 
reason one sex may suffer more Troubles of some kinds from the Invisible World than the 
other.”88  Devils, in Mather’s analysis of Margaret Rule’s case, are not instigators, but 
opportunists.  The heart of Mather’s point here is that hysterical symptoms, rather than 
being an alternative diagnosis, are a possible precursor for demonic possession.  Hysteria 
provides the opening and possession is the “further mischief.”  The solution is neat, given 
Mather’s requirements.  It both coordinates the interaction of physical and supernatural 
causes and provides a hypothetical explanation for the overrepresentation of women 
among the possessed.  Yet, as we saw in the cases of Short and Rule, he does not limit the 
interaction of invisible and natural causes to devilish mischief.  Angels, too, could make 
use of this opening into the female consciousness.  In Fish’s case, the result of her 
hysterical disorder is not demonic possession, but a kind of self-possession that mirrors the 
divine will.  In these miracle stories, potentially dangerous female weakness is reframed as 
a kind of gracious vulnerability.  Here also, women’s bodies provide the most vivid 
evidence of invisible influence.  The hard stamp of divine will finds its ideal receptive 
medium in the delicate constitution of young, hysterical women like Thankful Fish.89 
Not coincidentally, Mather’s story celebrates actions (like prayer, reading, and 
listening) which indicate Fish’s willingness to be impressed upon.  When Fish is 
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discouraged by the helpless doctors she finds in Rhode Island, her hope is revived by 
miracle stories:  
[S]he was told of Several Miraculous Cures that occur’d in the latter End of the last 
Century; and Some that were Cured of Distressing Maladies, While Reading and 
Thinking on the Miracles wrought by our SAVIOUR…and Beleeving that He 
could still do as great Things as Ever.  She had good Advice given to her, to Pray 
much and ask the prayers of others for her; and hope in the Power and Mercy of 
her SAVIOUR. (AB, 52)     
Here a collection of miraculous stories like the abbreviated anthology of the Raphael 
capsula appears as a curative force.  Mather is dramatizing the usefulness of exactly the 
kind of historical context in which he has placed this very story.  The miracle tale is 
another kind of numinous stamp that impresses upon the mind.  Fish’s models the proper 
pious response to the Raphael capsula.  By attending to the miraculous stories of the 
seventeenth century, and by believing in the continuity and continuation of miracle as a 
curative force, she enacts the kind of faithful acquiescence that her own story is designed 
to elicit.  Public example both produces and enlivens personal faith. 
While this faith is the essential ingredient, it is not, by itself, sufficient.  Thankful 
Fish’s cure turns out to be the result of cooperating forces.  To fulfill the narrative 
requirements of the tale, Fish must move from the passive acceptance of divine will to the 
active expression of that will in the world.  Since she has not received her remedy by 
direct communication, she must also be receptive to ordinary exchanges.  The actual 
mechanism of the cure appears in singularly undramatic form:  “By and by, while she yett 
continued at Rhode-Island she heard mention of a Malt-Bath” (AB, 52). The idea at first 
meets with some resistance.  Mather tells us “her friends were much against her trying of 
it, but thought her so feeble that it could not be used without unhappy consequences.”  
Fish, however, refuses to yield, and we are told that she “was Impetuous and Obstinate 
for it, and would not be diverted from the perillous Experiment” (AB, 52).  In specific 
response to concerns about bodily weakness, she asserts a kind of direct will we have not 
seen before.  The force of miracle leads her not to the slow obedience of Lydia Ingram, 
but a fearless approach to the dangers of experiment. 
Mather was not alone in his interest in the tale of Thankful Fish’s experiment. In 
January of 1726, Paul Dudley, like Mather an American fellow of the Royal Society, sent 
a letter to James Jurin, then secretary of the Society, with his own description of the cure 
of Thankful Fish.  The general sequence of the story tracks Mather’s earlier relation, and 
there is considerable overlap in the specific wording, suggesting either that these two men 
communicated about the story or had access to a common source.  Despite this similarity, 
they clearly understood the story’s value in significantly different ways.  One indication of 
this divergence is the generic context in which Dudley places the tale.  In his letter, he 
presents it as the first in a series of cases under the heading “Physick” and titles it “A 
Remarkable Cure of a Person Sweating in Malt at Newport in New England October 
1724.”90  He follows it with another tale of a sweating cure, in which a woman is relieved 
of her rheumatism by sweating in rum.  This interest in sweating cures had previously 
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been encouraged by the Royal Society, which had, the year before, published a Dudley 
letter entitled “An Account of an extraordinary Cure by Sweating in Hot Turff.”91 
While the mechanism of the cure is the same in both versions of the tale, the 
impetus for its enactment differs in an important way.  Mather’s Fish is driven by the 
force of her own miraculous impression and by the anecdotal support of other miraculous 
stories.  Consequently, the discovery of the mechanism for her cure is a muted note in his 
version of the story.  As suggested above, Fish’s active receptivity to social exchange has 
important narrative implications.  In medical terms, however, Mather’s introduction of 
the  “malt bath” is casual to the point of being nonsensical.  No link at all is made 
between the bath and her particular illness.  Compare this to the way in which Dudley 
introduces the cure: “after some time, either reading or hearing of Sweating Persons in 
her Condition with Malt, she was Resolved to make the Experiment.”92  The difference is 
small, but crucial.  The introduction of previous instances of the experiment creates a 
meaningful link between Fish’s illness and her action.  The relevant comparison set for 
Dudley’s Fish is “Persons in her Condition.”  She learns about those other cases through 
social transmission, either oral or written.  If she is not actually reading Dudley’s letters 
about sweating cures in the Transactions, she might as well be.  As a reader/listener and an 
experimenter, she is a participant in the same diffuse network as Dudley and Mather.  
Her own experiment contributes to the general fund of knowledge, through the mediation 
of letter writers like Dudley.  There is a process of cyclical generation at work, as the 
transmission of cure stories produces more (and more effective) instances of cures.   
What is at work in these two stories is a similar textual strategy with radically 
different implications.  In each case, Fish’s cure is helped along by a group of stories that 
recapitulate the narrative form and purpose of her own story.  The necessary impulse for 
Mather’s Fish is divine grace.  Yet her faith was bolstered and encouraged by a cluster of 
miracle stories just like the ones that surround her tale in the Raphael chapter.  So also is 
Fish’s life saved in Dudley’s account thanks to stories like the sweating cures in his letters.  
In both instances, the collection of thematically linked stories not only frames, but also 
produces the cure of Thankful Fish.  This takes us to the heart of what Mather is (and is 
not) doing with these miracle stories.  His account positions the experimental urge as a 
product of historical and contemporary miracle.   
Dudley’s account, by contrast, is situated firmly in the contemporary context of 
knowledge production and transmission.  Susan Scott Parish uses Dudley’s letter as an 
example of the strategic aims of colonial reporters.  She argues that such accounts were 
intended to suggest that consequential empirical and interpretive work was taking place in 
the colonies:  “The colonials’ letters were not only implicit claims to legitimacy, but they 
also made explicit claims for the skills of local nonelite testifiers.”93 Parrish focuses on 
Dudley’s mention of a “Skillful Woman in the neighborhood” who performs Fish’s cure, 
a figure completely absent from Mather’s account.  This woman, with Fish as her implicit 
experimental partner, prepares the cure, of which Dudley gives a careful, presumably 
reproducible account.  His interest in the details of the procedure and its enactors stands 
                                                
91 Paul Dudley, “An Account of an Extraordinary Cure by Sweating in Hot Turff; With a 
Description of the Indian Hot-Houses; By the Honourable Paul Dudley, Esq; F. R. S.,” 
Philosophical Transactions (1683-1775) 33 (1724): 129-132. 
92 Paul Dudley to Jurin, January 21, 1726. 
93 Parrish, American Curiosity, 119. 
 39 
in contrast to Mather’s much sketchier account of the particulars of the cure.  Yet the 
generic and functional differences in these two approaches to the cure should not distract 
us from an essential similarity:  these are both accounts of experimental activity in British 
America.  Mather’s Fish is stubbornly insistent on her “perillous Experiment” just as 
Dudley’s Fish is “Resolved to make the Experiment.”  Mather’s faithful Fish, nourished 
by miracle, is comfortable and active in the social real of experiment, but she arrives there 
on different terms. 
The consonance of Dudley and Mather’s language in this moment bears directly 
on our broader examination of Mather’s complex use of miracle.  What he has 
accomplished here is a careful imbrication of experiment and miracle.  Thankful Fish’s 
tale is a celebration of the rational and faithful use of means.  Fish carries out the divine 
mission she inherits through the genealogical sequence of the Raphael stories.  In essence, 
she adapts the central Matherian concerns of attention to divine communication and 
filiopietistic respect for spiritual precedent to the experimentalist idiom of the moment.  
In Mather’s version of her story, Thankful Fish can participate in the tradition of miracle 
without the dramatic intervention of the angel who appeared to Samuel Wallas or who 
scolded Lydia Ingram in her dreams.  Yet even without this dramatic demonstration, she 
is properly cognizant of the source from which her miraculous cure flowed.  In the last 
line of Mather’s tale she is carried to a church where “she signified her Desire to have 
Thanks rendered unto God her SAVIOUR for the Wonderful Work which He had 
wrought upon her: And she continues to Walk and not faint, or complain of Weariness” 
(AB, 52-3).  This brings miracle almost literally up to the minute.  The piety of faithful 
sufferers, the direct intervention of the divine and the resulting miraculous experiment are 
working in concert to sustain the bodily and spiritual health of God’s people.  It is a vision 
of a changing present and a faithful future that has more to say about the continuing uses 
of miracle than has been supposed. 
Then, on the next line, Mather begins one more story.  It is, unlike the other 
stories, enclosed in brackets in the manuscript.  It reads like a narrative afterthought, a 
final tale on the way back to the quotations, meditations, and learned miscellanea that 
close the chapter:  “What shall one think of a passage, in the Memoirs of, Mr. Robert 
Billi[o], One of the shining Lamps of Heaven, that were extinguished in 1662” (AB, 53).94  
Here Mather dips back into the annals of Puritan piety, and comes up with a somewhat 
dusty bookend to the story of Samuel Wallas.95  With its brevity, its age, its English 
provenance and its apparent disinterest in empirical verification, Billio’s story stands in 
striking contrast to the carefully drawn, local immediacy of the Thankful Fish story.  The 
faithful core of the tale is the same, however, a direct echo of the central motivating 
structure in Fish’s story.   Deprived of the use of his legs by the gout, Billio is visited one 
day in his parlor by “a Strong IMPULSE upon his Mind, which caused him with much 
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Difficulty to creep up into his Chamber, and there with fervent Prayer pour out his Soul 
before the Lord” (AB, 53).  Billio’s gout is immediate cured, without the use of means that 
was required of Wallas, Ingram and Fish.  The power of the divine is sufficient to effect 
the cure at any point, and Billio’s “IMPULSE” echoes and reemphasizes Fish’s “Strong 
Impression.” 
As a narrative coda, the Billio story is a perfect example of Mather’s textual habit 
of circling back to old sources of pious instruction.  Coming as it does after the story of 
Thankful Fish, it may contribute to the sense that audacious advancement on the 
common terms of miracle and empirical science is ultimately impossible for Mather.  Yet 
what if, finally, we were to take the form of Mather’s chapter seriously as a product of his 
textual practice?  What if we allow the idea of the capsula to do critical work?  The term 
implies a container, an envelope in which various components can be combined.  Thus 
the historical and empirical immediacy of Fish’s tale is encapsulated by just the kind of 
exemplary pious stories that helped to save her life.  This capsule takes effect only if it is 
swallowed whole.  Mather’s vision of miracle is set up to emphasize continuity as well as 
to indicate progress, and his refusal to prioritize a recent, methodologically advanced 
story like that of Thankful Fish has the potential to mislead us.  If we consider miracles 
not as relics of old faith, but as a continuing negotiation with divine power, we see how 
they can continue to structure experience.  The recursive, repetitive process of belief and 
the way in which it demands and articulates its own frameworks of evidence and 
affirmation, has not been adequately described in our readings of Mather’s medical 
writings.  The persistence of miracle, with its startling immediacy and its eternal, looping 
return to the past, directs us simultaneously forward and backward.  In that spirit, 
Mather’s medical stories should encourage us to think not only of what was being left 
behind in this moment, but what discourses of faith, miracle and narrative were being 
perpetuated, augmented and inaugurated. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 George Whitefield and the Evangelical Figure of Miracle 
 
 
1. Deist Provocation and The Limits of Miracle 
Shortly after Cotton Mather wrote the manuscript of The Angel of Bethesda and 
reaffirmed his longstanding interest in contemporary miracle stories, a controversy began 
to grow in the London press.  Over the course of the late 1720s, a running argument 
about the proper interpretation of biblical miracle flared up into a war of words that one 
scholar has called “one of the dominating features of English intellectual life in the first 
half of the eighteenth century.”1  It was a debate that Mather (who died in 1728), could 
only have encountered in its initial stages, yet it helped to shape the transatlantic 
Protestant understanding of miracle in ensuing decades in ways that would likely have 
been broadly intelligible to him.  The provocation for the fight came from a diverse, 
heterodox group of free-thinkers and controversialists who were collectively (and 
somewhat problematically) referred to as deists.  Their objections to the orthodox 
Anglican understanding of miracle were various, but largely focused on the case against 
its status as revelation, and as evidence for the divinity of Christ.  Apologists for the 
orthodoxy of the Church of England made frequent, strident and lengthy replies to their 
arguments.2  The fact that the debate endured until the middle of the eighteenth century 
gives a sense of the degree and the duration of investment in miracles on both sides. 
As this initial focus on English religious controversy suggests, this chapter 
represents a shift, in generic, temporal and geographic terms, from my investigation of 
Mather’s writings on miracle healing.  I begin by outlining the stakes of the debate over 
miracles, with a particular focus on the eccentric and mystical writings of Thomas 
Woolston, perhaps the most infamous of the deist writers on miracle.  From there I 
proceed to a series of controversies over miracle in the early methodist movement, 
illustrated primarily through the polemical exchanges that John Wesley and George 
Whitefield carried on with the Anglican hierarchy.  Finally, I propose a reading of 
Whitefield’s miracle sermons that takes into account both the pressure of controversy and 
the requirements of evangelical religion.  In short, this chapter aims to treat the 
celebrated career of Whitefield, which so profoundly affected the American colonies, 
from the perspective of English religious controversy and theological conflict.  Its larger 
objective, however, is to use that particular textual perspective on miracles as a means of 
thinking about the emergence and evolution of the evangelical Protestant imaginary in 
Europe and America in the second quarter of the eighteenth century.   
In particular, I argue that transatlantic revivalism and the tectonic effects of 
evangelical regeneration created the conditions for important new engagements with the 
idea of the miraculous.  Confronted with extraordinary religious changes, evangelicals 
and their opponents grappled with miracle not just as a potentially problematic 
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contemporary phenomenon, but also as an evidentiary resource for spurring and 
strengthening Christian faith.  The imagistic intensity and the empirical solidity of 
miracle make it an appealing rhetorical and theological object, conveniently deployable 
as a metaphorical referent.  Yet the metaphysical significance of miracle, of the public 
manifestation of divine power, was so immense that it tended to resist containment in 
such metaphorical structures.  As a consequence, powerful metaphorical uses of the 
miraculous bled over into lived experience, and the supposedly essential division between 
Biblical and contemporary miracle proved difficult to maintain.  In the writing and 
preaching of George Whitefield, attempts to deploy and control the significant power of 
miracle ran up against questions about what could be felt, imagined and said about the 
action of the divine.   
In Whitefield’s sermons on the miracles of Christ, he turns to the great works of 
power as analogical, exhortatory and evidentiary resources.  As Christ healed and 
resurrected in the gospels, the logic goes, so also the soul of the evangelical subject would 
experience repair and rebirth in London, Scotland, Georgia and Massachusetts.  The 
challenge of this stance is as conspicuous as the opportunity.  Whitefield’s sermons called 
on believers to re-envision those distant, immensely consequential spectacles, to 
experience miracles vicariously, even while insisting that they were vanished from the 
earth, and no longer necessary in a mature church.  This process of collective, guided re-
envisioning, which I see as essential to Whitefield’s homiletics, depends upon what I refer 
to as figural miracle.  This is importantly distinct from a casualization or troping of 
miracle, its transformation into a commonplace for describing providential favors from 
God.  In this context, the figure of miracle is a highly complex and central object of 
faithful contemplation, one that Whitefield goes to great lengths to represent in all of its 
monumental significance. 
 In placing this rhetorical work in the broader context of doctrinal controversy, I 
do not focus primarily on the tactical aspects of Whitefield’s career, on polemical writing 
as a means of self-promotion.  Nor do I attempt to reevaluate familiar arguments about 
Christian revival, like the struggles over the meaning of enthusiasm or the permissibility 
of itinerancy.  Rather, I want to think about how the practice of controversy on a subject 
like miracle can shape its imaginative possibility and its rhetorical uses, and consequently 
how that concept helps to form the expressive world of the faithful.  Nonetheless, the 
focus on figural language and the representation of the miraculous has made for odd 
bedfellows in confessional terms.  In the opening pages of his weighty biography of 
George Whitefield, Arnold Dallimore describes an early-eighteenth-century England 
beset by moral turpitude and decline in piety.  In addition to crime, sodomy and the “Gin 
Craze,” Dallimore focuses on the challenge that the Church of England faced from 
deism.  For Dallimore, this state of affairs was nothing less than a spiritual battle: “The 
Deists carried on a vigorous warfare against supernatural religion – Biblical Christianity – 
and in so doing made loud boast about the reason and logic of their views.”3  Dallimore 
notes the forceful responses from the orthodoxy, but for the most part he sees a church 
too weakened by heretical teachings, temporal preoccupations and impiety to properly 
return fire.  It was a spiritual crisis answerable only by revival–precisely the kind of revival 
that Dallimore, himself a Baptist minister, hoped for in the middle of the twentieth 
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century.  Given this sense of deism as an evil that only revival could cure, it would 
doubtless seem perverse to Dallimore (and perhaps to Whitefield himself) to enter into an 
analysis of Whitefield’s career with anything more than a cursory look at the radical 
heresies of deism.  I do so not in an effort to exclude the fundamental spiritual objectives 
of Whitefield’s mission.  Rather, I think that a consideration of deist perspectives indicates 
the scope and variety of English and American Protestant thinking about miracle in the 
second quarter of the eighteenth century, and so sheds light on the particular 
representational challenges that confronted Whitefield in his evangelical work.  I don’t 
assert some hidden doctrinal commonality between the figures in this chapter.  At the 
same time, I don’t see these various approaches to miraculous figuralism as antithetical to 
each other.  Instead I think it’s important to recognize that in this moment of 
considerable religious ferment, the forms and the meanings of divine power were under 
constant, close examination, and that the intensity of interest in miracles in particular 
shaped the imaginative possibilities that emerged. 
From the end of the seventeenth century through the middle of the eighteenth century, 
English Reformed Christianity was caught up in a heated debate about the nature and 
significance of miracles. 4  Across the seventeenth century, thinkers like Spinoza and 
Hobbes had traced important challenges to the orthodox Christian idea of miracle.5  In 
the English eighteenth century however, the debate took on its own particular theological 
character, with the most violent disagreements being prompted by a group of writers 
loosely classed as “deists,” who were answered by orthodox apologists in the Anglican 
clergy.  As is the case with other famously elusive collective terms (such as “Puritan”), 
defining the scope, tenets, and individual membership of the “deist” movement has 
always been something of an historical and critical puzzle.  Certainly there was no fixed 
deist doctrine, no set of principles that would constitute a particular religious outlook.  
The major deist writers held a range of ideas about the nature and attributes of God, 
running the gamut from what we might recognize as a species of atheism to more 
mystical strains of Christianity.  In view of this fact, as James Herrick has pointed out, the 
perennial shorthand view of deist faith “as theological rationalism centered on a God who 
set the universe in motion and then stepped away” is not of much use.6  In place of this, 
something of a scholarly consensus seems to have evolved around certain broadly defined 
deist preoccupations. 7  
The most important of these, for the purposes of this chapter, is the deist objection 
to the idea of revelation as a necessary precondition for salvation.  The deists refused the 
notion of particular revelation as a patently unfair and unreasonable mystification, 
unworthy of divine perfection.  Although there were a number of important attacks on 
miracle, and countless orthodox responses, the most enduringly famous contribution was 
David Hume’s seminal essay “Of Miracles” which appeared in the Enquiry Concerning 
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Human Understanding in 1748.  While Hume is not generally classed among the deists, his 
publication appeared at the end of the prolonged debate about miracle, and in the 
waning days of English deism.  His argument touches on a number of essential points 
related to the miracle debate, and a brief summary of his famous intervention will help to 
set the parameters for my examination of earlier skeptical writings.  Hume’s treatment 
approaches miracle not as a question of direct experience, but of testimony.  The 
question, as he frames it, is not whether you might believe a miracle if you saw it, but 
whether you can trust a report of a miracle.  Hume does not reject the evidence of 
testimony, but he suggests that we are constantly weighing such testimony against our 
own experience.  In the case of miracle, the conflict between testimony and experience is 
necessarily pushed to its limit:  “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a 
firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, 
from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly 
be imagined.”8  With that, he describes a range of miracle reports, and analyzes their 
probability.  Repeatedly, his verdict is that the preponderance of testimony against 
miracles must outweigh the testimony for:  “there is no testimony for any [miracle]…that 
is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys 
the credit of the testimony, but even the testimony destroys itself.”9  While he 
conspicuously avoids a direct examination of Christ’s miracles, the reader can plainly see 
how they are implicated in his final conclusion:  “we may establish it as a maxim, that no 
human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation 
for any such system of religion.”10  The necessary result of this conclusion, for Hume, is 
the entire segregation of faith and reason:  “Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, 
not on reason; and ‘tis a sure method of exposing it to put it on such a trial as it is, by no 
means, fitted to endure.”11  Faith in Christianity is for Hume an ongoing miracle of its 
own, entirely divorced from the empire of reason.  
From the vantage point of Hume’s mid-century rejection of all testimony for 
miracle, both the diversity and the relative caution of most earlier deist writing on the 
subject is easier to see.  In one early instance, John Toland’s Christianity Not Mysterious 
(1696), the primary target is not miracle itself, but the mystification that Toland sees 
encumbering the teachings and practice of the Christian church.  In his vision of 
Christian history, the natural simplicity and reasonableness of the Gospels and the early 
church were corrupted by the fatal poison of priestcraft and ceremony.  These were 
heathen mysteries blasphemously dressed in new garb, observably different from the 
miracles of Christ, which are, for Toland, eminent models of reasonable action.  Rather 
than accepting miracles as mysteries above human comprehension, he asserts their clarity 
and simplicity on the grounds of their evidentiary function.  There is, in Toland’s 
account, no “Miracle mention’d in the New Testament, but what serv’d to confirm the 
Authority of those that wrought it, to procure Attention to the Doctrines of the Gospel, or 
for like wise and reasonable Purposes.”12  This transparent functionality is the antithesis 
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of mystery, a “thing of its own Nature inconceivable, and not to be judg’d of by our 
ordinary Faculties and Ideas, tho it be never so clearly reveal’d.”13  Matthew Tindal, in 
his Christianity as Old as the Creation (1730), the book that came to be known as the “deists’ 
bible,” takes the emphasis on the essential rationality of scripture to a new extreme.  No 
miracle, he argues, could prove an evidently vicious doctrine to be holy.  Thus the 
grounds of judging the goodness of a doctrine must lie somewhere outside of miracles–
namely, in our natural, God-given reason:  “[I]f the Doctrines themselves, from their 
internal Excellency, do not give us a certain Proof of the Will of God, no traditional 
Miracles can do it; because one Probability added to another will not amount to a 
Certainty.”14  Rather than objecting to the truth of miracles, Tindal makes them 
extraneous. 
As this survey indicates, even on the specific issue of miracles, the range of 
opinions expressed by freethinking English skeptics makes it difficult to identify a single 
deist position on miracles that would cover all particulars. This is particularly true of the 
most controversial, productive, and iconoclastic figure of the miracle debate, Thomas 
Woolston.  A Cambridge educated minister and academic, Woolston made his mark in 
the 1720s as a theological controversialist and caustic ironist, as well as a deeply 
heterodox and mystically inclined thinker.15  In a series of sensational publications, the 
most famous of which was a series of six Discourse[s] on the Miracles of Our Savior, Woolston 
advanced an extreme and inflammatory line of attack on the miracles of Jesus Christ.  It 
was a rhetorical project that would bring him near-universal condemnation and give him 
the reputation of being a dangerous opponent of Christianity.  This characterization of 
Woolston as anti-Christian is, as we will see, problematic at best, but subsequent readers 
have not managed much better.  He was a vexing figure in his lifetime, and remains one 
now, easy to caricature yet difficult to accurately categorize.  In part, this was a product of 
style, a particularly corrosive and erratic brand of ridicule, an “unrelenting burlesque of 
the Scriptural account of Jesus’ miracles.”16  The effort to sift his positive principles from 
his ironic ridicule began with his contemporaries and has continued even in recent 
decades.  Critics have disagreed about whether he can be accurately called a deist, 
whether or not he was insane, and whether he was a sloppy and mediocre theologian or 
“the first major figure in modern biblical criticism.”17  In all this analysis of Woolston’s 
significance, both in the heat of the controversy and now, even relatively sympathetic 
readers seem unconcerned with the mystical representational strategy that subtends his 
caustic rhetoric.18  As his biographer William Trapnell observes, “Woolston clearly 
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wanted to accredit a figurative, parabolic and prophetic interpretation of the Bible,” a 
project his opponents obtusely (or maliciously) ignored.19  It’s not my intention to 
diminish Woolston’s reputation for extremity and idiosyncrasy, or to argue for a 
reevaluation of his theology.  Nonetheless, Woolston’s radical figural scheme illuminates 
the special status of miracle, and the challenge of presenting the phenomenon in the 
world. 
Across his publications on miracle, Woolston persistently challenged the orthodox 
conviction that Jesus’ divinity and the truth of his doctrine were proved by his literal and 
supernatural performance of earthly miracles.  A version of the evidentiary model to 
which he was responding had been articulated earlier by Locke:  “The Evidence of Our 
Saviour’s mission from heaven is so great, in the multitude of miracles he did, before all 
sorts of people, that what he delivered cannot but be received as the oracles of God, and 
unquestionable verity.”20  Beneath this confident proclamation, however, the reader may 
detect a degree of hedging, some uncertainty about the reliability of isolated divine 
evidence.  Locke’s emphasis on the number of the miracles and on their public nature is 
indicative of what R.M. Burns calls the “moderate empiricist” position, which he also 
identifies with the writings of latitudinarian Anglicans like Joseph Glanvill and Robert 
Boyle.21  The argument for the truth of Christ’s miracles, in this case, depends upon the 
context in which they occur in scripture.  Specifically, we can be sure these acts are 
miraculous because they appear together (“the multitude of miracles”) and because of the 
excellency of the doctrine that accompanies them.  The elements of the argument are 
mutually reinforcing (critics would say circular) since it founds the proof of Christ’s 
divinity on miracles, which are themselves verified by the manifest divinity of Christ, as 
observed in his doctrine.22  The “moderate” nature of this stance consists in its 
circumspection about the extent to which an isolated miracle can function as 
incontrovertible empirical evidence.  Locke, for one, was unwilling to credit a 
decontextualized miracle as self-justifying evidence of the divine.  Instead he depended on 
the “evident marks of a greater power,” the “seals set by to his truth for the attesting of 
it.”23  Such marks are a kind of providential interpretive aid, given to humans by God to 
allow them to distinguish true miracle from “lying wonders.”  In contrast to this moderate 
stance Burns also identifies a later, less cautious position advanced by William Fleetwood 
and Samuel Clarke, among others, which he calls “extreme evidentialism.”  This 
formulation avoided the potential circularity of Locke’s argument by asserting that certain 
events, like resurrection, could be taken to be self-evidently miraculous, regardless of 
context.24  Even for orthodox Anglican apologists for rational Christianity, who could 
agree that scriptural miracles constituted a kind of empirical evidence, there was evidently 
some disagreement and concern about how, exactly, they functioned as proof. 
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Woolston, in sharp contrast to both versions of the evidentialist case, grounded his 
faith in Jesus’ “messiahship”–i.e. in his spiritual and mystical fulfillment of prophecy.  
This, then, was Woolston’s creed: “I believe upon good Authority, some of the Miracles 
of Jesus, as recorded by the Evangelists, were never wrought, but are only related as 
prophetical and parabolical Narratives of what will be Mysteriously and more 
wonderfully done by him.”25  The principle Woolston is attacking, that Jesus’ divinity is 
confirmed by the literal record of his miracles, constituted a normative truth for most 
other English divines, and they were predictably enraged by his heresy.  The complexity 
of Woolston’s opposition to prevailing literalist doctrine was perhaps obscured by the 
intensity of his ridicule and the clamorous tone of the response.  His is not, in fact, a 
totalizing attack on the principle of miracle, or on the sensory apprehensibility of the 
divine.  We should note, for example, that in foregrounding the “parabolic” nature of the 
miracles, Woolston does not insist that all of Jesus’ supposed miracles are false, merely 
that “some” were never wrought.  In the wider context of his argument, it is an important 
concession. 
Similarly, in the first of six discourses on Christ’s miracles, Woolston specifically 
promises to demonstrate “that the Miracles of Healing all manner of Bodily Diseases, 
which Jesus was justly famed for, are none of the proper Miracles of the Messiah, neither 
are they so much as a good Proof of his Divine Authority to found a Religion.”26  Again, 
this does not constitute a total rejection of miracle, since he allows that Jesus was “justly 
famed” for his healings.  While Woolston is a profound skeptic about the literal truth of 
miracles, he does not go so far as to reject the possibility of biblical miracle outright.  
Rather, he focuses our attention on what a given miracle might signify.  If we read 
Woolston’s tracts as a statement on the absence or presence of miracle at any given 
historical moment, we misunderstand his intentions.  His ultimate interest is in severing 
the connection between the sensory apprehension of miracle and divinity, not in 
suggesting that a phenomenon like miraculous healing could never exist, or must exist 
only at a certain point in time. Quite to the contrary, he argues that miracles have 
persisted since the apostolic age, and have occurred even within the last generation: 
“History affords us Instances of Men, such as Apollonius Tyanaeus, Vespasian, and of the Irish 
Stroker, Greatrex who have miraculously cured Diseases to the Admiration of Mankind, as 
well as our Jesus.”27  Rather than attacking these instances of continuing miracle as 
imposture, Woolston allows for their literal truth.28  He does so not to suggest that 
Greatrex or Vespasian might have equaled Jesus in spiritual terms, but rather, “to defeat 
us of all Distinction between true and false Miracles, which are the Object of out bodily 
Senses.”29  Woolston accepts miracle as a transhistorical fact, but denies that this fact has 
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any relevance to the mystical truth of religion.  As evidence, miracle is allowed to stand, 
but the significance of that evidence has shifted. 
The fact that the complexity of Woolston’s temporal understanding of miracle was 
overlooked by his critics is perhaps unsurprising.  Even if they had been inclined to take 
his figuralism seriously, his vituperation against the clergy and the rhetorical violence of 
his impiety would surely have put them off.  By the time he arrives at his Sixth Discourse on 
the Miracles of Our Savior, he is mounting a frontal assault on the resurrection of Christ.  He 
called this most consequential (and, for the orthodox, most indubitable) of Christian 
wonders a “Sham-Miracle, …the most bare-faced, and the most self evident Imposture 
that ever was put upon the World.”30  Such an approach was obviously not conducive to 
calm hermeneutical debate.  Acidic and sometimes erratic ridicule was Woolston’s 
rhetorical mode of choice, and even careful consideration of the structure and limits of his 
figuralism does little to soften or naturalize the extremity of his positions. 31  His attacks 
on supposedly sacred truth are ironic, varied, and sometimes almost frenzied.  More 
importantly, his positions are shaped by the structures and contingencies of controversy, 
as much as by a desire to articulate a clear doctrine.  
Nonetheless, it is in the very density and extremity of Woolston’s figural 
understanding of miracle that we encounter his most significant provocation.  He insists 
that his reader consider the possibility of an allegorical vision of miracle that does not 
merely correspond to the evidence of perception but utterly subsumes and supersedes it.  
This is a mystical, wild-eyed species of figural understanding that scorns and discards the 
sensory world, seeking to replace it with vision beyond image.  Such is his treatment of 
the miraculous transfiguration of Christ.  In his first Discourse, he calls this “the darkest 
and blindest Story of the whole Gospel,”32 thereby effectively yoking literalist 
interpretation to sensory failure.  Pursuing this theme of perceptual fallibility, he argues 
that the shining transformation of Christ and the disembodied divine voice could easily be 
produced by a magician: “we know, in these our Days that some Jugglers are strange 
Artists at the imitation of a Voice…and can cast themselves too into different forms and 
shapes, without a Miracle, to the Surprise and Admiration of spectators.”33  In a classic 
instance of Woolstonian ridicule, everyday magic and scriptural miracle commingle and 
confound each other.34   
Yet Woolston had previously offered another vision of the transfiguration, a 
totalizing figural reading that he laid out in his 1725 tract The Moderator Between an Infidel 
and an Apostate.  This text elaborated his allegorical doctrine, which he drew from his 
idiosyncratic reading of the church fathers.  The Moderator appeared before the First 
Discourse, and so it preceded the infamy of those higher flights of ridicule, as well as the 
derisive take on the transfiguration we have just encountered.  However, rather than 
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looking for contradiction or evolution in his thought, I read these two versions of the 
transfiguration as indicative of the gulf between literal and figural modes of Woolston’s 
hermeneutics.  What is at stake is not merely a shift in understanding, but a total 
remaking of the sensory faculties, and so of the means of perceiving the evidence of 
miracle.  Under the figural dispensation, the transfiguration is itself transformed from a 
ventriloquist’s parlor trick into the constitutive marvel of all Christianity:  
 For the whole Mystery of Christianism and Antichristianism is only intelligible in 
and through Jesus’s Transfiguration, which, as Gregory Nazianzen says, will be the 
grand Subject of the Contemplation of Mystisists, who, upon the Holy Mount of 
the Law, will intellectually behold how Jesus passes from one Type and Figure to 
another, and will apprehensively hear Moses and Elias reasoning with divine Logos, 
about the Harmony and Agreement between Law and Gospel.35 
This mystical vision throws an important sidelight on the epistemology of miracle I will 
trace across this chapter.  Woolston’s scornful reading of the literal transfiguration 
focused on deceptive sensory data.  Here that sensory failure is replaced by the mystical 
fullness of intellectual beholding, and that shift radically reorganizes the experiential 
dimension of the miraculous.  In what, precisely, does this beholding consist?  What 
might it be like to see such a thing with the mind, and at the same time to 
“apprehensively hear” as the “Mystisists” do?  Clearly, given the suggestive prolepsis of 
the phrasing, we cannot have this experience directly, at least not yet.   
Here I think of Cotton Mather’s retelling of the vision of his dying wife Abigail.36  
In much the same way as it was for the Mathers, the spectacle of this mystical 
transfiguration is a cascading mystery, radiating out through circles of beholding.  We, 
the readers, watch the mystisists, who watch the shifting logos.  As the circles widen, so 
does our distance from an already mysterious and intangible center.  The reader stands 
transfixed by the intellectual vision of logos, but he is separated from it by the pressures 
that crowd in on the miraculous.  For the Christian, there is no experience more essential 
that the contemplation of this mystic signifier, but it is hard not to sense that the 
experience of miracle is always happening at a temporal, narrative and imaginative 
remove.  For Woolston, legitimate Christological experience is available only through the 
figural representation of miracle.  This is an attempt at rerouting the massive empirical 
significance of miracle through the imaginative intellectual space of figural language, but 
it still depends upon the debased evidentiary frame of the miracle story. 
More broadly still, I think Woolston’s vision of the transfiguration challenges the 
empiricist separation between immediate sensory experience and intellectual vision. Why, 
Woolston asks, should we be so interested in the “experience” of miracle, in its physical 
presence?  Even more significantly, on what grounds do we divide lived experience from 
the imaginative work of parable and figuralism?  For Woolston, the actual experience of 
miracle would not constitute a colossal rupture, a transcendent piece of evidence, or even 
particularly a surprise.  It would be the kind of experience you might equally expect to 
have on a London street at the hands of a showman, or in the presence of the living God.  
Neither experience would constitute an ultimate proof–rather it would be a distraction 
from the intellectual harmony of logos, the mystical truth of Christ.  His version of 
deceptive sensation renders the idea of “authentic” miracle meaningless. What replaces it 
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is an analogical sensorium–the practice of intellectual beholding.  If we take this effort 
seriously, we can glimpse the stifled power in Woolston’s vision.  Rather than weakening 
the power of miracle, he attempts to multiply and disperse it, to render it as an eternal 
future state of unlimited comprehension.  Woolston’s mystical decontextualization of 
miraculous power is an extreme formulation, but one that offers us a key into the 
complexity of other treatments of miracle in the period.  To summon miracle, even by 
analogy to higher truth, is always to deal in potentially deceptive imagery, to trouble the 
border between external and internal sight.  The figural deployment of miracle, the ways 
in which it is named by association and comparison, gave it an important, 
underexamined life during the upheaval of the religious revivals that were to come.   
 
2. Whitefield, Wesley and Methodist Controversy  
Woolston, dogged by fierce condemnation and rumors of madness, was ultimately 
tried and convicted of blasphemy, and died under that sentence in 1733.37 Yet the heat of 
the controversy he had ignited outlived him considerably.  Years later, the famous 
itinerant preacher George Whitefield would remember Woolston as he defended himself 
in his own controversies with the Anglican clergy.  Whitefield enters my account of 
miracle in this period in part as an instance of the essentially trans-oceanic character of 
these religious debates. His kinetic itinerancy embodied (and indeed helped to create) an 
evangelical Christianity that was beginning to understand itself in global terms.38  This 
reading of Whitefield as a cultural force, as the transatlantic eighteenth-century Protestant 
par excellence, should be balanced, however, by careful attention to the exact nature of 
the spiritual product he promoted.  Whitefield made miracle a focus of a number of his 
famously well-attended and repeatedly published sermons, and in so doing promoted his 
own figural view of the miraculous.  Where Woolston was concerned to defend a spiritual 
reading of miracle against any literal interpretation whatsoever, Whitefield and his fellow 
evangelical revivalists were obliged to balance orthodox fidelity to the letter of Christ’s 
miracles with a more immediate and urgent commitment to the work of the spirit in the 
world.  Whitefield’s writing, alongside that of contemporaries like John Wesley, offers 
another vantage point on the changing object of miracle, and its relation to categories of 
evidence, apprehension and spiritual experience.   
At the same time, these early evangelicals operated in an intellectual climate that 
had partly been shaped (and continued to be influenced) by the deist miracle 
controversies.  Like Woolston, Whitefield understood the value of controversy in 
promoting a polemic, and his barbs found some of the same targets.  Indeed, Whitefield’s 
fervent and public evangelism brought him into conflict with some of the very men who 
had shouted down Woolston, including Richard Smalbroke, Bishop of Lichfield and 
Coventry.  Woolston had dedicated his Third Discourse on the Miracles of Our Savior to 
Smalbroke, then Bishop of St. Davids.  By way of reply, the Bishop published A Vindication 
of the Miracles of Our Blessed Saviour (1729), a two-volume work that ran to over 1000 pages.  
In 1741, he turned his sights toward the methodists, and preached against their alleged 
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enthusiasm in a sermon that was published in 1744.39  Later that year, while on board a 
ship to the colonies, Whitefield wrote a response to the Bishop’s accusations under the 
title “Some Remarks upon a late Charge against Enthusiasm.”  In that text, Whitefield 
specifically takes up the issue of miracle and its limits.  The core of the Bishop’s charge, as 
Whitefield outlines it, is that evangelical belief in “the indwelling and inward witnessing of 
the Spirit” constituted an “enthusiastical” faith in “the extraordinary gifts and operations of 
the Holy Ghost.”40  In other words, Whitefield asserts that the Bishop is charging him 
with an impermissible belief in the external, miraculous, continuing operation of the Holy 
Spirit.  Whitefield’s response looks back to the Bishop’s condemnation of Woolston 
almost fifteen years earlier.  While joining in the rejection of Woolston’s doctrine, 
Whitefield slyly accuses the bishop of his own extremism: “as he justly charged the 
infamous Woolston with sticking too close to the spirit, and not minding the letter, has he 
not in this performance so closely adhered to the letter, and so sadly neglected the spirit, 
as almost totally…to exclude the Holy Ghost in his operations, since the primitive times, 
our of the Christian world?” (WGW, 4:186).  Thus Whitefield could tweak his opponent 
and claim a virtuous middle ground between the heresy of Woolston and the formalism 
he perceives in the bishop. 
This was, by the middle of the 1740s, a familiar move for Whitefield.  He had 
offered a similar argument five years earlier, in answering a pastoral letter from Edmund 
Gibson, then Bishop of London.  The Bishop’s letter was addressed “To the People of his 
Diocese…By way of Caution, Against Lukewarmness on One Hand, and Enthusiasm on 
the Other.”  The letter is in large measure an assault on the social and doctrinal threat of 
itinerancy and revivalism.  The Bishop spends the bulk of the letter trying to hang the 
charge of enthusiasm around Whitefield’s neck, largely by quoting suspect passages from 
his recently published Journal.   The bishop anchors this charge of enthusiasm in the 
distinction between the ordinary and the extraordinary works of the Holy Spirit.  The 
extraordinary works are those by which the apostles and others: “were enabled to work 
Miracles, and speak with Tongues, in Testimony that their Mission and Doctrine were 
from God.  These have long since ceased.”41  Whitefield’s response, Answer to the Bishop of 
London’s Last Pastoral Letter, rejects the charge, and takes up the challenge and the 
opportunity of public controversy.  Like much of Whitefield’s work, the Answer was 
rapidly and widely disseminated in print.  It was penned in August of 1739, and was 
published in London, New York and Philadelphia before the year was out.42  In the letter, 
Whitefield is careful to emphasize his moderate credentials, and he grounds his self-
defense in the disavowal of present-day miracle: “according to your Lordship’s own 
definition, I am no enthusiast.  For I never did pretend to these extraordinary operations 
of working miracles, or speaking with tongues, in testimony that my mission and doctrine 
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were from GOD” (WGW, 4:9).43  Thus for both the Bishop and Whitefield, miracle is 
useful in this debate mostly as a safely alienable limit case, a way to define the terms of 
impermissible excess.  Whitefield’s tactical pledge of assent to the Bishop’s cessationist 
doctrine does not, however, entail a complete retreat from the reality of direct divine 
experience.  The Bishop asserts that enthusiasts are deluded “by a strong Persuasion on 
the Mind, that they are guided in an extraordinary Manner, by immediate Impulses and 
Impressions of the Spirit of God.”44  Whitefield, however, asserts that such a belief must be 
groundless to be unlawful – God can and does work in such ways.  While he is willing to 
allow that the external, evidentiary power of miracle does not testify to his mission, he will 
not sacrifice the resource of internal apprehension. 
The terms of this debate provide an outline of the central structural and 
intellectual dynamics of the controversies over revival and enthusiasm.45  Whitefield 
agrees with the bishop that “Lukewarmness and enthusiasm, are the two rocks against 
which even well-meaning people are in danger of splitting,” and thanks him for the 
reminder (WGW, 4:5).  Given this consensus that there were perils on each side, a 
rhetorical combatant like Whitefield or the Bishop of London had only to slide the 
continuum in one direction or another, to place himself more nearly in the center, and his 
opponent nearer one of the perilous rocks.  Whitefield works to distance himself from the 
enthusiast’s position, while simultaneously shifting the Bishop and the rest of the Anglican 
hierarchy closer to lukewarmness.  There, is, of course, an inherent weakness to this 
apparently safe middle position. With enthusiasm and lukewarmness both at arm’s length, 
Whitefield is forced to defend himself on both flanks, creating a pincer effect that is both a 
spiritual peril and a rhetorical challenge.  In his highly public writings he must defend 
evangelical faith in direct divine action, and at the same time he must police the discourse 
and reprove the actions of his more radical contacts within the revival movements.  In the 
context of his debates with Anglican authority, this generally entails a refusal of miracle as 
an operative contemporary category.  
This was not universally true of Whitefield’s evangelical contemporaries.  To take 
one particularly important example, John Wesley staked out a significantly different 
position from Whitefield on contemporary miracle.  The relationship between Wesley 
and Whitefield, which lasted for decades, was characterized both by loving friendship and 
strident theological disagreement.  In his formative years at Oxford, Whitefield was 
befriended and greatly influenced by John and his brother Charles, members of the group 
of pious youths known as the Holy Club.46  As their respective ministerial careers 
developed, however, John Wesley and Whitefield came to differ publicly on doctrinal 
matters, particularly on the crucial issue of predestination.47  In 1739, Wesley published a 
sermon called Free Grace, which called into question a number of fundamental Calvinist 
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theological assertions.  Whitefield’s published responses, The Perfectionist Examined (1740) 
and A Letter to the Rev. Mr. John Wesley (1741) took Wesley to task for this apparent 
Arminian turn.  This theological rift was never fully healed, although the personal 
relationship between the two men eventually improved.  The rupture highlights the 
importance of internal, as well as external, controversy in shaping Whitefield’s early 
career.  It also indicates the degree to which the status of divine evidence was up for 
debate within the emergent evangelical movement.  Famously, in deciding whether to 
follow the urgings of his heart to speak against predestination (and thus risk causing 
dissension), Wesley was encouraged by the dramatic emotional reactions of his auditors.  
In need of further proof, however, he turned to the Moravian practice of drawing lots to 
divine God’s will.  The lot that he drew read “Preach and print,” and so he did.  In a 
letter from September, 1740, Whitefield expressed his dismay over the ensuing 
controversy.  In that letter he implicitly links his theological objections to concerns about 
Wesley’s evidentiary approach:  “O that you would be more cautious in casting lots!  O 
that you would not be too rash and precipitant!  If you go on thus, honoured sir, how can 
I concur with you?”48  Even as he dueled in print with the Bishop of London about the 
divine evidence for his own commission to preach as he saw fit, Whitefield stood ready to 
debate not only the doctrine, but also the methods of his fellow evangelical preachers.49  
He was strenuously careful, however, to place his disagreements with Wesley in the frame 
of evangelical unity and love, evidence of a cordiality that survived between the two men 
long after this conflict.50 
Anglicans outside the evangelical movement, with none of Whitefield’s much 
protested love for Wesley, would of course be even more direct in their criticisms of his 
standard of evidence.51  In 1745, the Anglican controversialist Thomas Church initiated a 
lengthy and sharp dispute with Wesley.  The polemical exchange that ensued offers 
insight into the uncertain status of miracle in the early days of methodist evangelism.  
Church opened his attack with a letter published under the title Remarks on the Reverend Mr. 
John Wesley’s Last Journal.  The letter is focused on a critical reading of Wesley’s fourth 
journal, which appeared in 1744.52  The broader argument of the Remarks recapitulates 
the basic terms of the attack on enthusiasm advanced by the Bishop of London against 
Whitefield, insisting particularly on the bad consequences of “resting so much on sensible 
Impressions, which cannot be Marks of the Spirit.”53  According to Church, this 
enthusiasm, so threatening to the good spiritual and temporal order that he would see 
maintained, is nothing more than “ a false Conceit, or an ill grounded Persuasion, of an 
extraordinary divine Power and Assistance.”54  Church’s focus on false conviction is 
essential.  Wesley’s error, according to Church, is not that he believes in something 
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impossible (extraordinary assistance), but rather that he is falsely persuaded that he has 
received such dispensations.  In effect, he is self-deluding, producing sham versions of the 
only evidence that would prove his doctrine beyond doubt.  “An enthusiast is sincere, but 
mistaken.…  Hence he talks in the Stile of Persons, who were really inspired, and who 
proved their inspiration by the plainest Miracles.”55  The objection to enthusiasm here is 
twofold.  On the one hand, Church’s critique is stylistic, proceeding from an attitude of 
High Church condescension that pervades his part of the controversy with Wesley.   In 
this mode he figures methodist enthusiasm as a kind of clownish pretension, an 
unpersuasive (but nonetheless dangerous) mimicry of true inspiration. On the other hand, 
this posture requires Church to defend the miraculous precedent that he accuses Wesley 
of imitating; to support the existence of “plainest miracle,” and to separate it from the 
subordinate orders of divine intervention in the world.   
As we will see, Church was in fact an avid and celebrated defender of historical 
miracle.  He also stood ready, however, to pounce on the barest suggestion of 
contemporary miracle.  One of his key points of contention has to do with a story that 
Wesley relates in his journal about travelling, tired and alone, on a dark, rainy night: 
“Being wet and weary, and not well knowing my way, I could not help saying in my 
heart, (though ashamed of my want of resignation to God’s will) O that thou wouldst ‘stay 
the bottles of heaven’! or at least give me light, or an honest guide…Presently the rain 
ceased; the moon broke out, and a friendly man overtook me.”56  Church’s response to 
this anecdote is scathing: “This it is to be so great a Favourite of Heaven.  The whole 
Course of Nature must be suspended to prevent your suffering some trifling 
Inconvenience.  The Rain must immediately stop, the Lights of Heaven shine, and a Man 
be directed to travel your Way, for fear your important Person should be injured by the 
Wet and Cold.”57  Immediately after this attack, anticipating his opponent’s response, 
Church offers this refinement on his point:  “Don’t Sir, mistake and accuse me of being 
against a particular Providence.  There is a great Difference between this and such 
miraculous Interpositions in your Favour.  If you would not have us look upon what you 
here relate as being miraculous, there is nothing in it worthy of being related at all.”58  
Once again, the objection mingles a critique of style and a defense of doctrine.  In 
Church’s framing, Wesley’s story must fail on one count or another.  If it is claim to 
miracle, it is a remarkable story but an absurd pretention on doctrinal grounds.  If it is an 
account of special Providence, it’s doctrinally admissible, but a bad story.  This return to 
style continues an implicit argument that enthusiasm is always a violation of decorum in 
the most serious sense.  This has a particularly important consequence for understanding 
how the pressures of controversy affect the eighteenth-century understanding of miracle.  
Church, as an apologist for good Anglican order, is working to subdue not just the actions 
of evangelical factions, but also the expressive and imaginative dimensions of their piety. 
Pursuing this same line of attack, Church then turns to a series of wonderful cures 
reported by Wesley, both those he claims to have experienced himself and those he 
observed among the faithful.  In particular, Church pounces upon the speed with which 
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relief comes to the sufferers:  “Once you represent a Woman in the very Ravings of 
Blasphemy and Despair; and on you desiring two or three...to join in crying to [God] on 
her Behalf, you add, immediately ‘that horrible Dread was taken away.’”59  The emphasis 
that Church places on the claim of immediacy is of special importance.  In sifting the 
evidence of a natural process like healing, the rate at which that healing occurs is 
especially significant.  Evidently Church is less impressed than Wesley by the rate of 
change over time:  “there is no need of supposing these Recoveries miraculous.  Some of 
them were not instantaneous.  In some Cases the Disorder was only removed for the 
present, and returned again shortly.”60  Finally, in the closing pages of the letter, Church’s 
prodding of methodist evocations of the miraculous comes to a head:  “Please then to 
answer coolly and seriously, can you work real and undoubted Miracles?  You know, you 
and Mr. Whitefield have been frequently called upon for these.  I can hardly imagine you 
will in earnest pretend to them.”61  Here Church amplifies his charge in doctrinal and 
personal terms, directly accusing Wesley and Whitefield of being sham miracle workers. 
Wesley responded to Church’s first attack via a letter, published in Bristol under 
the title An Answer to the Reverend Mr. Church’s Remarks.  In countering Church’s ridicule of 
the rain story, he defends the anecdote as an instance of “particular Providence” and 
disavows any suggestion of miracle.  On the topic of the sudden healings, however, he 
argues for a mixture of divine and natural causes.  In so doing, he returns the debate to 
the grounds of essential definition.  Wesley puts the question to Church thusly: “What do 
you mean by Miraculous?  If you term everything so, which is not strictly accountable for, but 
the Ordinary Course of Natural Causes; then I deny the latter Part of the Minor Proposition” 
[i.e. that a belief in miracles makes one an enthusiast].”62  Church, in his reply, (his 
second and last letter in the controversy), criticizes Wesley’s tolerance for the mixture of 
divine and natural causation in disease and healing: “It would have been kind to have let 
us know your Rule, by which you distinguish these, or at least to have pointed out the 
Cases which you think wholly natural … However some of these you’ve here allow to be 
in Part supernatural.  Miracles therefore are not wholly ceased and disclaimed by you.”63  
According to Church, Wesley’s healing accounts would then be considered heterodox on 
two counts–they violate a clear separation of natural and supernatural causation, and 
they transgress the historical limits set up by the church’s doctrine of cessation. 
Wesley’s second and final response to Church, published under the title The 
Principles of a Methodist Farther Explained (1746), ends the controversy without either party 
seeming to have given significant ground.  In this letter, Wesley makes some of his most 
extensive and plainspoken remarks on the topic of miracles.  On the evidence for 
miraculous healings, he stands his ground:  “I acknowledge, that I have seen with my 
Eyes, and heard with my Ears, several Things, which, to the best of my Judgment, cannot 
be accounted for, by the ordinary Course of Natural Causes, and which, I therefore 
believe, ought to ascribed to the extraordinary Interposition of God.  If any man chuse to stile 
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these Miracles, I reclaim not.”64  The events were, he continues, observed by a multitude 
of witnesses, who are willing to swear oaths to what they saw.  Finally, though, he offers a 
direct refusal of the doctrinal basis of Church’s objection:  
I do not know, that God hath any way precluded himself from this exerting his 
sovereign Power, from working Miracles of any Kind or Degree, in any Age to the 
End of the World.  I do not recollect any Scripture, wherein we are taught, that 
Miracles were to be confined within the Limits either of the Apostolick, or the 
Cyprianick Age: Or of any Period of Time, longer or shorter, even till the 
Restitution of all Things.65 
At the end of a long exchange, which swirls in large part around the nature and extent of 
God’s supernatural action in the world, John Wesley flatly denies the principle of the 
cessation of miracles.  Although he is careful to avoid claiming a direct personal role in 
the operation of those miracles, he maintains the possibility of immediate, unfettered and 
contemporary divine action in the world.  Significantly, Church himself did not abandon 
the issue at the close of this conflict.  Several years later, he would enter into controversy 
with quite a different opponent, Conyers Middleton, whose A Free Inquiry into the Miraculous 
Powers (1749) had attacked the credibility of the church fathers.66  Church’s defense of 
post-apostolic miracles, A Vindication of the Miracles (1750) suggests that more than 20 years 
after the scandal over Woolston, the argument over the legitimacy of historical miracle 
was still going strong.67   
I will address the historical origins and the theological complexities of the doctrine 
of cessation at greater length in the following chapter.  In the more immediate context of 
this chapter, however, Wesley’s refusal to submit on the question of cessation brings up an 
interesting contrast with Whitefield, who was much more circumspect about reports of 
miraculous events, at least when speaking within the evangelical fold.  On June 12th, 
1739, only shortly before the beginning of his controversy with the Bishop of London, 
Whitefield sent a stern letter to the Fetter Lane Society.  The Society was founded in 
1738 by the Wesley brothers and a group of fellow Anglicans, and it was strongly 
influenced from the outset by Moravian principles, particularly through the guidance of 
the young Moravian minister Peter Bohler. Moravian piety had an important early effect 
on both of the Wesleys and on Whitefield, and Fetter Lane was a crucial locus of that 
influence, becoming, as Colin Podmore puts it:  “the main seed-bed from which the 
English Evangelical Revival would spring.”68  Nonetheless, the zeal of the participants, 
and the variety (in both intensity and form) of their oppositional positions toward the 
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established church, led to frequent conflict.  The particular trouble that prompted 
Whitefield’s letter was occasioned by the influence of the radical movement referred to as 
the French Prophets, some of whose members intermingled with in the Society in 1739, 
claiming the gift of prophecy.69  While Whitefield writes here in this case in support of the 
Wesleys’ more moderate position in the conflict, his chastising of the Fetter Lane Society 
is reminiscent of his split with the brothers over predestination. 70 It offers another 
example of a steady love for fellow evangelists, marred occasionally by pointed 
disagreements about doctrine and behavior.  
In the letter to the Fetter Lane Society, Whitefield cautions against the teachings 
of radicals, and takes a much harder line on miracles than Wesley would later do in his 
struggle with Church.  In particular, he warned against those who preach that “there will 
be a power given to work miracles, and that now CHRIST is coming to reign a thousand 
years upon the earth” (WGW, 1:50).  Whitefield reproves this tendency, arguing that the 
visible miracles of the Bible have conclusively ceased, and were no longer needed, in any 
case:  “[I]f we have the thing already, which such miracles were only intended to 
introduce, why should we tempt GOD in requiring further signs?”  In refusing to allow 
that miracles might resume as the millennium approached, Whitefield maintains the 
outward coherence of the cessationist position.  Yet the particular terms with which he 
makes his argument are worthy of our close attention:  “What need is there of miracles, 
such as healing sick bodies, and restoring sight to blind eyes, when we see greater miracles 
every day done by the power of GOD’s word?  Do not the spiritually blind now see?  Are 
not the spiritually dead now raised, and the leprous souls now cleans’d?” (WGW, 1:50).  
Whitefield’s version of cessationist doctrine describes a categorical shift in the experience 
of the divine, whereby the significance of miracle is transferred from the literal to the 
figural.  In contrast to Woolston’s approach, the move into the spiritual register does not 
obviate the importance of the literal content of miracle.  Importantly, the representative 
miracles he highlights here are directly concerned with the visible repair of the human 
body.   Contrary to the spirit of his rhetorical questions, there was a manifest and 
constant need of physical healing in the congregations he addressed, as Whitefield knew 
very well.  Much as it did for Cotton Mather, the omnipresence of physical suffering 
creates an immediate bodily correlative for spiritual desire that is expressed through a 
faith in contemporary miraculous healing. These miracles of the flesh then cede their 
place not to something new entirely, but to a metaphysical transformation.  In his 
exchanges with Wesley and the Fetter Lane Society, Whitefield was plainly unwilling to 
go as far as some of his associates in countenancing contemporary miracle.  Nonetheless, 
he repeatedly frames the issue of divine action and power in the terms of miracle.  In this 
spiritualizing approach, the hunger for healing, for divine intervention, had to be 
channeled toward its correlative in the spiritual imagination. 
   This transfer is one of the great tasks of Whitefield’s evangelism, which excites 
the processes of public, visible divine interaction, but then spiritualizes and internalizes 
them.  In that spiritualizing process, the naked power of the scriptural miracle remains a 
vital rhetorical tool for encouragement of the faithful.  Whitefield, despite his many 
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differences from Woolston, is caught in a similar analogical bind.  He is trying to harness 
the spiritual power of miracle by means of its physical imagery, without at the same time 
insisting upon its literal reality.  Paradoxically, this requires him to recur to the literalizing 
tropes of sensory apprehensibility.  As Whitefield says, “we see greater miracles every day 
done by the power of God’s word.”  In the context of this intra-evangelical dialogue, 
reassertion of the cessation of miracle conduces, strangely, to a daily experience of 
“visible” miracle.  Deprived of literal miracle, supposedly the apotheosis of divine 
evidence, the faithful are comforted by the greater miracle of their vital experience of the 
new birth. 
Nancy Ruttenburg, in her work on Whitefield and “spectacular conversion,” 
identifies a similarly paradoxical relation between limited human faculties and unlimited 
divinity.  She approaches the issue primarily through the vocal expression, rather than the 
sensory apprehension of divine truth, but the relation to the category of miracle is 
compellingly similar.  Speech, in Ruttenburg’s reading of Whitefield, is both tantalizingly 
liberatory and entirely bounded.  Even as it provides experiential access to divine ecstasy, 
it reminds the speaker of the conclusive limitations of mortality.  The solution to this 
problem is to die: “Death, and particularly death in the pulpit, becomes...the only way in 
which the paradox of speech–as a metaphor for the miracle of conversion, which brings 
life out of death, exaltation out of humiliation–could, as it were, be consummated.”71  
Miracle reemerges here as the signal means of imagining the instantaneous transmutation 
of limited experience (like speech or sight) into unlimited divine truth.  To this it seems 
necessary to add that the “miracle of conversion” is itself a metaphorical construct, and a 
fraught and powerful one at that.  To claim any faith in contemporary miracle was to risk 
the charge of enthusiasm.  As his exchanges with both the Anglican bishops and 
evangelical congregations has indicated, Whitefield was aware of the value of maintaining 
some strategic ambiguity with regard to the association between miracle and conversion, 
even as he urged the figurative link upon the regenerate: “A great work is begun in 
America, at Georgia, South Carolina, New-York, Philadelphia and New-England.  GOD has 
confirmed the word by spiritual miracles and signs” (WGW, 1:242).  Caught up in the 
heady expansion of the revival, Whitefield tiptoed to the edge of defensible analogy.  
This equivocation touches upon one of the key elements of Ruttenburg’s analysis 
of Whitefieldian preaching and theology–the notion of “uncontainability.”  For 
Whitefield, Christ (and by extension the minister of the Word), cannot be contained by 
linguistic or physical boundaries.  The limits that Reformed orthodoxy placed on the 
operations of miracle are plainly just such a containment structure, an instrument of 
theological and discursive limitation.  The principle of cessation obliged orthodox 
Protestants in the period to agree that God remained capable of working miracles (i.e., 
that he is uncontainable) but also to believe that they lived (by the accident of history) in a 
moment where the operation of that power was remitted.  The mediated nature of figural 
miracle permits an escape.  Figuring the new birth as a daily, constant, spiritually visible 
miracle permits Whitefield to disallow a faith in contemporary miracle while insisting 
upon a steady exercise of uncontained divine power.  It is this doubleness, the push away 
and the pull towards, that charges Whitefield’s infrequent deployments of the actual term 
“miracle.”  Ruttenburg quotes one such instance, in which Whitefield links his own 
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physical infirmity to the imaginative promise of divine intervention and miraculous 
healing:  “Christ’s labourers must live by miracle; if not, I must not live at all; for God 
only knows what I daily endure.”72  Whitefield’s doctrinaire insistence that he neither 
works nor experiences miracles is balanced (and unavoidably subverted) by this somewhat 
offhand reference to miracle as a sustaining force in daily life.  He expects no literal divine 
healing for the congregations, yet he lives by miracle.   
This is what the fire of evangelism looks like when it circulates in a world of 
transatlantic controversy.  If Whitefield’s willingness to engage in controversy helped to 
elevate his profile essential to his success, it also exerted pressure on his approach to 
miracle. As we have seen, opponents like Thomas Church were actively surveilling 
methodist publications for evidence of enthusiastic transgression, ready to pounce on 
apparent heterodoxy.  These conditions were a source of opportunity in the work of 
awakening–baiting church authorities was unquestionably good press for Whitefield.  Yet 
it also created an intensely charged atmosphere for his expression on the subject of 
miracle.  By the time Whitefield began to preach in America, his enemies had already 
shown a willingness to scrutinize minutely any hint he dropped on the subject, and 
publish in response.  Moreover, the fight over the figural and literal status of miracle first 
whipped up by men like Woolston was nearly twenty years old.  Metaphorical references, 
like Whitefield’s reflection on living by miracle, emerge into a theological, polemical and 
figural crucible.  In the most direct sense, this rhetorical context could lead to a kind of 
reflexive caution among supporters of the Whitefield’s itinerant preaching.  In his Memoirs 
of the Life of the Reverend George Whitefield John Gillies reprints a series of letters testifying to 
the effectiveness of his ministry in Scotland.  One such letter, by a Mr. Willison, minister 
of Dundee, describes the operation of GW’s evangelism in the following terms:  “I have 
myself been witness to the Holy Ghost falling upon him and his hearers oftener than 
once, I do not say in a miraculous, though an observable manner” (WGW, 7:94).  It is a 
version of this very effort–to frame a public, observable, and deeply significant divine 
intervention while segregating it from miracle–that preoccupies Whitefield in his sermon 
literature.  A representative instance appears in his sermon on “The Folly and Danger of 
Being Not Righteous Enough”:73 
If these are what they expect; I speak with humility, GOD, by us, hath done 
greater things than these: many, who were dead in sin, are raised to scripture-life: 
those, who were leprous by nature, are cleansed by the Spirit of GOD; those, who 
were lame in duty, now run in GOD’s commands; those, who were deaf, their 
ears are unstopped to hear his discipline, and hearken to his advice. (WGW, 5:126) 
To fail to attend to such events, and to demand physical miracle is, for Whitefield, “only 
Deism refined” (WGW 5:126).  It is the “letter-learned,” the “scribes” who call for 
physical evidence of miracle, when the spiritual evidence of God’s power surrounds them.  
Yet the analogical bind inherent in this position is immediately clear.  The great work of 
the new birth, so evident to the faithful, can only be made manifest in text here through 
the figure of literal miracle.  It is the effort to convey this continual, daily apprehensibility 
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of divine action in the mode of figural intangibility that structures, complicates and 
enriches Whitefield’s approach to miracle in his sermons.   
 
3. Whitefield’s Sermons and the Imaginative Space of Miracle 
 In The Marriage of Cana, a sermon published in 1742, Whitefield recounts the 
miracle of Jesus’ transformation of water into wine.  In good evidentiary form, he argues 
that the primary purpose of Jesus’ action was “‘to shew forth his glory,’ or to give a proof 
of his eternal power and godhead” (WGW, 6:71).  Yet the dominating rhetorical drive of 
the sermon points us beyond simple visual verification: “Thus, my brethren, I have 
endeavoured to make some observations on the miracle itself.  But alas!  this is only the 
outer court thereof, the veil is yet before our eyes; turn that aside, and we shall see such 
mysteries under it, as will make our hearts to dance for joy, and fill our mouths with 
praise for evermore!” (WGW, 6:69-70).  The literal content of the miracle offers the 
occasion for deeper, transporting mysteries of the incarnation of Christ.  His sermon 
carries his readers and listeners up through an ascending chain of figural implications, 
drawing out the Christological essence of this miracle.  This climb out of the world of 
flesh and letter carries us, like Paul, into an ineffable third heaven beyond mortal speech 
and thought: “Oh the invisible realities of the world of faith!”  That final figure, “invisible 
realities” is as finely balanced and as evocative of his paradoxical faithful empiricism as 
Thomas Woolston’s intellectual beholding on the mount of transfiguration.  Thousands in 
the fields and squares of England and the colonies would have apprehended Whitefield’s 
miraculous figuralism, and contemplated a living miracle that was at once uniquely 
comprehensible to their regenerate eyes and ears and utterly beyond them.  
The operation of grace through and on the senses is a central theme in another of 
Whitefield’s miracle sermons: “Blind Bartimeus.”  The sermon focuses on a passage in the 
tenth book of Mark where Jesus heals a blind beggar.  In his opening, Whitefield draws 
particular attention to the dual purpose of Christ’s miracles:  “The miracles of Moses, 
agreeable to the Old Testament dispensation, were miracles of judgment; the miracles of 
JESUS, who came to bear our sickness and heal our infirmities, were miracles of mercy, 
and were wrought, not only for the cure of people’s bodies, but also for the conversion of 
their precious and immortal souls” (WGW, 5:404).  It is the simultaneity of this action, the 
cure of body and cure of soul, that captures Whitefield’s imagination in the Bartimeus 
sermon.  This sermon is constructed around an analogy between physical and spiritual 
disability, which is expressed through meditation on the miraculous healing power of 
Christ. Here Whitefield figures the hated and blameworthy incapacity of the soul that 
results from human sin through the natural, blameless blindness of Bartimeus.  The two 
sides of this analogy are plainly not equal partners.  Whitefield’s spiritualizing discourse 
makes it clear that our internal disability, produced by original sin, is of far greater 
concern than our physical impairment:  “if thou art in a natural state, thou art as blind in 
thy soul, as Bartimeus was in his body; a blind child of a blind father, even of thy father 
Adam, who lost his sight when he lost his innocence, and entailed his blindness, justly 
inflicted, upon thee, and me, and his whole posterity” (WGW, 5:414).   
When Christ calls Bartimeus to him, the blind man’s obedience to this command 
is an indication of his desire to return to spiritual sight.  The immediate conferral of sight 
not only heals the physical organ but also awakens a particular kind of pious aesthetic 
sensibility.  In the case of Bartimeus, Whitefield tells his audience: “I believe he received 
also a fresh addition of spiritual sight, and although others saw no form or comeliness in 
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the blessed JESUS, that they should desire him; yet he by an eye of faith discovered … 
transcendent excellencies in the royal person” (WGW, 5:413).  The sermon itself for 
Whitefield becomes a process of collective re-seeing, of correcting a carnal failing in our 
vision.  He models the use of this sight with a visionary descant on the moment of 
restoration: “O! happy Bartimeus! … Methinks I see thee transported with wonder and 
admiration, and all the disciples and the multitude, gazing around thee” (WGW, 5:413).  
This is the climactic instance of a literalizing vision, and it plays on the reciprocal, 
communal act of “gazing” upon which the printed sermon depends.  Reading 
Whitefield’s text is already an act of imaginative envisioning, inseparable from the 
persona and the imagined image of the most celebrated speaker in the Atlantic world.  
Here in a miraculous apotheosis, he redoubles that imaginative vision, inviting the reader 
to a plane of spiritual vision where, significantly, and a bit oddly, what the reader sees 
there is a static scene of looking: “the multitude gazing around thee.”  The sermon’s 
readers are spectators watching spectators, and the layers of recursion are a reminder of 
the fundamental value of historical miracle.  At the same time, this is a scene of adoration, 
a recreation of that moment in time when a believer could see, hear and touch the 
incarnate beauty of Christ.  There is of course a danger in this fantasy, a lure toward 
enthusiasm.  The imaginary contemplation of the miraculous event, in its appeal to our 
natural sight, threatens to trap the reader in a corrupt literalism:  “A natural man, indeed, 
goes no further than the outward court of the Scripture, and reads this, and the other 
miracles of our blessed Saviour, just in the same manner as he reads Homer’s battles, or 
the exploits of Alexander.  But God forbid, that we should rest in only hearing this matter 
of fact” (WGW, 5:414).  The mixing of reading and hearing seems anything but 
accidental here.  It is the hearing of this sermon, this interpretive guidance, that will steer 
the faithful clear of the snares of “matter of fact.”  With that, Whitefield urges his hearing 
readers to restore their spiritual sight, and so to complete the far greater half of the double 
healing that Bartimeus received.  Yet the narrative arc of the miracle makes itself felt–we 
are, post the miraculous event, in the space of denouement, and the call to turn toward 
Christ occupies only the last few pages of the sermon.  The trap of literalism, of dallying 
in the outward court, threatens the form of the sermon too.  It is precisely in the essential 
final stage, the turn toward a saving faith, that the risk of dependence on the miracle 
reveals itself.  The narrative material is exhausted–the great work of rebirth is no certain 
corollary to the hearing of the miracle.  The practice of analogy can take Whitefield’s 
readers and auditors to the edge of revelation, but it may spend its rhetorical force in 
getting there. 
Perhaps Whitefield’s most sustained and searching effort to put miracle to saving 
use in the sermon form is his discourse on The Resurrection of Lazarus.  Here his fierce 
engagement is keyed to his sense of this particular miracle’s preeminent importance, 
which he sees as calling for “our particular and most serious meditation” (WGW, 6:104).  
The argument for its importance is founded upon the stark evidentiary force of 
resurrection, which is the greatest imaginable act of power over the human body.  It is 
also, however, tied to a sense, which pervades Whitefield’s sermons on the gospels, of the 
extraordinary divine care given to the orchestration and sequencing of events.  In this 
case, the steadily ascending wonder of Christ’s earthly miracles creates something like a 
dramatic arc:  “the nearer he came to the end of his public ministrations, the greater and 
more noble did the miracles which he wrought appear” (WGW, 6:103).  The observation 
is likely not Whitefield’s own.  Indeed, remarks on both the wonder of the miracle and its 
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careful timing appear in William Burkitt’s Expository Notes, a biblical commentary 
Whitefield had recommended highly in his autobiography.74  The comparison helps to 
remind us what the sermon offered for Whitefield.  As both a literary genre, and an act of 
performance, it provided an opportunity not so much for interpretive novelty as for the 
methodical, public exploration of the visionary spiritual space of miracle.   
This last point bears comparison to Harry Stout’s important characterization of 
Whitefield as an “actor-preacher, as opposed to a scholar-preacher…a performer rather 
than a theoretician.”75  While acknowledging Whitefield’s unswerving devotion to 
Calvinism, Stout positions him primarily as a great homiletic innovator who anchored his 
ministry in passion and “restored narrative to the center of preaching.”76  This link 
between heart religion, preaching and narrative is an essential component of Whitefield’s 
lifelong evangelical project, and the presence of the theater (and theatricality) as both 
agon and model is fundamental to understanding how those essential elements were 
woven together.  Indeed, in the Lazarus sermon, Whitefield figures Christ as something of 
a master stage-manager, an orchestrator of spectacle.  In leaving Lazarus dead for days, 
in bringing his audience from a great distance, Christ magnifies the public impact of his 
work of power:  “[H]ow wisely were all things ordered by the blessed JESUS, to manifest 
his glory in the most extraordinary manner, that not only his disciples might have their 
faith confirmed, but also many of the Jews might believe on him” (WGW, 6:112).  If the 
implicit analogy between stagecraft and miracle seems a bit coarse, that is part of the 
wager that Whitefield makes in treating the topic.  His homiletic strategy depends upon 
the idea that a re-narrating (or, put more forcefully, a guided public re-envisioning) of this 
ultimate miracle will reproduce the confirmatory and converting effect that it had in the 
original.  If it succeeds, there could be no greater justification for a theatrical approach, 
and no better way to defeat the implicit, perilous association between a well-orchestrated 
miracle and the staged deceptions of a charlatan. 
As in the Bartimeus sermon, Whitefield’s most pointed uses of this strategy seek to 
create a total experiential analogy between three ordinarily distinct layers of reception–
watching the miracle, attending to the sermon, and reading the text.  Again, this effort is 
marked by a focus on the sensory conditions of the miracle: “How gradually does our 
LORD proceed, in order to engage the people’s attention the more!  Methinks I see them 
all eye, all ear, and eagerly waiting to see the issue of this affair” (WGW, 6:119).  With the 
deployment of his visionary cue word, “methinks,” Whitefield prompts (and himself 
enacts) a fantasy of pure receptivity, as Christ’s audience (and presumably his own) 
become “all eye, all ear.”  As we proceed, the intimacy of the relation between the 
divinely orchestrated miracle and the dramatic structure of the sermon becomes ever 
clearer.  Finally, in the instant of the expression of power, of the actual performance of 
the miracle, there is a kind of temporal and experiential fusion:  “And now the hour of 
our Saviour’s performing this long-expected miracle, is come” (WGW, 6:121).  This 
climactic instance, representation as re-experiencing, prompts a now familiar rapture 
from Whitefield, which imaginatively collapses Christ’s audience with his own:  “What a 
fright was here!  Methinks I see surprize sit upon each spectator’s face:  as the body rises, 
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their wonder rises too.  See how they gaze!  See how their looks bespeak the language of 
astonished hearts; and all with a kind of silent, expressive oratory” (WGW, 6:121).  
Sermon and miracle, both public spectacles, merge as two audiences behold one fact.  
Appropriately, Whitefield closes the scene with an expression of hope that the sermon will 
spur belief in Christ just as the miracle did, that the effect, as well as the means, will be 
homologous. 
What we would seem to have in the Lazarus sermon is an intense confirmation of 
Stout’s sense that “theater won the contest for Whitefield’s personality, even as 
methodism won the contest for his soul.”77  The finely balanced antagonism between 
these two forces is part of what produces the famously intense effects of his sermons, and 
The Resurrection of Lazarus is no exception.  Yet there is also something more here, a 
difference dependent upon the special status of miracle as a theological and imaginative 
object–especially this particular miracle.  For Whitefield and his contemporaries, 
resurrection is the most surpassingly excellent and indubitable of immediate divine 
actions.  It depends, after all, on an absolute and normally inviolable binary–alive or 
dead.  The starkness of the distinction separates it from healing miracles more generally, 
which accelerate a natural process past some loosely defined threshold into the realm of 
supernatural effects.  More importantly, in its totality, its immediacy and its analogical 
content, it vividly resembles that fundamental evangelical Protestant construct, the New 
Birth.   
It is this idea that Stout finds at the center of Whitefield’s preaching, the very 
essence of a ministerial practice that declined theological speculation or doctrinal 
reinforcement.  This is heart religion, an affair of the senses:  “The new creation of which 
he spoke was not a ‘mere metaphor’; it was as self-evident and palpable as a ‘tasteless 
palate’ suddenly brought alive at a sumptuous feast.”78  This is an elegant encapsulation 
of Whitefield’s evangelical commitments.  It also applies, in general terms, to his homiletic 
approach to miracle.  His discomfort with speculative theology, for example, can be felt in 
his unwillingness to pursue the implications of miracle beyond the limits of the text:  “And 
now perhaps, some may be ready to ask, What news hath Lazarus brought from the other 
world!  But stop, O man, thy vain curiosity! It is forbidden, and therefore useless 
knowledge.  The scriptures are silent concerning it.  Why should we desire to be wise 
about what is written” (WGW, 6:121).  There is in this an element of orthodox 
nervousness about occult investigation, the same spirit that led Whitefield to scold Wesley 
for casting lots.  More generally, though, his comment indicates a studiously self-limiting 
interpretive practice, rooted in the literal, the useful, and the immediately apprehensible.  
His favorite Puritan sources tended to hew to this line too, emphasizing practical divinity.  
In surveying the account of Lazarus’ resurrection, Matthew Henry’s exposition shows a 
similar epistemological modesty–his concern is with the effect, and not the cause:  
Power went along with the Word of Christ to reunite the Soul and Body of 
Lazarus, and then he came forth.  The Miracle is describ’d not by its invisible 
Springs to satisfy our Curiosity, but its visible Effects to confirm our Faith… In a 
World of Sense we cannot frame to our selves, much less communicate to others, 
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any adequate Ideas of the World of Spirits, and the Affairs of that World; let us 
not covet to be wise above what is written.79   
This is a divinity of surfaces, of sensory reception and empirical verification.  Miracle, 
then, should be a tool for explication, and not for mystification.   It should produce a 
feeling of wonder, certainly, but also of clarity.  
Here perhaps we have the most direct contrast between Whitefield’s imaginative 
regime and that of Woolston, the mystical deist.  Miracle is not, for Whitefield, a tool for 
plumbing the depths of God’s nature, for seeing the true and eternal face of logos.  
Importantly, it is also not simply a coin stamped with the value of Christ’s divinity, as the 
most literalizing evidentialists might have it.  Instead it offers a chance for collective 
contemplation of a literal, sensible, but also ineffable New Birth.  Miracles are doing 
imaginative work in the sermons of George Whitefield, in a way that has not been 
properly accounted for.  My purpose here is not to promote Whitefield as an 
underappreciated theologian or a doctrinal innovator.  Rather, I want to show how direct 
focus on the miraculous reveals a local conflict that opens up to broader questions.  When 
viewed from the perspective of Whitefield’s discussion of Lazarus, the vanquishing of 
metaphor and the separation of the New Birth from “mere” figure, seems an ambitious 
and not uncomplicated goal.  After all, in the case of Lazarus, the fact of resurrection and 
the feeling of the new birth are unavoidably linked through analogy, a comparison 
between physical and spiritual rebirth.  Given Whitefield’s evangelical motivations, 
miracle appears not for its own sake, but as a way to stimulate, to make more vivid, the 
sense of the New Birth as a literal, non-metaphorical event; the soul rises from the grave 
of perdition like Lazarus from his tomb. Yet the potential neatness of the analogy is 
disturbed by two factors that I have already discussed.  The first is the charged, unstable 
nature of the miraculous referent, so often a chief locus of controversy.  The second is 
Whitefield’s preoccupation with the conditions of performance.  In the final movement of 
the sermon, Whitefield summarizes his fondest hopes for its saving effects:  “Would to 
God that my preaching upon the resurrection of Lazarus today, may have the same 
blessed effects upon you, as the sight of it had upon some of the standers-by” (WGW, 
6:122).  The contemporary compliment to the resurrected Lazarus is not then the 
resurrected soul of the convert, but the sermon itself.  The sermon takes the place of the 
miraculous work, and Whitefield’s hearers become the viewers of the risen corpse, their 
reception of the truth indicated by the “silent, but expressive oratory” of their faces - “as 
the body rises, their wonder rises too” (WGW, 6:121).  Spiritual engagement with the 
scriptural fact of miracle must always also be a verbally mediated re-visioning of the 
sacred event that attempts to erase temporal distance.  For Whitefield, that process is best 
represented in the terms of public spectatorship, but of a knotty, complex and multivalent 
sort, in which contemporary and ancient audiences comingle, and the preacher becomes 
the thaumaturge. 
At this point, one might reasonably object that any sermon on scripture depends 
on some version of this imaginative spectatorship, this process of re-envisioning.  What is 
particular about Christ’s great works of power, however, and what makes them such 
attractive objects of spiritual and imaginative contemplation is the way in which they 
reorganize causal relations.  The point is emphasized in Burkitt’s commentary on 
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Lazarus: “His Humane nature is the exemplary cause or pattern of the Resurrection.  For 
which Reason Christ is called the first born from the Dead.  For tho some were raised before 
him: Yet was his Resurrection the cause of their Resurrection.”80  Lazarus rises because 
Christ will rise–the great work of salvation is always assured.  As Matthew Henry puts it 
in his commentary on the same passage: “Tho’ the Miracle was not yet wrought, yet the 
Prayer was answered, and he triumphs before the Victory.”81  Thus the temporal 
sequence of past miracle and present sermon is inevitably and constitutively disrupted by 
miracle, and the faithful are always imaginatively watching an unmediated performance 
of divine wonder. 
A recognition of the complex consonance of the event and the figure of 
resurrection takes us to the threshold of a larger question.  Why, finally, is the status of 
miracle in Whitefield’s evangelism best understood through a literary analysis of his 
written texts?  What status does the content of these printed and circulated sermons have 
in establishing the degree of his influence and the character of his public spiritual 
imagination?  Along these lines, in the context of a broader argument about the 
importance of orality in early America, Sandra Gustafson argues that Whitefield’s 
message was not just crucially linked to his performance of it, but also to improvisation.  
In a trend that she connects to Solomon Stoddard’s earlier effort to discourage reading 
from the pulpit, Gustafson sees Whitefield’s habitual extemporaneous preaching as an 
essential contribution to American evangelical piety: “Whitefield made affective 
extemporaneous preaching of the kind that Stoddard advocated the sign of evangelical 
commitment.”82  That commitment, combined with Whitefield’s immense celebrity, 
sparked a kind of fashion among American preachers: “After Whitefield’s first American 
tour, ministers declared their dedication to the evangelical party by leaving their 
manuscripts in their studies and preaching extemporaneously.”83  Taken together with 
Stout’s powerful argument about Whitefield’s fundamental theatricality, one might begin 
to wonder if specific textual formulations matter at all when thinking about the 
importance of these hugely influential sermons.  Was Whitefield, in essence, a creature of 
public style, who made dramatic use of a limited range of borrowed figures?  To respond 
in the affirmative would be no discredit to Whitefield, whose goal, it should always be 
remembered, was the salvation of souls–literary accomplishment, if it arrived, would be at 
best a means to that essential end.  In reading the published remains of these magnetic, 
improvisatory performances, are we actually reading Whitefield, in a meaningful sense?  
Is The Resurrection of Lazarus, as a published text, a significant reflection of Whitefield’s 
spiritual power? 
One potential answer to that question comes from Frank Lambert’s analysis of 
Whitefield as a creature of the transatlantic press.  He was, Lambert reminds us, a central 
and active node in an evangelical print network:  “The Grand Itinerant operated at the 
center of a voluntary network of evangelicals who disseminated revival news by reprinting 
reports in local newspapers, relating progress to ministers, and distributing Whitefield’s 
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latest writings.”84  Lambert cites the volume of Whitefield’s publishing, including 90 
editions in 1739, the year in which he began his American tour, and print runs in the 
thousands.85  Perhaps more importantly, however, he notes the carefully planned 
symbiosis of performance and print that this frantic activity represented: “Adopting what 
he termed a ‘print and preach’ strategy, Whitefield bracketed his oral sermons with 
publications that first prepared men and women to hear the gospel and then reinforced 
the spoken word with a more enduring instrument.”86  In addition, many who did not 
hear Whitefield in person were affected by his print evangelism.  One of Lambert’s 
examples of this extended textual reach is particularly interesting in light of Gustafson’s 
point about the centrality of improvised orality in Whitefield’s mission.  A community in 
Virginia, lacking an acceptable evangelical pastor, “worshiped by reading Whitefield’s 
sermon’s aloud.”87  For this congregation at least, orality, textuality, performance and the 
aura of the Grand Itinerant were interwoven in a complex and deeply spiritually 
stimulating manner.  Guided only by lay readers, their congregation grew and thrived. 
  It is partly with the experience of this congregation in mind that I advocate for a 
close examination of the textual record of Whitefield’s thinking about miracle.  Major 
studies of Whitefield, like those I draw on above, have had a great deal to say about the 
mechanics of his mission and message, and rather less to say about its imaginative 
content.  This focus on the technical aspects of evangelical itinerancy has taught us a 
great deal about how the social world of the Protestant church changed in England and 
America across the eighteenth century.  It is less useful, however, for explaining the depth 
and the resonance of the mental landscape conjured by preachers like Whitefield.  What 
he spread, in his transatlantic career, was a captivating imaginative regime, as well as an 
electrifying pastoral mode.  At the same time, the emphasis on ideas in Whitefield should 
not be taken as an effort entirely to divorce his perfomative work from his message, to 
make him a philosopher.  It’s hard to imagine one of his contemporaries attributing his 
appeal to refined intellectual force, as Samuel Hopkins did in his beautiful description of 
Jonathan Edwards’s preaching: “his words were so full of Ideas, set in such a plain and 
striking Light, that few Speakers have been so able to command the Attention of an 
Audience as he.”88  Rather, in publicly celebrating Christ’s miraculous actions, he shaped 
the broader Protestant imaginary, reminding the readers, hearers and speakers of his 
sermons that Christian piety is a process of continually re-apprehending those 
performances.  His vision is not empirical, like Mather’s or cosmological, like that of 
Edwards.  Rather it is rooted in the fundamentally social dynamics of display and 
perception.  It is the figural techniques of literary representation that enable his 
continuous, public recreations of the miraculous events that stand at the center of his 
evangelical piety. 
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Chapter Three 
 
History, Law, Grace:  Jonathan Edwards and the Problem of Miracle 
 
 
1. Cessation 
With regard to the history of the Christian religion, Jonathan Edwards makes his 
doctrinal position on miracles quite clear:  “[T]he first hundred years of the Christian era, 
or the first century, was the age of miracles.  But soon after that, the canon of the 
Scripture being completed, when the apostle John had written the book of 
Revelation…these miraculous gifts were no longer continued in the church.”1  Edwards is 
articulating an orthodox view of miracles broadly referred to as the doctrine of cessation.  
Although this doctrine is primarily associated with Protestantism, the principle of the 
historical limitation of miracle appears in Christian theology long before the 
Reformation.  A version of the idea can be found, for example, in Augustine, whose 
substantial and varied writings on miracle would later provide ammunition for both 
supporters and critics of the doctrine.2   
Historians have traced the more particular formulation of cessationist doctrine 
from which Edwards’ position descends to the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.  
D.P. Walker’s essay on the subject suggests that while Luther and Calvin offered 
occasional and cautious statements on the cessation of miracle, Protestant polemicists of 
the late sixteenth century turned repeatedly to the idea in an effort to “discredit 
contemporary Catholic miracles and to justify the lack of Protestant ones.”3  Catholic 
missionaries and apologists were equally strident in their opposition to cessationism, as 
Alexandra Walsham has shown in her analysis of miraculous discourse in the Counter-
Reformation.  Walsham argues that the promotion of contemporary miracles as a 
uniquely Catholic phenomenon offered comfort to an embattled minority population in 
England, as well as providing leverage in winning converts.  Consequently,  “[v]igorous 
rejection of the Protestant precept that miracles had ceased…became an increasingly 
prominent feature of English Catholic polemic in the course of Elizabeth’s reign.”4  
Protestants returned fire:  “In their determination to uphold the axiom that miracles had 
ceased, polemicists like Samuel Harsnet, John Gee, and Richard Sheldon devoted much 
space to describing the ‘lying wonders,’ ‘mendacious prodigies,’ and ‘egregious 
impostures’ by which the Jesuits and their secular brethren sought to seduce the credulous 
laity and prop up the reputation of the Antichristian papacy.”5  The ferocity of this 
debate is a good reminder that the doctrine of the cessation of miracles had its roots not 
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in calm theological speculation, but in the heat of a struggle for the religious future of 
Europe.    
Walsham’s reconstruction of the debate shows us how miracle circulated in the 
polemical context as a linguistic sign:  
Every sect could wrest the biblical text to its advantage, said the Irish Jesuit 
Richard Archdekin in 1667, but when the Lord ‘speakes by works ... they cannot 
be controverted’.  It was in this sense that Catholic writers spoke of miracles as the 
‘very woord’ and ‘divine sentence’ of God. As Edward Worsley wrote in reply to 
the Restoration bishop Edward Stillingfleet, these were His ‘legible Characters’ 
and ‘Seals and Signatures of truth.’6  
The doctrine of cessation was a product of discourse, but miracle itself is a discursive 
object, and this was ultimately a fight over the legibility and the significance of the 
miraculous sign.  That significance depended, to a great extent, on the context in which 
the question of miracle was being debated.  In a separate discussion of early modern 
English beliefs about the cessation of miracle, Walsham argues that dogmatic Protestant 
doctrinal assertions were molded by the polemical context in which they were expressed.  
She suggests, in concurrence with Anthony Milton, that much of English Protestant 
doctrine was characterized more by variability and pluralism than by stability and unity: 
“The point certainly seems true in relation to the cessation of miracles. When the clergy 
addressed the question in other discursive contexts their answers were not so cut and 
dried.”7  There turned out to be a number of basic articles of faith at stake in the concept 
of contemporary miracle, most notably the essential, sovereign independence of divine 
will.  This made it difficult for Protestant thinkers, at least in their calmer moments, 
comfortably and permanently to reject the idea.  
In Miracles in Enlightenment England, Jane Shaw extends the historical scope of this 
debate by deepening the experiential and narrative evidence against rigid cessation.  
Shaw’s book focuses on English Protestantism in the second half of the seventeenth 
century and the first decade of the eighteenth century, a context that I consider to be one 
of the essential intellectual and historical foregrounds for eighteenth-century American 
writings on miracle.  One of Shaw’s crucial interventions in the historiography of 
cessation is her rooting of broader assertions about theoretical multiplicity in the actual 
reported experiences of individual English Protestants.  Acknowledging, with Walker and 
Walsham, that the doctrine of cessation emerged initially from a Protestant disdain for 
Catholic wonders, she goes on to note that “while official condemnation of miracles 
occurred…other Protestants nonetheless reincorporated a belief in the occurrence of 
miracles in their day into their theology and practice.  In short, there existed a real 
diversity of belief and practice about miracles among Protestants.”8  Shaw takes the 
doctrine of cessation and places it in conversation not just with Catholic thaumaturgy but 
also with the miraculous ideas and experiences of Baptists, Quakers, Huguenots and 
others.  Ultimately, she argues that in this context there emerges a “new theology of the 
miraculous in a Protestant context, over and against the official Protestant doctrine of the 
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cessation of miracles.”9  I will return to this rich diversity of Protestant belief, and to its 
consequences for Jonathan Edwards’ thought, over the course of this chapter.  For the 
moment though, let me say that while I use the word “cessation” (and its various 
derivations) throughout this chapter, I do so advisedly, in keeping with my general 
concurrence with the arguments outlined above.  I mean for the idea of cessation to 
connote an important trend in Protestant theology, but I do not associate it with a stable, 
codified, or completely triumphant set of beliefs. 
Indeed, Cotton Mather’s writing provides a useful American example of the 
complexity of the question of cessation.  While one might see traces of the influence of the 
doctrine of cessation in Mather’s cautious faith in miracles, he clearly did not feel himself 
bound by a firm prohibition against asserting the continuing extraordinary operation of 
the divine.  Indeed, I think Shaw’s insight about the turbulence and variety of Protestant 
thinking about miracle outside or against the frame of cessation has important echoes in 
the American context that are just beginning to be explored.  Recent studies of writings 
about supernatural events in early America have shown that the limitation of miraculous 
phenomena to the scriptural past was by no means a universal principle.  Important 
attention is now being paid to the range of extraordinary and potentially miraculous 
events (healings, visions, prophecies etc.) that were recorded by eighteenth-century 
American Protestants.10  This work builds on a previous generation of important studies 
that explored the diversity of supernatural practices and beliefs in early America, moving 
the conversation beyond a preoccupation with witchcraft.11  We are beginning to see a 
clearer picture of eighteenth-century Anglo-American Protestantism, one that gives the 
continued life of miracle its due.   
That growing scholarly interest in these lived experiences of divine power is 
forcing us to confront the ways in which the experiences of the faithful challenged 
prevailing cessationist doctrine.  Thomas Kidd’s article “The Healing of Mercy Wheeler” 
is perhaps the most significant recent examination of the power and the vulnerability of 
cessationist doctrine in eighteenth-century America.  In his summary of both the context 
and the intellectual stakes of the cure narrative of a woman named Mercy Wheeler, Kidd 
suggests that the principle of cessation led to a kind of self-censoring caution in 
chroniclers of extraordinary events.  His central example is the author of the Wheeler 
account, one Benjamin Lord.  As Kidd puts it: “Reformed Christians, including Lord's 
Puritan forebears, believed that special providences sometimes led to surprising recoveries 
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from grievous maladies, but not to instant healings.  Lord was not prepared to take on the 
centuries-old assumption that miracles, including immediate healings, no longer 
occurred.”12  This sense that extraordinary cases required rhetorical and theological 
circumspection seems entirely accurate.  Yet Kidd’s broader argument, that a resurgent 
interest in miracles was a phenomenon of the revivals of the 1740s, seems too temporally 
limited to me, in light of the growing body of work on miracles.  Indeed, the evidence 
Kidd himself presents throughout his article serves as a reminder that the agreement 
among Reformed Christians about the possibility of miraculous healing was nowhere 
near total, either before, during or after the events we refer to as the Great Awakening.  
In fact, as I argue in this chapter (and throughout this project) the principle of cessation is 
always necessarily constituted by the pressures of challenge and doubt.   
In part, this challenge came from a continual stream of novel claims to miracle, 
like those that persisted in England and America throughout the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  I will touch upon those miracle stories in this chapter, and I 
consider a full acknowledgment of their continuity and importance to be essential to my 
aims in this project.  Yet miracle stories and their relation to cessation are not at the 
center of my analysis in this chapter.  Rather, I show how the doctrine of cessation was 
susceptible to internal conflict, not just on experiential, but on theological, linguistic and 
narrative grounds.  I understand this conflict to be rooted in the unique potential of 
miracle as a signifier, its power and desirability as a form of divine communication.  It is 
on this point that Jonathan Edwards assumes his primary significance for my project.   I 
propose that in reading Edwards’ writing on miracles we need to extend ourselves beyond 
the binary of the cessation and continuation of miracles, and attend to the knotty 
multivalence of his approach to extraordinary divine intervention.  Ultimately I will argue 
that Edwards is unwilling, despite his impressively reasoned cessationist convictions, to 
surrender the possibility of contemporary miracle, or the rhetorical power that 
accompanies it.  While Edwards was, by the standards of his time, nothing like an 
enthusiastic proponent of present-day miracle, his approach to the subject bespeaks a 
desire to exploit its potential, accompanied by an equally important need to contain its 
problematic force.  To understand the delicate nature of this project, it is essential to 
review the rhetorical, doctrinal and controversial status of contemporary miracle in mid-
eighteenth century New England.  
While Edwards could spar with Old Light thinkers like Charles Chauncy over the 
significance and permissibility of certain modes of religious expression, he tended to agree 
with the critics of the revival that claims to contemporary miracle were illicit.  Yet the 
grounds of this assumption were, I would argue, under pressure, and always had been.   
This was not only because they occasionally conflicted with lived experience, but also 
because miracle itself is so vital to the larger evidentiary claims of Christian belief.   My 
intention is to show that miracle itself is (as I put it in my discussion of Edwards) 
“polysemous.”  The root of the quandary of miraculous evidence is theological, as 
Jonathan Edwards well understood.  He explicitly recognizes the impossibility of limiting 
or predicting arbitrary divine power, while at the same time arguing that some effort must 
be made to separate spiritual truth from delusion.  The response he cultivates to this 
problem is a literary one, an allusive communicative mode that allows him to balance the 
empirical requirements of his moment with the sovereignty and the ineffability of his 
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God.  To explain that response, I want first to consider two discourses of Edwards’ day in 
which miracle played a central role, namely the debates over “enthusiasm” and “deism.”  
I will turn first to criticisms of “enthusiastic” belief in miracles, as presented in the 
writings of Edwards’ Boston opponents and their theological predecessors. 
 
2. The Specter of the French Prophets: Miracle and Enthusiasm 
The threat of intemperate zeal, for Charles Chauncy, lay in its power to disrupt 
stable structures of all kinds.  Across his writings on the New England revivals, he pounds 
steadily on the threat to hierarchy posed by the orthodoxy’s old enemy, immediate 
revelation.  If believers felt that religious understanding could be derived directly, rather 
than through the stable medium of Scripture and the mediations of the clergy, then they 
laid themselves open to the horizontal, social contagion of enthusiasm and the vertical, 
internal deepening of mistaken belief.  This process of cascading error was instigated, in 
Chauncy’s view, by the bad doctrine of irresponsible preachers like George Whitefield, 
and accelerated by the rampant misuse of their prominence and mobility.  
In his massive 1743 critique of the excesses of the revival, Seasonable Thoughts on the 
State of Religion in New England, Chauncy details his fears of a potential spiritual contagion, 
with the promiscuous Whitefield as its principal vector: “I was always afraid, lest People, 
from him, should learn to give Heed to Impulses and Impressions, and by Degrees come 
to Revelations, and other Extraordinaries of this kind.”13  The final term, 
“Extraordinaries,” is a persistent feature of Chauncy’s anti-revival writing, and the range 
of its significance is worth examining.  In the case above, it appears as a general term for 
an aggravated state of spiritual error, exemplified in this case by a mistaken belief in 
“Revelations.”  Here and elsewhere for Chauncy, the “extraordinary” is a term of 
opprobrium, a way of denigrating unusual external evidence: “han’t the great Talk of a 
Revival of Religion arisen more from the general Appearance of some Extraordinaries (which there 
may be where there is not the Power of Godliness) than from such Things as are sure Evidences 
of a real Work of God in Men’s Hearts?”14  The force of Chauncy’s critique has everything 
to do with the way in which he defines the extraordinary in this context.  As he explains 
subsequently, “there is a two-fold Work of the SPIRIT of GOD spoken of in Scripture: 
The one respects his extraordinary and miraculous Gifts and Powers; the other, his 
common and ordinary Influence, that by which a Work of Grace is begun and carried on in 
the souls of men.”15  In this binary construction, the extraordinary and the miraculous 
stand in opposition to the more proper, usual and important work of grace. 
So is Chauncy’s “extraordinary” synonymous with miracle?  Certainly in the 
quote above he seems to allow that they are closely associated.  On the other hand, the 
fact that he does not collapse the two terms gives Chauncy some flexibility, permitting 
him to associate and critique a whole range of aberrant and disorderly behavior under the 
heading of the extraordinary.  What seems essential however, in the context of a 
discussion of miracle, is the relation between the extraordinary and the category of 
evidence.   The problem with these “Extraordinaries” is that their evidentiary power (and 
ultimately their status as signs) is unreliable.   Even if they were provably divine, they 
would be no sure evidence of salvation.  To further this point, Chauncy reaches back in 
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Christian history, and argues that even in the indubitably miraculous days of the 
Apostolic Age, there was no necessary link between miraculous ability and salvation.  
This baseline principle is laid out in the introduction to Seasonable Thoughts, and bolstered 
by an extract from the English theologian John Owen’s 1676 tract, Pneumatologia.  As 
Owen puts it in Chauncy’s quotation: “Neither were those miraculous Operations of the 
Holy Spirit, which were visible unto others, any part of the Work of Regeneration; nor did 
they belong necessarily to it: For many were the subjects of them, and received 
miraculous Gifts by them, who were never regenerate, and many were regenerate, who 
were never Partakers of them.”16  To put it more directly, in the tradition of orthodox 
Anglo-American Calvinism the miraculous action of the Spirit and the work of internal 
regeneration have no necessary relationship to each other.   
Yet to say that such works are not sure evidence of grace is not to say that they are 
evidence of nothing at all.  The introduction of a historical frame, in the move back to the 
Apostolic Age, creates an immediate argumentative problem.  This problem has 
everything to do with the uncertain status of miracle as sign, and the unavoidable dual 
character of miraculous works in this strain of Protestant theology.  In the context of 
contemporary events, Chauncy and Owen understand claims of extraordinary works to 
be deceptive and dubious.  At the same time, they allow that the evidentiary, signifying 
power of such “Extraordinaries” was an essential aid in the preparation and 
establishment of Christ’s church.  This duality is evident in a later quote from Owen’s 
Pneumatologia.  In a discussion of the purpose of miracles in the Old Testament 
(“Preparatory to the New Creation”), Owen emphasizes the communicative function of 
extraordinary events:  “Now the end of all these miraculous operations was to give 
reputation to the Persons, and to confirm the ministry of them by whom they were 
wrought.”17  Owen frames this with a reminder that those miracles were not performed 
by the power of men like Joshua, but through them, by God.  In other words, we are 
cautioned, as in Chauncy’s Seasonable Thoughts, not to ascribe the excellence of the work to 
its human vehicle, but to its divine origin.   
At the same time, the effect that the miracle has on the reputation of the 
individual is an essential aspect of its function.  Owen’s prime example is God ordering 
Moses “to work several miracles or Signs before them that they [the people of Israel] 
might believe that he was sent of God, Exod. 4.8.  And such Works were called Signs, 
because they were Tokens and Pledges of the Presence of the Spirit of God with them by 
whom they were wrought.”18  This is one of the essential intellectual challenges of the 
principle of cessation, from the seventeenth-century Calvinism of Owen down through 
Chauncy’s critique.  Cessation makes the idea of miracles do double work.  Those 
miracles that occur during the preparation and building of the church are signs to be 
celebrated and magnified.  Then, past a given historical point, the communicative 
significance of a putative miracle becomes a threat, and it must be rigorously limited, 
controlled and even denigrated. 
This second iteration of miracle, as a potentially uncontrollable contemporary 
signifier, was also a central concern for the English bishop George Hickes, another of 
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Chauncy’s sources in Seasonable Thoughts.  Hickes first delivered his sermon “The Spirit of 
Enthusiasm Exorcised” in 1680, making the core text roughly contemporaneous with 
Owen’s Pneumatologia.  The text from which Chauncy quotes, however, was a revised 
edition published in 1709, in direct response to recent claims of contemporary miracle.  
In his sermon, Hickes is emphatic about the undesirability of extraordinary gifts, and 
Chauncy quotes him at length on this point: “‘how much more excellent and desireable 
the saving Graces of the SPIRIT are than all these pompous miraculous Gifts: In which there 
is really no intrinsical excellence.  All which I would have those especially to consider 
whose enthusiastical Tempers, or Education, incline them first to admire, and then to 
conceit these miraculous Gifts.’”19 Like Owen and Chauncy, Hickes is conscious that the 
arc of the history of redemption offers a resource for fixing the signification of miracles, 
and thus dispelling a potential source of confusion.  Consequently, he sponsors a kind of 
soft and gradual cessation, in which the special gifts taper off individually, terminating in 
“the latter end of the Fourth, and beginning of the Fifth century” with a few healings 
“which were the last Miracles in the Church.”20  Importantly, fixing the line at this point 
focuses the reader’s attention not on the nature of the testimony (i.e. scriptural or not) but 
on the historical limits of that testimony.21  Stories up through the fifth century could be 
credited, those beyond were taken to be inadmissible evidence.  However inexact this line 
seems in doctrinal terms, what is essential is that Hickes marks a point in history past 
which the “Miraculous Unctions of the Holy Ghost” would no longer appear.   
This particular formulation of Hickes’ stance on miracle, like that of his 
predecessors, is shaped as much by early-eighteenth-century religious debate as by a 
desire for theological precision.  It is, as I have suggested, only necessary to reiterate the 
principle of cessation if it is being challenged by contemporary claims to miraculous 
power.  In Hickes’ case, the provocation came in the form of the French Prophets, whose 
claims to miraculous power caused a sensation in London in the first decade of the 
eighteenth century.22  The Prophets were an English offshoot of the Camisards, a French 
Protestant faction that launched a rebellion in the Cevennes in 1702.23  The Camisard 
rebels emerged from the entrenched, persecuted Huguenot communities of rural 
southern France, and from the beginning, their prominence was tied to their claims to 
miraculous gifts, especially prophecy.  After the rebellion in France was put down in 
1705, three Camisard prophets, Durand Fage, Elie Marion and Jean Cavalier made their 
way to London, arriving in the summer of 1706.  Their notoriety spread quickly, and by 
the following year there were dozens of English converts among the “French” Prophets.  
As their influence expanded, the miraculous claims of the Prophets also grew bolder, 
encompassing not just prophecy but also miraculous healing.24  This trend culminated in 
a promise by John Lacy, the most prominent English prophet, that he would resurrect his 
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dead comrade Thomas Emes on May 25th, 1708.  This represented a transformation of 
the group’s rhetoric and practice of just the kind that most troubled those who criticized 
enthusiasm.  It took the social and spiritual metaphors of restoration and rebirth and 
remade them in the literal image of the most consequential of all Christian miracles, the 
resurrection.25  The prophecy was not without risk, however, and Emes’ failure to rise at 
the appointed time was a critical blow both to the credibility and the millennial hopes of 
the Prophets.   
These events motivated Bishop Hickes to revise and expand his 1680 sermon on 
enthusiasm, and to reframe it in a fourth edition of 1709 as part of a collection of three 
works designed to “shew the Vanity of the Pretensions of our new Prophets to Miracles 
and inspiration.”26  His dedicatory epistle to the new volume emphasizes the core 
presumptions of cessationist doctrine, and argues that when it comes to miraculous work, 
history and context are all-important:  “the Times of the Church, when Miracles were 
wrought, are not to be admired, and preferred before those, in which Miracles are ceased, 
because our Lord commended their Faith and pronounced them blessed who believed 
but had not seen.”27  This denigration of miraculous evidence and promotion of belief 
without sensory proof is an entirely rational gesture in the context of cessationist doctrine.  
At the same time, it runs counter to the epistemological procedures that had just been 
applied to the prophets and their claims of revelation.  It was not the principle of 
cessation itself that proved to skeptics that the Prophets were deluded, but the actual, 
observable failure of their predicted miracles.  
This reliance on visual evidence is not just a question of responding to vulgar 
curiosity.  It has its analogue in the necessary epistemological modesty of cessation.  The 
absurdity of prophetic claims or miraculous evidence cannot be assumed a priori, since this 
would infringe on the liberty of God’s action in the world.28  Hickes is fully aware of this 
point, as is evident in the body of his sermon, which takes us back to signifying miracle as 
the true test of prophecy:  “I deny not, but God is free to send Prophets when he 
pleases…but then whensoever he sends them, he will, as he hath always done, send them 
with the Power of working Signs and Wonders, and whensoever they shall come, we shall 
have a right to try them by the Scriptures.”29  The cessation of miracles is provisionally 
assumed, but not guaranteed, and evidence must still be tried.  Even if the miraculous 
sign is not to be coveted, the principle of its communicative power remains as essential a 
resource as ever for Hickes’ church, beset as she is with the claims of false prophets who 
could always, of course, turn out to be true ones. 
In quoting Hickes and Owen, Charles Chauncy is acknowledging his debt to 
generations of Protestant experience with miraculous claims.  In fact, in Seasonable Thoughts 
he makes this historical continuity into one of the significant virtues of his critique.  He is 
drawing, as his text points out, not just on the accumulated wisdom of Protestant 
theology, but on a long record of historical analogues to the current revivals.  His 
repeated reply to the assertion of novelty in the New England revivals is essentially that 
both America and the larger Christian community have seen such things before.  The 
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errant dependence on immediate revelation (instead of the Word) is, for Chauncy, part of 
a recurrent Satanic assault on true Christian order and practice, linked to previous events, 
especially the furor over “Antinomianism” in early New England.30  He shared this 
interest in creating a polemical genealogy of the deceptions of immediate revelation with 
other anti-enthusiastic writers in England and America.31  Given this rhetorical proclivity, 
it may not be surprising that critics of the revivals in New England raised the decades-old 
specter of the French Prophets.  In 1742, a lengthy anonymous text entitled The Wonderful 
Narrative: Or, A Faithful Account of the French Prophets, their Agitations, Extasies and Inspirations 
appeared in Boston.32  By way of demonstrating the perils of enthusiasm, the text 
chronicles the most resonant and consequential miraculous prediction of the Prophets, 
the resurrection of Emes.33  Befitting the anti-revivalists’ preoccupation with the social 
consequences of enthusiasm, the Narrative presents the pretension to miraculous power as 
a source of dangerous social mobilization: “such was the Alarm of this predicted Miracle, 
on the appointed Day of its being wrought…that the Queen’s Guard, to prevent Disorders, 
was posted in Bunhillfields.”34  On the other hand, if this witnessing crowd is liable to the 
contagion of error, they are also a means to magnify and perpetuate the record of the 
miracle’s failure:  “There are some Persons now living in New-England, who appeared with 
the Multitude at Bunhillfields, on that noted 25th of May, who can testify, that nothing 
remarkable happened.”35  From the perspective of the anti-revival divines of Boston, this 
final note surely has a dual message:  The supposed miracles of the French Prophets (both 
reported and failed) constitute both a monitory specter of enthusiasm and a testament to 
its absurdity.  The great cataclysm of pretended miracle at Bunhillfields appears not just 
in the historical record, but also in living New English memory. 
So much for latter-day miracles.  Yet the Wonderful Narrative is careful not to let the 
reader’s newly fortified disdain for the miraculous extend too far.  Miracle, as always, 
must be mocked in its pretended form and protected in its true one.  Accordingly, the 
appendix of the Wonderful Narrative reminds us that we must not neglect true religion.  If 
the notion of contemporary miracle, like the predicted resurrection of Emes, is 
objectionable in the extreme, the evidence of Christ’s miracles is desirable and self-
evident in the other extreme:  “The Gospel…is a System every Way worth of GOD, and 
approving it self to the Reason of Man; and JESUS, the Author of it, evidently proved his 
Mission…by the WORKS WHICH HE DID; which were great and marvellous, and 
such as could not be the Effect of Art and Contrivance, but at once appear to be above the 
Powers of Nature.”36  The authorship of the gospel is undergirded by the deployment of the 
transparent miraculous sign, the antithesis of the dubious claim to contemporary miracle.  
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This corrective, moderating return to the subject of miracle serves as a reminder of the 
complexity of reading the miraculous sign in the eighteenth-century Protestant world.  As 
we saw in the previous chapter, skepticism, like enthusiasm, carried a risk of contagion, 
and if misapplied, could convey the believer to the equally dangerous impiety of deism.  It 
was a threat that Jonathan Edwards took very seriously, and it exercised as great an 
influence on his miracle writing as did the anti-enthusiastic writings of Chauncy and the 
Old Lights. 
 
3. Edwards and The Deist Threat: The Defense of Miracle 
I should begin by saying that Jonathan Edwards absolutely reviled the intellectual 
trend he labeled deism, and thought it presented nothing less than an existential threat to 
Christianity.  In an oft-quoted passage from the History of Redemption, he charges these 
deists with atheism and Satanic plotting against the Reformation:  “The deists wholly cast 
off the Christian religion, and are professed infidels. They ben't like the heretics, Arians 
and Socinians, and others, that own the Scriptures to be the word of God, and hold the 
Christian religion to be the true religion, but only deny these and these fundamental 
doctrines of the Christian religion; they deny the whole Christian religion.”37  As we have 
seen, many “deists” like Thomas Woolston were not fundamentally anti-Christian 
thinkers, and much of their work fits poorly into almost any collective definition of deism, 
however sensitive and provisional.38  It’s hard then to see that Edwards’ broad invective 
has much critical purchase, beyond the hack and slash of polemical exchange.  But, if it 
matters in a historical sense that this anti-deist charge doesn’t describe Woolston’s 
thought accurately (and indeed caricatures all the thinkers labeled as deists), it’s hard to 
imagine that it would have mattered much to Edwards.  Even if he had been better 
acquainted with the quirks of Woolston’s miracle writing and his quixotic interest in 
saving Reformed Christianity from itself, it’s unlikely that he would have been any less 
outraged by his impiety and his ridicule of the literal Christ.   
As reflexively unsympathetic as Edwards may have been to any notion that 
smacked of deism, we should not miss the importance of his engagement with this broad 
strain of unconventional thought.  Gerald McDermott’s book Jonathan Edwards Confronts 
the Gods took the first comprehensive look at the philosophical and theological 
components of Edwards’ response to deism.  McDermott positions the struggle with 
deism as one of the grand preoccupations of Edwards’ thought: “Edwards considered 
deism to be Christianity’s most formidable opponent, and…the better part of his 
theological project was a direct or indirect response to it.”39  In fact, McDermott argues 
that Edwards saw a greater threat in deism than he did in Arminianism, the doctrinal 
trend more traditionally identified as his theological nemesis.  The immediate threat may 
have been overstated, at least in the colonies, since any American writing that could be 
plausibly associated with deism would not appear until just before the Revolution.40  
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Nonetheless, the struggle with English deism offered Edwards a broader intellectual stage 
than did quarrels within the mainstream of Reformed Christianity.  He uses the 
opportunity, in effect, to locate and confront those aspects of Enlightenment rationality 
that might threaten faith.   
As McDermott notes, the refutation of deistical reasoning is a distributed project, 
scattered throughout the Edwards corpus, and leaving its traces in his great works like 
Freedom of the Will and Original Sin.  The bulk of the explicitly anti-deist material appears in 
his “Miscellanies,” an immense group of carefully composed notes that Edwards began in 
1722, and added to regularly for the next thirty-five years.   The “Miscellanies” cover a 
wide range of subjects, but a significant minority of the entries are dedicated to explicitly 
arguing for the rationality of Christianity, against the skeptical critiques raised by the 
deists.  Ava Chamberlain has argued that these entries, most of them appearing under the 
title “Christian Religion,” are notes toward an unfinished larger project, which Edwards 
intended to call "A Rational Account of the Principles and Main Doctrines of the 
Christian Religion."  This systematic treatise was meant to be a “transatlantic assault 
upon deism” which would reconcile the truth and necessity of revelation with the dictates 
of reason.41  Thus, while Edwards was engaged in the promotion, management and 
defense of the revivals in Northampton, he was also steadily at work on another kind of 
evidentiary project. 
Among the writers commonly identified with early-eighteenth-century English 
deism, the attack on miracles as an irrational and intolerable mystification was a 
commonplace.  Edwards’ was clearly aware of Woolston’s provocations, although his 
direct familiarity with him may have been limited.  Still, he would have found plenty of 
skepticism and derision about miracles in the work of his two primary deist targets, 
Thomas Chubb and Matthew Tindal.42  Unsurprisingly, he gives over a good number of 
his entries in the “Miscellanies” to defending the orthodox evidentiary view of miracle.  In 
the literature discussing Edwards’ relation to deism and Enlightenment religion, the 
attention to his ideas about miracle has been relatively cursory.43  A fuller examination of 
this aspect of the debate will shed important light on more familiar critical questions 
about Edwards’ empirical and spiritual approach to conversion. 
The thrust of Edwards’ defense of Christ’s miracles, as it appears in the 
controversial context, does not differ greatly from the evidentiary line of the latitudinarian 
Anglicans that we encountered in the previous chapter.  In his thinking about miracle as a 
proof of Christian doctrine, he follows the same general principles advanced by Locke, 
who compared the miracles worked by Jesus to ambassadorial credentials.  Assent to 
miracle and belief in divine truth were indivisible for Locke:  “where the miracle is 
admitted, the doctrine cannot be rejected; it comes with the assurance of a divine 
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attestation to him that allows the miracle, and he cannot question its truth.”44  Edwards, 
assuming the same coercive logical power of miracle, uses it to take aim at the supposed 
rationality of deism.  He frames the self-evidently excellent work of miracle as the height 
of rational demonstration:  “What can be more reasonable than to believe a man, when 
he comes and tells us that he is sent from God, and will heal the diseases of our souls; and 
tells us, that we may believe him, [that] he'll heal the diseases of our bodies; and 
accordingly heals all sorts at all times, of all manner of diseases, by a touch or word's 
speaking.”45  Part of the supposedly self-evident rationality of this construction of miracle 
lies in the symbolic resonance between spiritual and physical healing, a standard 
analogical baseline that undergirds the orthodox reading of New Testament miracle.   
I will return to the broader consequences of that physical/spiritual analogy, but I 
think it is also important to note the way in which Edwards skirts the problem of history 
in this example.  Self-consciously or not, his use of a generalized present tense, with its 
implication that Christ is always presenting this evidence directly to us, allows him to 
evade one of the most famous objections to the reliability of scriptural miracles – that we 
can know about them only through the testimony of others.46  In order to capitalize in a 
lasting way upon the sensible nature of miracle (which is the essence of its crucial 
evidentiary power) Edwards must imagine a sort of constant faithful re-creation of sensory 
immediacy.  Here also there is an important parallel with Locke, who recognized that 
accepting miracles as evidence required an act of imaginative transference: “He that is 
present at the fact, is a spectator.  He that believes the history of the facts, puts himself in 
the place of a spectator.”47  Edwards was a revivalist as well as an apologist for an 
orthodox view of Scriptural miracle, and it suits his purposes to assure us that Christ’s 
rational presentation of confirmatory sensory evidence is both indubitable and ongoing: 
“He tells us that he will deliver us from spiritual and eternal death, and also from 
temporal death…. And to prove this, he gives us sensible evidence that he has power over 
men's lives, not only by prolonging men's lives, but even by restoring of them after they 
are dead; and besides, rises from the dead himself.”48  Divine power pointedly extends 
beyond the ordinary providential action of prolonging life to that most nakedly 
miraculous act, resurrection. The deist argument, as Edwards well knew, was precisely 
that the testimony of revelation did not constitute “sensible evidence.”  Edwards’ relieves 
this pressure on miracle through his faithful reading, which envisions a kind of atemporal, 
continual re-apprehension of the most powerful and direct proof of the rational truth of 
the Christian religion. 
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4. The Ethical Weight of Cessation  
This tactical rhetorical victory is of course in some tension with the important 
historical principle of cessation.  In fact, the apparent incompatibility between God’s 
unconditional ability to intervene in the world and the harmony of his redemptive 
historical plan may be the dominant problem in Edwards’ thinking about miracle.  In the 
fight with deist heterodoxy, he must balance his exploitation of the evidentiary power of 
miracle with his adherence to the doctrine of cessation.  Like Whitefield, Edwards had 
both political and theological incentives to control the kind of millenarian enthusiasm that 
was encouraging new faith in contemporary miracles among revivalists.  As we saw at the 
outset of the chapter, he was adamant in his historical conviction that miracles had 
ceased.  They would, he argued, not return to the created world, even with the approach 
of the millennium, which he himself eagerly anticipated.  He observed a willingness 
among certain zealous friends of the revival to countenance immediate and extraordinary 
divine experience, a tendency that he linked to theological error.  This was, it is important 
to emphasize, a carefully considered position, grounded as much in his sense of Christian 
ethics as in any doctrinal allegiance.  Whatever the political advantages of cessation, the 
depth of Edwards’ commitment to it as an ethical principle, as well as the care with which 
he investigated and articulated it, is worth our sustained attention.  This is all the more 
true because the principle of absolute cessation was, as we will see, difficult to sustain on 
other grounds. 
Edwards’ most complete statement on the subject is found in a series of fifteen 
sermons he preached on 1 Corinthians 13, Paul’s famous hymn to love.  The sermons 
were preached in 1738, but were not published until 1852, when his great-great grandson 
Tryon Edwards collected them under the title The Fruits of Charity.  Across these texts, and 
in particular in the second and fourteenth sermons, Edwards develops a philosophical 
and ethical argument for the disappearance of what he refers to as the “extraordinary 
gifts of the spirit.”  He does so by figuring both the individual and the collective life of the 
church in terms of a moral and historical teleology, a sweeping arc that tends toward the 
ultimate fulfillment of divine love in heaven.  In this scheme, the extraordinary gifts, such 
as miracle, prophecy, speaking in tongues (i.e. the collection of supernatural phenomena 
identified in 1 Corinthians 12) are subordinated to the principle of divine love.  As 
Edwards makes clear in his second sermon, the argument for cessation rests upon the 
essentially limited nature of the gifts.  Miraculous gifts were an instrument designed to 
win men to God’s doctrine.  They were not the object of the doctrine itself.  So to suggest 
that such miraculous means would return when the promised end arrives is, in Edwards’ 
eyes, an absurdity:  “the end is more excellent than the means, by an universally allowed 
maxim. For the means has no goodness in it otherwise than as subservient to the end. 
The end, therefore, must be considered as superior in excellency.”49  That end is the 
unbounded and eternal operation of the Holy Spirit, producing the fullest possible 
happiness and sanctification in believers. This is Edwards’ vision of Paul’s “charity.”  His 
fourteenth sermon, “Divine Love Alone Lasts Eternally” makes the point succinctly:  
“Divine love is the end of which all the inspiration and all the miracles which ever were in 
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the world were but the means.”50  Miracle and grace are causally related, but, as 
Edwards’ title makes clear, the former is everlasting, while the latter, which Edwards 
identifies with the famous “childish things” of 1 Corinthians 13:11, will fade away. 
In fact, while Edwards allows for the necessary (if unequal) causal association of 
miracle and grace, he understands their inherent qualities as being diametrically opposed.  
The grounds of this distinction are important in contextualizing the moderate revivalist 
understanding of miracle that Edwards is detailing here.  At the outset of the second 
sermon in Charity, he lays out “a twofold distinction of the gifts and operations of the 
Spirit, viz. into common and saving, and ordinary and extraordinary."51 Ordinary works 
are available at all times, whereas extraordinary works are only available for a particular 
time (e.g. during the Apostolic age).  Common works are available to both regenerate and 
natural men, whereas uncommon works are available only to the saints.  Thus, miracles are 
understood to be extraordinary, common gifts, while grace is an ordinary, uncommon 
gift.52  This distinction is made along historical and spiritual lines; in the moral frame of 
The Fruits of Charity, miracle is bounded in time and carries no necessary association with 
salvation.  The category of sensation, and indeed any mention of the physical status of 
miracle, is conspicuously absent. 
This definition bears comparison with one offered by an earlier New England 
divine.  At the turn of the eighteenth century, the Boston minister Samuel Willard wrote a 
vast theological compendium entitled A Compleat Body of Divinity, which was posthumously 
published in 1726.  In a discourse on the “publick life of Christ,” Willard gives a different 
definition of the nature of Jesus’ miraculous works: 
[Christ’s miracles] were supernatural effects, above the ordinary course of second 
causes, and so they were great Works, such as none but God could perform…. 
They were also sensible effects; for though the work of Grace be a super natural 
work, yet it is not called a miracle, because it is spiritual and affects not the senses, 
as these do, and for that reason are called signs, which represent one thing to the 
sense, and another to the mind.53  
For Willard, the sensory availability of miracle is what distinguishes it from grace. In 
introducing “signs” as a synonym for miracles, he emphasizes the doubled and divided 
representational power of those events.  Grace, by contrast, because of its unavailability to 
the sensory apparatus, is a non-representational work.  Its action and its meaning are 
unified in internal space, and the invisibility of the sign reduces its interpretive 
complexity.  The miracle, on the other hand, has both mental and physical existences 
that are by definition separate and not intended to be reconciled.  In a sense, Willard’s 
solution is the simpler one – miracles happen outside, grace on the inside.  Edwards, as a 
consequence both of his historical situation and his intellectual and spiritual 
preoccupations, can segregate miracle and grace in temporal and spiritual terms.  He 
cannot, however, permit grace to escape sensation.  By the extension of this same 
principle, he cannot allow any part of the moral or natural world to escape its 
susceptibility to divine power.  This inevitably creates a tension between his vision of 
                                                
50 Ibid., 360. 
51 Ibid., 152. 
52 For another instance of a New England minister’s deployment of this distinction as a check on 
enthusiasm, see Winiarski, “Souls Filled with Ravishing Transport,” 32–33. 
53 Samuel Willard, A Compleat Body of Divinity (Boston, 1726), 371. 
 81 
miracle’s place in Christian history and its place in the natural world.  The balance of this 
chapter will be dedicated to exploring the context and the consequences of this dual 
commitment, and the problems it raises for Edwards in establishing a unified theory of 
the divine action of miracle and its relation to history.   
 
5. Causation, Miracle and the Universe of Law 
 In his great late career work, Freedom of the Will, Edwards makes a complex and 
extended case for Calvinist necessity.  In the text he refers constantly to the logic and the 
figure of the chain, those iron links of cause and effect that cannot be broken, that forbid 
all contingency, and that inevitably lead us back to God.  One of his central proofs of this 
concept rests upon the necessary conclusions to be drawn from God’s “foreknowledge,” 
of all events and moral actions.  In part the case rests, as it often does for Edwards, on the 
logical extension of the fundamental Calvinist faith in God’s absolute sovereignty.  If even 
the smallest contingent event were unavailable to God’s knowledge, it would bring the 
absolute reason and order of his system to ruin.  Here Edwards deploys some of the 
sarcasm typical of his controversial mode:  “The supreme Lord of all things must needs be 
under great and miserable disadvantages, in governing the world which he has made, and 
has the care of, through his being utterly unable to find out things of chief importance, 
which hereafter shall befall his system.”54  This emphasis on harmony and systematicity 
typifies Edwards’ vision of the divine, but also makes possible the key rhetorical strategy 
we see throughout Freedom of the Will, wherein the slightest imaginable deviation from 
perfect order can be shown to reduce God to absurdity, and thus to be itself absurd. 
 Yet this insistence on the dictates of natural reason must be subordinated, 
ultimately, to “the affairs of the moral kingdom.”55  Edwards’ great proofs of God’s 
foreknowledge are derived from scripture.  He reminds us, at the outset of his discussion 
of God’s timeless knowledge, that he supposes himself “herein to have to do with such as 
own the truth of the Bible.”56  This essential limitation on his argumentative structure 
serves to re-establish the centrality of the moral kingdom in the scheme of creation, and 
to emphasize the supremacy of scripture as the only meaningful authority in that 
preeminent sphere. 
 The predominance of the moral world, and the idea that scriptural revelation is 
an unquestionable baseline of agreed-upon truth, has important consequences for 
Edwards’ conception of miracle: 
For the moral world is the end of the natural world; and the course of things in the 
latter, is undoubtedly subordinate to God's designs with respect to the former.  
Therefore he has seen cause, from regard to the state of things in the moral world, 
extraordinarily to interpose, to interrupt and lay an arrest on the course of things 
in the natural world; and even in the greater wheels of its motion; even so as to 
stop the sun in its course.  And unless he can foresee the volitions of men, and so 
know something of the future state of the moral world, he can't know but that he 
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may still have as great occasion to interpose in this manner, as ever he had: nor 
can he foresee how, or when, he shall have occasion thus to interpose.57 
Here we begin to see the challenge that absolute divine authority over the natural and 
moral world poses to the cessationist limitation of miracle.  Edwards here defends the 
right and the ability of God to intervene in the natural order not just in the scriptural 
past, but also in the future.  The benefit of such a defense is that it places that which is 
apparently vicious and disorderly in miracle–the violation of the natural “course of 
things”–in the proper context of a superior order, the absolutely foreknown and non-
contingent “moral world.”  Plainly, however, this continuity of extraordinary 
interposition is in conflict with the cessationist telos that Edwards lays out in The Fruits of 
Charity, that ethical arc of the church from the tutelage of miracle to the mature empire of 
orderly love.   
 What is at stake in all of Edwards’ thinking about the natural implications of 
miracle is the status of causation, and the extent to which a miracle, properly defined, 
represents a threat to the exquisitely important causal order.  In Freedom of the Will he is at 
pains to defend Calvinism from the familiar charge that it creates a kind of endless prison 
of necessity, which would tend to vitiate all incentives to moral action.  He argues that, 
rather than being destructive to morality, this “doctrine of necessity” protects us from the 
nightmare of Arminian contingency.  The threat that he perceives in Arminianism is the 
collapse of cause and effect, the dissolving of an ordered universe into meaningless 
contingency, in which no act of the will could be reliably connected to its consequence.  
In keeping with his prioritization of the moral sphere, the most troubling result of such 
unchecked contingency would be the undoing of moral necessity, and a consequent 
evacuation of the meaning of praise and blame: “It will follow from Arminian principles, 
that there is no degree of connection between virtue and vice, and any foregoing event or 
thing…And if so, then all foregoing means must be totally in vain.”58  Given the stakes of 
this threat, we see the danger of the apparent causal disturbance of miracle all the more 
clearly.  A change in the settled natural order (like halting the movement of the sun) 
would, if it were the product of contingency, threaten the order of the moral world, too.  
Again, the force of miracle, once mobilized, must be contained.  That such events 
happened in the past must be admitted by all who “own the Bible” and read it as 
Edwards does.  That such events may happen again must also logically be allowed by any 
who allow for divine omnipotence.  For the historical and Scriptural reasons identified 
above, Edwards has cause to consign miracles to the past.  Yet given the suppositions of 
his Calvinism, miracle remains a necessary, powerfully affecting (and thus potentially 
destabilizing) presence in the world.  The need to subordinate it to a meaningful and 
absolute divine moral order is thus especially pressing.  
 It is here that my discussion of the specific object of miracle intersects with a 
broad, long-running debate about Edwards’ engagement with natural philosophy in 
general, and particularly with Newtonian physics.  Rather than attempting to account for 
all of the implications of the new science in Edwards’ thought, I want to think about how 
Edwards makes use of a Newtonian atomic view of the universe to deal directly with 
miracle.  Within the scope of his discussion of the will, the atomic scheme offers Edwards 
a means of emphasizing the scope and the totality of universal causation:  “If the laws of 
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motion and gravitation, laid down by Sir Isaac Newton, hold universally, there is not one 
atom, but what has influence, every moment, throughout the whole material universe, to 
cause every other part to be otherwise than it would be, if it were not for that particular 
corporeal existence.”59  For Perry Miller, famously, it was this intuitive and active grasp of 
both Newton and the atom that permitted Edwards to anticipate, if not fully articulate 
“the great line of the future” and the development of modern physics.60  Miller sees 
profound theological ramifications following from this Newtonian rationalism, and the 
principle of invariable causation that follows from it.  Most importantly for my 
investigation, he sees a necessary epistemic shift in the understanding of miracles:  
By either book [Freedom of the Will or Original Sin], by both logic and induction, we 
come to Edwards’ basic prerequisite to all experience: the course of nature, as 
infallibly shown “by late improvements in philosophy,” is an inviolable sequence 
of events.  All Christians profess an “immediate agency” of God, but they may no 
longer vulgarly invoke it as a miracle, as a break in the coherence.  Even when 
bringing the soul of a child to birth, ‘God works as much according to an 
established order, as his immediate agency in any of the works of nature 
whatsoever.’61 
Miller’s insight–that Edwards’ understanding of experience was significantly (even 
primarily) structured by the order of causation–remains essential.  Certainly the entire 
logical structure of his Freedom of the Will depends upon a rigorous and pervasive model of 
causation.  Edwards is also manifestly less willing than was Cotton Mather to credit 
miracle as an operative aspect of contemporary experience.  Yet, as we have seen 
throughout this chapter, and will continue to see, this more circumspect approach did not 
mean that miracles could be abolished, either by the doctrinal means of cessation or by 
the kind of rationalist progression Miller suggests.  The controversial status of miracles in 
the mid-eighteenth century, both in transatlantic exchanges and in the context of revival, 
had little to do with providential actions like conception and birth.  When the various 
players disputed over God’s willingness to intervene, they discussed, as Edwards does, the 
great things of the “moral universe” and the relation of God’s work to the plan of 
salvation.  The question then, is whether the kind of causal chains that define human 
experience can be said to extend to God. 
 Recently, Avihu Zakai has examined this issue in depth, and he offers a stark 
contradiction of the notion of Edwards as a proto-modern sympathizer with the new 
science.  Indeed, he argues that not only did Edwards “not embrace the new scientific 
modes of thought,” he was in fact “one of their sharpest critics as evident in his rejection 
of mechanical, experimental philosophy.”62  It is, as Zakai suggests, ultimately a question 
of sovereignty, and he argues persuasively that the full extension of Newton’s thought 
leads inevitably to conflict with the absolute Calvinist insistence on divine autonomy: 
“Reacting to the mechanical philosophers’ assertion that ‘divine operation’ is ‘limited by 
what we call laws of nature,’ Edwards declared that the use of such a concept to describe 
God’s relation with the order of creation was unwarranted.”63  Significantly for my 
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purposes, Zakai turns to Edwards’ discussion of historical miracle as the most significant 
and stark expression of that sovereignty: “‘God in some things in providence, has set aside 
the ordinary course of things in the material world to subserve to the purposes of the 
moral and spiritual, as in miracles.’”64  The specific context of this comment on miracles 
is particularly important, and I will examine it shortly, but Zakai’s general point about the 
need to reassert the importance of miracle in Edwards’ view of the universe is very much 
in line with my thinking.   
Zakai’s argument is a useful corrective to the over-modernization of Edwards’ 
thought.  Nonetheless, it is perhaps only in combination with Miller’s reading that we can 
see the particular power that the new philosophy has given to Edwards’ vision of miracle, 
even as he disputes it.  He cannot allow God to be barred from disrupting the causal 
chain whenever he sees fit, but he also emphasizes the limitations that God holds himself 
to in service of the preeminent moral structure of his plan of salvation.  He will not use his 
power in a way that vitiates that plan, by confusing (as humans might), the excellence of 
means and ends.  Yet humans also cannot pretend to understand the harmony of his 
creation so well as to fix limits on the expression of his power within it.  Correlating the 
dual harmonies of the moral and natural worlds is not a simple task.  Miracle, as a 
quintessential expression of sovereignty, is uniquely resistant to being anchored in any of 
the particular orders of human science, the moral, the natural, or the historical.  Taken as 
a whole, Edwards’ analysis of miracle presents a polysemous, occasionally contradictory 
and protean account of the place of divine power in the world.  It is an account that is 
always aware of the inevitable fracturing created by human thought, the 
misrepresentation that creeps in when subordinate human orders are used to convey the 
absolute unity of the divine. 
Perhaps understandably then, Edwards makes at least a temporary concession to 
that multiplicity.  His major statements on miracle tend to focus on its individual aspects, 
without attempting to synthesize all the implications of the phenomenon (or even to 
standardize its definition).  Another important framing of the question is found in no. 
1263 of the “Miscellanies.”  This long entry contains what is perhaps Edwards’ most 
sustained and probing analysis of the relation between divine action and natural law.  He 
opens the several page discourse by reasserting God’s independence from constraint.  
God’s consent to the laws he has established is by no means permanent or conditional 
upon events in human history: “if he acted once, why must he needs and forever act no 
more?”65  According to this account, God’s actions can be separated into two kinds, the 
“arbitrary” and “that which is limited by fixed laws.”  Of these two, it is the arbitrary 
order that remains preeminent.  According to Edwards, the universe and its laws 
originated at the moment of creation in God’s entirely arbitrary pleasure, unconstrained 
by any preexisting laws: “’Tis arbitrary operation that fixes, determines and limits the 
laws of natural operation.”66  This regression to the first cause is reminiscent of the logical 
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structure of Freedom of the Will, and reminds us that for Edwards, this divine arbitrariness is 
precisely opposed to anything like contingency in the created world.   
Indeed, perfect arbitrariness is essentially divine:  “An operation is absolutely 
arbitrary when no use [is] made of any law of nature [and] no respect had to any one 
[su]ch fixed rule or method.”67  Edwards allows, however, for certain mixed modes of 
partial arbitrariness, whereby the natural and the divine could mix.  In essence, he is 
arguing for the existence of gradations of miracle, the idea that certain actions could be 
“nearer to arbitrary and miraculous than other divine operations.”68  Even God himself 
was only perfectly arbitrary in that first moment, in the creation ex nihilo.  All creation that 
followed, the shaping of the things of the world, was mixed with the operations of the laws 
he had established.69  The arc of the universe will, he is careful to note, swing back to 
perfect arbitrariness at the end of time, when God will abolish his own laws in the final 
cataclysm.  What stands in between these two points of unalloyed miracle, then, is a 
period of natural operation that is always intermixed with arbitrary power.   
Norman Fiering, in his perceptive analysis of no. 1263 of the “Miscellanies,” 
remarks upon the essential symmetry in this particular Edwardsian vision of history:  
“One might conceive of Edwards’ history of the universe as a great parabola.  From the 
middle of the curve one may ascend in either direction to the unique and singular actions 
of God.”70  The essential consequence of this structure is that at no point does the 
presence of miracle in the world diminish to zero.  We are always somewhere on a sliding 
scale.  As Fiering puts it, this discourse is “ostensibly a defense of miracles, but the total 
effect of it is to diffuse the idea of miracle along a graded scale, as in Malebranche, so that 
one can speak in the end only of the more or less miraculous in a natural world that is one 
great miracle in all of its parts.”71  This stands in stark contrast to Perry Miller’s 
characterization of Edwards as essentially beyond the vulgar incoherence of miracle, 
espousing an immediate providence that need never conflict directly with natural law.  
Yet the overall effect may be somewhat similar, in that a faith in the diffuse omnipresence 
of miracle permits Edwards to create a new regularity out of the diversity of creation.  
According to Fiering: “Given the continuum from the arbitrary to the fixed, or from 
grace to nature, a wonderful harmony and symmetry is observable.”72  The smooth arc of 
divine history compensates for the potential disruption of miracle.  
What we have here is not, however, a unified and final expression of Edwards’ 
understanding of the history of the universe.  In his discussion of the intergrading of 
nature and arbitrary divine will, Edwards strategically allows one divine arc to take 
precedence, and Fiering, following him, sees the harmony that such a narrowing of the 
frame makes possible.  There are, however, other historical arcs in Edwards, which must 
complicate the picture of miracle.  The parabolic model of history excludes the most 
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consequential moral intervention in the universe: the incarnation of Christ.  Edwards 
proceeds in the same text to explore how such monumental historical instances trouble 
the smoothness of the curve of divine arbitrariness that bends from alpha to omega.  The 
natural creation finally makes possible another, greater work of arbitrary power, the 
foundation of the church.  This “new creation” occurs, in Edwards’ account, in a 
punctuated series of miraculous seasons, in “which God appears in an extraordinary 
manner and operates by an arbitrary influence.”73  The greatest of all of these were the 
miracles of Christ’s life and death, which were “infinitely greater effects than the creation 
of the world.”74  This spike in arbitrary power, and the centrality of Christ in Edwards’ 
history of the universe, cannot be seen to conflict with divine harmony, but it must 
disturb the smoothness of the curve that Fiering isolates.  If we allow Edwards’ physical 
model, the variable but harmonious mixture of arbitrary and naturally regulated divine 
action in the world, it’s hard to ignore the conflict with the restraint he places upon 
miracle in the framework of post-apostolic cessation.  Fiering rightly describes the 
symmetry and heroic integrative scope in one facet of Edwards’ analysis of miracle, but 
this harmony cannot describe the whole range of Edwards’ positions.  In Edwards’ 
merging of history, nature and divine will, there is a multiplying complexity that refuses to 
submit to any individual order.  Edwards is, after all, trying to describe those actions that 
are the most entirely divine, and which are therefore the most free from the explanatory 
systems of human order. 
It is precisely this effort to speak the order of pure divine action that makes 
miracle an attractive literary object for Edwards.  Once we begin to realize how potent 
and complex the idea is, we can sense both the rhetorical force of miracle and how it 
fragments into multivalence and ineffability.  Edwards’ distributed, decades-long project 
of accounting for miracle is a literary and psychological effort to activate the immense 
and overwhelming evidentiary force of the impression produced by miraculous events.  At 
the same time, he tempers that force by emphasizing that God’s miraculous power does 
condescend to human understanding.  The arbitrariness that defines God’s action is 
made predictable, in a sense, by its participation in the communicative project that 
advances the supremely important telos of salvation.  God’s miraculous work consents to 
a kind of legibility because it has a pedagogical and rhetorical purpose, both in its 
application and its remission.  This is a reflection, in part, of an old providential model, 
that of the pervasively signifying universe that is legible to faithful readers. 
One of the essential ways in which Edwards explored the representational 
connections between sensation and spirit was via the typological tradition.  In a 
manuscript series spanning decades and comprising hundreds of entries, Edwards 
collected observations on these “Images of Divine Things.”  This allegorical mode of 
reading the world, Wallace Anderson argues, was a theological and literary inheritance 
that Edwards modified for his own purposes:  “From these features of substance and 
language it is evident that Edwards devoted this series, not to the exercise of literary 
imagination alone, but to certain investigations of fact.”75  This duality of purpose, with 
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its intertwining of method and objective, seems particularly relevant to the question of 
miracle, where both the status of the fact–the event itself, and its spiritual implications are 
so pressingly important. 
 At several points in the manuscript of “Images,” Edwards turns to the example of 
snakes that have the ability to charm their prey, luring them to their doom.  The 
phenomenon of rattlesnake fascination was, as Herbert Leventhal has explained at length, 
a favorite natural curiosity in eighteenth-century America.  Leventhal usefully situates the 
discourse relating to the phenomenon at the junction of natural history, emergent 
scientific paradigms, occultism, and the synthesis of Native American and settler 
traditions.76  Edwards’ interest in this apparent deviation from the normal sequence of 
events has to do (as in all of the “Images”) with understanding the meaning of divine 
communication in the medium of the created world.  More particularly, however, it gives 
him a concrete opportunity to explore the theory of partial arbitrariness, the graded 
mixture of natural causation and miracle: 
God in some instances seems to have gone quite beside the ordinary laws of 
nature in order to it, particularly that in serpents' charming birds and squirrels 
and such animals. The material world, and all things pertaining to it, is by the 
Creator wholly subordinated to the spiritual and moral world. To show this, God, 
in some things in providence, has set aside the ordinary course of things in the 
material world to subserve to the purposes of the moral and spiritual, as in 
miracles. And to show that all things in heaven and earth, the whole universe, is 
wholly subservient, the greater parts of it as well as the smaller, God has once or 
twice interrupted the course of the greater wheels of the machine, as when the sun 
stood still in Joshua's time.77  
The drumbeat of Edwards’ logic here and elsewhere is hierarchy–the absolute 
subordination of the created world to the spiritual world.  Thus one of the communicative 
functions of miracle is to demonstrate that subordination through unusual natural events.  
In the case of the snake it is also a means of enfolding the natural curiosity of the 
eighteenth-century colonial elite within the plan of salvation, exposing all knowledge to 
divine hermeneutics.  The oddity of the snake is truly significant not as an American 
natural outlier.  Rather its remarkableness is divinely arranged in proportion to the 
importance of the moral truth it has to teach.  Edwards phrases the analogy more baldly 
in a subsequent entry:  “the manner in which birds and squirrels that are charmed by 
serpents go into their mouths and are destroyed by them is a lively representation of the 
manner in which sinners under the gospel are very often charmed and destroyed by the 
devil.”78   
 The long passage above is remarkable not so much for its objective, which is very 
much in line with the re-enthroning of theology as the queen of the sciences, as Avihu 
Zakai puts it.79  What is more striking is Edwards’ effort to manage vast shifts in scale 
without collapsing the subtle degrees of divine action.  The move to the example of 
Joshua and the sun standing still represents a huge change in register, launching the 
reader at once from the recurrent contemporary curiosity of snakes into the realm of 
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Scriptural history and the very greatest celestial works of power.  In part, this serves to 
mortify human attachment to minor hierarchies like time and size, in favor of the grand 
hierarchy of spiritual preeminence.  In that now familiar but always tense negotiation 
with the avowed principles of cessation, Edwards refuses to separate categorically Joshua’s 
time from ours, or to make a radical distinction in the operations of God’s power over the 
snake and the sun.   
 At the same time, it is vitally important to note that he does not directly label the 
charming snake a miracle.  The snake’s power, and the striking natural oddity it produces 
(i.e. the apparent reversal of expected order) are only associatively tied to miracle.  God 
will occasionally “set aside the ordinary course of things in the material world… as in 
miracle”(italics mine).  This final clause makes miracle an instance of divine abrogation of 
natural law, but it does not imply that all such setting aside is miraculous.  At the same 
time, given the divine power invoked by the allusion to miracle, Edwards cannot simply 
subsume this event in a smooth and disinterested providentialism.  The mixed style of his 
expression mirrors the blending of the natural and the arbitrary.  This is more than just 
rhetorical sleight of hand.  It is a delicate and allusive expressive strategy that draws on 
the most inexpressibly powerful works of the divine.  Edwards’ figuralism, which joins 
absolute arbitrary power to sensible detail, is the definitive literary feature of his writing 
on miracle.  It is his response to the doubled need to exploit and contain the miraculous.  
Understanding this feature will allow us to see how he navigates the complexities of 
miracle in the fraught environment of religious revival. 
 
6. On the Miraculous Apprehensibility of Grace  
 The nature of grace and its relation to sensible experience was a primary concern 
during the Great Awakening.  It was in the context of this debate about grace that 
Edwards’ convictions and questions about miracle took on their most consequential and 
urgent public form, in dialogue with the anti-enthusiastic writings discussed above (see 
section 1).  It is in his seminal volume on religious psychology, A Treatise Concerning Religious 
Affections that Edwards addresses the sensible nature of grace most directly.  In the 
treatise’s second section Edwards notes a tendency among his contemporaries to devalue 
the observable actions of divine power:  “How greatly has the doctrine of the inward 
experience or sensible perceiving of the immediate power and operation of the Spirit of 
God, been reproached and ridiculed by many of late.”80  Edwards understands inward 
divine experience and sensibility as entirely consonant.  In fact, he argues that it would be 
offensive to reason to profess the existence of a power beyond the natural which is 
required to produce Grace, and then to argue that the recipient can’t feel it as such: “it is 
in no wise unreasonable to suppose that this effect should very frequently be produced 
after such a manner, as to make it very manifest, apparent and sensible that it is so” (RA, 138–
italics mine). With his triple insistence on the sensory availability of grace, Edwards argues 
that the work of the Spirit cannot be segregated, at least terminologically, from the 
language of external sensation.  
 He does not pursue this rhetoric of sensation to the point of arguing that miracle 
and grace are identical.  Yet if we take public sensory availability of the divine to be one 
of the markers of miracle, he is clearly moving in that direction, at least for the moment.  
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As was the case with Cotton Mather’s contemporary miracle stories, what Edwards 
defends here is the possibility that vertical, immediate communication with the divine is 
still possible, and continues to operate in the horizontal, networked space of the public 
sphere, as an object of rational understanding.  Yet there is a point beyond which he 
cannot go.  Pushed by his convictions away from the skepticism of cooler moderates, he is 
careful to stop short of radicalism.  He allows that “to expect that the Spirit of God will 
savingly operate upon their minds, without the Spirit’s making use of means, as 
subservient to the effect, is enthusiastical,” but he refuses to disallow the preeminent 
power and the sensory availability of immediate divine causation (RA, 138).  What he 
needs, I would argue, is an appropriate textual mode for encouraging faith in the sensory 
availability of the divine without appearing to countenance spiritual delusion. 
 This is where the figural deployment of miracle again presents itself as a useful (if 
somewhat treacherous) strategy.  The ultimate foundation of this belief in observable 
grace, and the clearest expression of the principle behind it, lies in scriptural examples of 
God’s greatest works of power.  The link between miracle and grace in Edwards’ system 
is analogical.  He posits first that “grace in the soul, is so the effect of God’s power, that it 
is fitly compared to those subjects, which are farthest from being owing to any strength in 
the subject, such as a generation, or a being begotten, and resurrection, or a being raised 
from the dead or a being brought out of nothing into being” (RA 139).  The train of 
divine action slips again from providence into miracle.  Generation is a plausibly natural, 
providential work of God, but resurrection is emphatically miraculous.  As Edwards’ note 
indicates, the biblical text that undergirds the passage is Ephesians 20: “God put this 
power to work in Christ when he raised him from the dead and seated him at his right 
hand in the heavenly places.”  Thus the central healing miracle of the Christian 
revelation, Christ’s resurrection, becomes simultaneously the source, the warrant for and 
the type of the miraculous work of grace.  It was a point that Edwards underscored in his 
“Miscellanies”: 
[A] resurrection must be God's own work and his only….  [W]hatever may be 
supposed of other miracles, of the possibility of their being performed by 
creatures, we know of this that it cannot.  I can think of no other miracle whatever 
that would be so full an evidence and manifestation of the finger of God; it must 
therefore be a certain evidence of the truth of that that it is done in confirmation 
of.81 
Here we see one of the major connections between the extreme evidentialist stance 
prevalent in the struggle against deism and the analogical effort to describe the operations 
of grace.  Resurrection stands above the perceptual and epistemological problems that 
trouble apparent instances of miracle as divine evidence.  Reasonable people could argue 
about the origin or the context of a remarkable healing, but a resurrection (so this 
argument goes) can only be a miracle–its divinity is self-evident.  The only reasonable 
inference by a witness would be that the worker of the miracle was sent from God.  This 
absolute certainty is linked to those periodic spikes in divine arbitrariness that Edwards 
identified as characteristic of Christian history in no. 1263 of the Miscellanies.  
Resurrection makes no concession to the processes of natural law–indeed it confounds 
them utterly.  The same can be said of “being brought out of nothing into being”–the 
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creation ex nihilo that is Edwards’ archetypal act of arbitrariness.  By linking grace, in its 
periodic and unconditional arbitrariness, with resurrection and original creation, he 
effectively yokes it to the most unalloyed forms of miracle. 
 While the direct equation of miracle with grace would seem “enthusiastical,” the 
practice of analogy allows Edwards to retain its evidentiary force.  Grace is “fitly 
compared” to the indubitable and fully visible finger of God.  Analogy bleeds over into 
the physical.  Edwards’ list of the exemplary great works of power is dominated by the 
forms of miraculous incarnation.  In the persistently human and social theological vision 
of the Religious Affections, (as in the New Testament) the substance of miracle primarily 
coheres around transformative corporeal experience.  Inevitably, however, this brings us 
back to the central Edwardsian problem of the indeterminacy of physical signs.  The 
human body and mind, the interconnected medium for producing the “manifest 
evidences” of grace, is a leaky and unreliable vessel. 82  And so again the anxious 
revivalist’s question: What if that which we name miraculous is merely a product of our 
deceptive imaginations? 
In his direct treatments of the category of imagination, Edwards seems to make of 
it a threatening and vulgar force, made up of intense and delusive sensory data.   
Here, for the sake of the common people, I will explain what is intended by 
impressions on the imagination, and imaginary ideas.  The imagination is that 
power of the mind, whereby it can have a conception, or idea of things of an 
external or outward nature…when those things are not present, and be not 
perceived by the senses. (RA, 210-11)   
The impression on the imagination is an exacerbation of this phenomenon: “when such 
kind of ideas are strongly impressed upon the mind, and the image of them is very lively, 
almost as if one saw them or heard them, etc. that is called an impression on the 
imagination” (RA, 211).  Edwards disapproves of such experiences being used as spiritual 
warrants, and warns against thinking of imaginative sensory experience as a variety of 
authentic “spiritual discovery.”  
Most importantly for my purposes, it is not misperception itself that troubles 
Edwards most, but the failure of the interpretive faculty that should regulate such faulty 
perceptions.  Those who misinterpret extraordinary sensation as divine power are 
collectively identified only by their tendency to be “of the common sort and weak of 
reason and body.”83  They wrongly take sensory confusion to be a sign of spiritual 
elevation, looking “upon it as sufficient evidence that these things are spiritual discoveries, 
and that they see them spiritually, because they say they don’t see these things with their 
eyes, but in their hearts; for they can see them when their eyes are shut” (RA, 212). 
Edwards acknowledges that the stumbling block here is partly linguistic: “because 
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spiritual things being invisible, and not things that can be pointed forth with the finger, 
we are forced to use figurative expressions in speaking of them, and to borrow names 
from external and sensible objects to signify them by” (RA, 212).  He blames an inability 
in some “common, and less considerate” believers to understand this practice.  When 
such people hear analogical comparisons between spiritual and sensory phenomena, 
“they ignorantly look and wait for some such external discoveries” (RA, 213).  Miracles, 
however, seem like a special case–they are nothing if not an external discovery.  To mix 
Edwards’ metaphors, not only can a miracle like resurrection be pointed out with a 
finger, it is the finger of God, both the indicator and the extension of divinity.  As I have 
detailed above, Edwards had complex and carefully considered reasons for differentiating 
between scriptural and contemporary miracle, but the problem with comparing grace to 
miracle still applies.  Miracle is too charged with physical, sensory potential to function as 
an innocuous metaphorical vehicle. 
All this is to say that the physical sensibility of miracle operates in some tension 
with much of Edwards’ project in the Religious Affections.  The debased, even pathological 
nature of corporeally produced impressions is a recurrent theme:  “Abundant experience 
does certainly show, that alterations in the body will excite imaginary or external ideas in 
the mind; as often, in case of high fever, melancholy, etc.  These external ideas are as 
much below the more intellectual exercises of the soul, as the body is a less noble part of 
man than the soul” (RA, 216). What is needed is not these “animal senses” but “a new 
spiritual and divine sense.”  This persistent attachment to literal perception is such a 
problem that it drives Edwards to iconoclasm, comparing vivid imaginations of Christ to 
“the idea that the papists conceive of Christ, by the beautiful and affecting images of him 
which they see in their churches” (RA, 214).  Such carnal imagery, and the emotional 
world it conjures, is ultimately and fatally linked to lying miracles, to those images which 
“through the craft of the priests, are made to move, and speak, and weep” (RA, 215).84  
Thus gaudy supposed miracle and over-literal interpretation are linked as two species of 
the same problem–Edwards rejects experiential literalism as blind stupidity.   
At the same time, he has not quite managed to escape the earlier bind, the 
insistence that the experience of justification can be sensible–he won’t argue for spiritual 
invisibility any more than he will for carnal vision.  His evolution of a spiritual sensorium 
is a solution to this problem to a certain extent but, I would argue, not one that can satisfy 
completely.  Miracle remains a vexed definitional problem, given the inevitable blending 
of the physical and the imaginative in his figural approach.  Edwards imputes the 
negative consequences of the practice of analogy to the interpretive failure of others, but 
he will not discard it entirely. 
Indeed, he persists in insinuating the existence of some miraculous essence in the 
work of grace, proceeding as before by means of an imbricated metaphorical vocabulary.  
In a later passage in The Religious Affections, he argues against immediate revelation via 
impression on the mind–God does not whisper in the believer’s ear.  The testimony of 
grace is “not only a mere declaring and asserting a thing to be true, but holding forth 
evidence from whence a thing may be argued and proven to be true” (RA, 231).  The only 
                                                
84 He recurs to this example later; his central references to contemporary miracle are used in 
service of an anti-Catholic polemic:  “the lying miracles of the Papists, may for the present, beget 
in the minds of the ignorant deluded people, a strong persuasion of the truth of many things 
declared in the New Testament” (RA, 309).  
 92 
fit comparison he can summon is to the evidence of miracle.  In the New Testament, 
“God is said to bear witness with signs and wonders, and diverse miracles, and gifts of the 
Holy Ghost.”  These miracles are not “of the nature of assertions, but evidences and 
proofs” (RA, 232).  The influence of grace is finally more directly observable and 
persuasive than any mere impression on the mind. It is to be compared to nothing less 
than the miracles of Christ.  Here Edwards, as befits his moderate evangelical stance, can 
argue for the miraculous evidentiary power of grace while holding firm against the 
Woolstonian excesses of all-consuming figuralism.  Yet still such figures proliferate.  
Pressing on to describe the exact nature of God’s “evidences and proofs of grace,” his 
primary resource is metaphor: “When God sets his seal on a man’s heart by his Spirit, 
there is some holy stamp, some image impressed and left upon his heart by the Spirit, as a 
seal upon the wax” (RA, 232).  The distinction is not between the false process of internal 
impression and some truer action, but in subtle Edwardsian fashion, between two versions 
of the process of printing, two forms of sensible, potentially divine internal action–a 
physical impression on the heart rather than on the mind.  Instead of conducting us, as 
we might expect, from deceptive spectacle to abstraction, he loops back to a literalizing 
analogy, to the imaginary physicality of the royal seal. Edwards allows the spiritual 
implications of the Lockean impression to expand in metaphorical space, supplanting the 
forbidden impression with a sanctified alternative, another kind of certain evidence. 
Miracle, then, sets up a particular tension between sign and sense is that is, for 
Edwards, a constitutional problem, a condition of mortality.  In an earlier work on similar 
themes, he focused on the necessity, inevitability and even the pleasure of imaginative 
work in spiritual matters:  “Such is our nature that we can’t think of things invisible, 
without a degree of imagination.”85  Even those endowed with “the greatest powers of 
mind” are incapable of a non-imaginary contemplation of the divine.  Thus we all recur 
to those minor human hierarchies, like history, nature and time, sorting indivisible divine 
action into imaginary categories.  These categories, as the wise know, are heuristics, 
divine condescension to our limited faculties.  The trouble with “those of less 
understanding” is narrative incontinence–an inability to parse and interpret their God-
given imaginings and to give a seemly report of them: “they are apt to lay too much 
weight on the imaginary part, and are most ready to speak of that in the account they 
give” (RA, 236).  Indeed, Edwards is willing, in this context, to defend as possibly licit even 
transporting visions of heaven.  He will not, however, allow that they are “of the same 
nature with the visions of the prophets, or St. Paul’s rapture into paradise” (RA, 237).  
Again we find Edwards policing the boundary of miracle, prohibiting a slippage from 
imaginative work into a belief in the spiritual gift of prophecy and physical transport into 
paradise.86  Yet he sympathizes, if only momentarily, with the pleasures of the unfettered 
spiritual imagination.  It is no surprise if “believers should for a season be diverted, and so 
taken off from impressions made on the organs of external sense, and wholly employed in 
a train of pleasing delightful imaginations, such as the frame the mind is then in disposes 
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it to” (RA, 237).  This is a glimpse not just of the raptures of the spirit, but of the 
associated and far-ranging pleasures of figuralism, where the ineffability of the logos strikes 
and sparks against the imagined objects of our physical world.   
It is the very kind of moment that Sharon Cameron illuminates in her essay on 
Edwards’ True Virtue.  Moments like these, as Cameron indicates, are marked by 
intellectual and affective complexity, but also by a particular literary power.  As she puts 
it: “What makes Edwards a great stylist with respect to moments that ventriloquize a 
mistaken position…is the way in which his representations underscore the overlapping of 
enticement and delusion.”87  I would argue that miracle, for Edwards, is always just such 
a source of enticement and delusion.  It is a wellspring of much-desired physical evidence 
for supporting Christian doctrine and articulating individual faith, but also a delicate 
rhetorical puzzle, for the reasons I have outlined above.  It is also, always, for Edwards, 
connected to that which he knows must be true about the divine, that the universe sprang 
from an unimaginable quintessence of arbitrary, miraculous power.  Spirit once made 
matter, ex nihilo, and that power cannot be diminished, though it may be remitted.  To 
reach toward that power with the mind is natural, even necessary, but to believe that we 
can define and delimit it with our categories is delusive.  Cameron particularly 
emphasizes Edwards’ dissatisfaction with our efforts to think of the spiritual in physical 
terms.  We cannot manipulate or describe the appearance of spirit because “[s]piritual 
things have features, but not physical features, have textures, but not the texture of objects, 
have pervasiveness without substance.”88 And yet faith in miracle promises that spirit is 
always offering us its physical manifestations.  It is the literary, the practice of figural 
representation, that offers Edwards his only resource for exploring this tempting and 
confounding problem, even if the work leads, inevitably, back to limitation and error.  
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Abbreviations 
 
I use the following abbreviations in the text for frequently cited works: 
 
AB: Mather, Cotton. The Angel of Bethesda. Edited by Gordon W. Jones. Barre, MA: 
American Antiquarian Society and Barre Publishers, 1972. 
 
RA: Edwards, Jonathan. Religious Affections. Edited by John E. Smith. The Works of Jonathan 
Edwards, vol. 2. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959. 
 
WGW: Whitefield, George. The Works of the Reverend George Whitefield. 7 vols. London: 1771. 
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